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A b s t r a c t
Launched in 1987, the Safe Motherhood Initiative has brought together UN 
agencies, donors, NGOs and academics to galvanise a political, financial and 
public health response to women’s pregnancy-related death and ill health in low- 
income countries. This thesis presents an historical ethnography of the ‘making’ 
of this policy community over the past twenty years, as one of many so-called 
global health initiatives that populate the global health field. Compared with its 
competitors, the Safe Motherhood Initiative is often depicted as weak and in 
need of urgent revival. Drawing on in-depth interviews with over seventy actors 
within the field, participant observation and document review, I explore how 
safe motherhood practitioners have come to understand the problems that are 
credited for the field’s stymied status, and how their ‘diagnoses’ and situational 
analyses have informed their subsequent practices.
My findings demonstrate that the Initiative has continually had to 
reposition itself in response to broader ideological, institutional and 
epistemological struggles. An impulse for self-preservation within a competitive 
global health field favouring disease-specific approaches has been in tension with 
safe motherhood practitioners’ fundamental conviction that comprehensive, 
socially-based policy change is needed to reduce maternal mortality. In order to 
pursue their common policy objectives and to secure their survival as an expert 
group, safe motherhood practitioners have sought to enhance the credibility of 
their policy proposals, establish new institutions and funding mechanisms, 
elaborate advocacy campaigns and pursue more sophisticated research to 
demarcate their practices as scientific, rather than ideologically driven. However, 
the benefits of such ‘self-management’ practices remain to be established. In 
conclusion, I challenge the widespread, if implicit, assumption that the success of 
a single advocacy issue, as measured through the rise of a global health initiative 
and growing political commitment to the specific issue, will necessarily lead to 
health improvement.
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C h a p t e r  1
1. INTRODUCTION
.. .you know, maternal health has had a very sad history, as you 
probably know better than I do, and the Safe Motherhood Initiative 
— that’s what it was called — in ’87 was full of hope and fell flat, flat, 
flat... Now, part of that was context. A lot of global health fell off 
the agenda in the late ‘80s early ‘90s.. .But, as far as I am concerned, 
it was a disaster, that whole effort, despite quite good intentions. The 
question is, can this constituency, this community, get its act 
together and push a little bit more effectively...
So started my interview with a senior policy advisor for the World I Iealth
Organisation (WHO) in 2005, during which we discussed the current position of the
Safe Motherhood Initiative within the global health field. Launched at an
international UN-sponsored conference in Nairobi, Kenya in 1987 (Starrs 1987), the
Safe Motherhood Initiative is a policy community consisting of multilateral and
bilateral agencies, academics, professional organisations for healthcare providers and
a range of international advocacy NGOs. Ever since its formation it has aimed to
galvanise a political, financial and public health response to women’s pregnancy-
related death and ill health, an important public health problem in low- and middle-
income countries.
Today, the Safe Motherhood Initiative co-exists with about one hundred 
other ‘global health initiatives,’ such as Roll Back Malaria, Stop TB and the Child 
Survival Initiative (WHO 2008). While the term is loosely defined, global health 
initiatives are often identified by several common characteristics. This includes their 
focus on specific diseases or on selected interventions, commodities or services and 
their ability to generate substantial funding, including from private sources (World 
Health Organization Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group 2009). 
Global health initiatives often invest directly in low-income countries, including 
through partnerships with NGOs and civil society, and their activities tend to be 
oriented towards the achievement of health and development ‘targets,’ especially 
those associated with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).' This is certainly 
the case with regard to safe motherhood: MDG 5 calls for improved maternal health *
* The MDGs are a list of eight goals that UN member states and leading development agencies strive 
to achieve by 2015 (United Nations 2009).
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and sets the target of a three quarters reduction of the maternal mortality ratio 
(MMR) by 2015, from 1990 levels.2
Global health initiatives constitute an ever more important part of the 
international health landscape. Increasingly they control financial resources (McCoy 
et al. 2009; Ravishankar et al. 2009), set the terms of debate, and occupy important 
positions in global health policy debates (Lee and Goodman 2002). Despite their 
proliferation and apparent success, some authors have described such initiatives as 
characteristic of a deeply fragmented and indeed “over-populated” global health 
architecture (McCoy 2009). Within this architecture, a multitude of diverse players 
exist in parallel and overlapping coalitions, alliances and partnerships and work 
towards different, often disease-oriented goals, largely in competition with one 
another (Buse and Walt 2000*?; Walt 2005). This notwithstanding, a small number of 
global health initiatives dominates the international health scene. Examples of these 
more powerful initiatives include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (often referred to simply as the Global Fund); the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI); the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (Pepfar); and the World Bank Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP) (Lancet 
2009*?). The Global Fund and others like it have been revered for their contribution 
to global health (Lancet 2005), and have received a good deal of academic attention. 
Much less attention, however, has been paid to the plight of those initiatives that 
struggle to make their way within this increasingly competitive global health field 
(Walt 2005; Behague and Storeng 2008).
The Safe Motherhood Initiative comprises one such arena of struggle. 
Though maternal health has an MDG of its own, the initiative itself is most certainly 
not among the more powerful group of global health players. Indeed, it is frequently 
depicted as weak and struggling for influence, success and funding (AbouZahr 2003; 
Starrs 2006). It has been estimated, for example, that donor spending on activities 
related to maternal, newborn and child health combined represented just 2% of gross 
aid disbursements to developing countries in 2004 (Powell-Jackson et al. 2006), and 
this at a time when other major, new disease-targeted global health initiatives have
2 The MMR is the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, and is a measure of the risk 
associated with each pregnancy (obstetric risk). The WHO defines a maternal death as the “death of a 
woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and 
site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management but 
not from accidental or incidental causes” (WHO 2004).
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been seen as playing a major role in bringing about a four-fold increase in 
development assistance to the health sector between 1999 and 2005 (OECD 2008; 
Ravishankar et al. 2009). The Global Fund in particular was in 2008 described as the 
single most important agency for health assistance in terms of the number of country 
partners and the diversity of recipients (it having agreed US$ 11 billion in grants with 
136 countries within its first decade) (Banati and Moatti 2008).
While the Global Fund claims to have saved 4,000,000 lives,3 the relatively 
limited improvement in maternal health statistics since the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative was launched has often been seen as a sign of the Initiative’s failure. The 
latest global estimates suggest that maternal mortality accounts for approximately 
536,000 deaths of women each year, for example: a figure that has remained 
remarkably constant since the first global estimates were published in 1986 
(WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA/World Bank 2007).4 While it may be true that a handful 
of countries in Asia and Latin America have succeeded in reducing their maternal 
mortality ratios, the maternal health situation in Sub-Saharan Africa is worse than it 
was twenty years ago and remains dismal in South Asia (Hill et al. 2007). The 
statistics are especially tragic given that most maternal deaths could have been 
prevented had women had access to medical interventions to treat the obstetric 
complications that are the main direct cause of maternal mortality (Rosenfield 1989).5
According to safe motherhood leaders, one of the principal reasons for such 
disappointing statistics has been the Initiative’s inability to issue clear, evidence-based 
recommendations to countries on how to best organise their health systems to ensure 
access to life-saving care to those who need it (Starrs 2006). This perception, in turn, 
has prompted considerable self-criticism of the Initiative’s ability to advocate for 
dedicated policy attention, to attract financial resources and to ensure that safe
3 http://www.theglohalfund.org/en/. accessed 10.11.09.
* Measuring maternal mortality accurately is difficult except where comprehensive registration of 
deaths (with causes) exists. As a result, estimates in low-income countries are usually derived from a 
combination of surveys and mathematical models. Given the variety of methods used and the large 
uncertainty bounds around estimates discerning trends in maternal mortality is particularly complex 
(Ronsmans and Graham 2006).
5 Complications including haemorrhage, infection (sepsis), hypertensive disorders during pregnancy, 
anaemia, obstructive labour and complications from unsafe abortion account for around 80% of 
maternal deaths globally, with the remaining 20% resulting from indirect causes (pregnancy-related 
death in a patient with a pre-existing or newly developed health problem) (WHO 2004; 
WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA 2004). The distribution of causes of maternal mortality varies by region. 
While haemorrhage is the leading cause of maternal mortality in Africa and Asia, hypertensive 
disorders (including eclampsia) have been identified as the top single cause in South America. By 
contrast, in developed countries, the most important cause of maternal death is ‘other direct causes’ 
such as complications during interventions like caesarean section and anaesthesia (Khan et al. 2006).
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motherhood remains high on the list of priorities on the broader global health agenda 
(Rosenfield 1997; AbouZahr 2001; Campbell 2001; Miller et al. 2003; Starrs 2006). 
Scholarly interest in the amount of international attention and funding directed at 
different global health initiatives has tended to reinforce such self-criticisms. In one 
such analysis of the Safe Motherhood Initiative, the political scientists Shiffman and 
Smith (2007:1377) argue that the Initiative has failed in its efforts to achieve political 
priority and that it “remains in a state of infancy even after 20 years,” in large part 
because of institutional weaknesses and problems in the way the issue has been 
publicly framed. They therefore recommend that safe motherhood advocates should 
build better institutions and identify champions who can drive the movement 
forward and take advantage of windows of opportunity for effective advocacy 
(Shiffman and Smith 2007). Key leaders in the field have taken this advice on board, 
as is reflected in the way the twentieth anniversary of the Initiative’s founding was 
marked in 2007. For many of the safe motherhood actors I spoke with in the course 
of my research, this anniversary was judged to be a critical juncture at which the 
movement needed to regroup and find ways to emulate its more successful 
competitors. According to one commentator, it offered an “unprecedented chance to 
redress errors of the past and take advantage of new opportunities” (Starrs 
2006:1130). As the WHO representative I cited at the beginning of this chapter 
claimed, as the Initiative approached its twentieth anniversary the time had clearly 
come for this coalition of actors to, “get its act together and push a little bit more 
effectively.”
Such recommendations speak to some of the principal concerns within the 
field, but tend to inappropriately reduce the relative ‘neglect’ of maternal mortality to 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s technical failure as a global health initiative. By 
focusing heavily on raising funds and political will to address safe motherhood, such 
recommendations may not adequately address the broader challenges of improving 
maternal health, including challenges relating to weak and poorly-functioning health 
systems in low-income countries, or the potential implications of intensified 
competition between global health initiatives for efforts to improve health. In just the 
last few years, at the same time that safe motherhood experts have been pushing to 
attain the status of a strong global health initiative, there has been growing concern 
that the ‘effectiveness’ of health sector aid is in fact hampered by the competition, 
duplication and lack of coherence that topic-specific global initiatives generate
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(Lancet 2009d). There are also worries that global health initiatives encourage disease- 
specific donor-funded Vertical’ programmes that weaken health systems by 
detracting financial and human resources from government services (Pfeiffer 2004).6 
Nevertheless, it is often in the self-interest of global health initiatives, who are 
themselves dependent on donor financing, to focus on short-term performance and 
to see health in terms of crisis and humanitarian immediacy, rather than to pursue 
comprehensive change and focus on the long-term sustainability of interventions.
Key players in the maternal health field are aware of the broader context that shapes 
the tension between disease-specific advocacy and the need for comprehensive 
change to health systems (Freedman et al. 2005). Indeed, this tension, together with 
the various activities that have been mobilised by maternal health experts in 
responding to it, became the central entry point for my own research.
Making sense of this tension entailed exploring first, how the actors involved 
in the struggle for survival and recognition have come to understand the problems 
that are credited for the field’s stymied status, and second, how their own ‘diagnoses’ 
and situational analyses informed their subsequent practices. I thus set out in this 
thesis to conduct an historical ethnography of the ‘making’ of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative, combining ethnographic and historical approaches to uncover the 
complexity of this initiative’s development over the past two decades.
Three specific objectives have oriented my fieldwork and analysis. The first 
of these was to analyse how the enduring tension between ‘comprehensive’ and 
‘selective’ or disease-specific approaches to public health has impacted on safe 
motherhood policy debates since the Initiative’s launch in 1987. This involves 
situating the emergence of the Safe Motherhood Initiative and the particular shifts in 
its international policy proposals within the rapidly changing context of international 
or global health. My second objective was to examine how research and advocacy 
practices have responded to, and are in part constrained by, these developments, 
including by dominant ideas about what constitutes evidence. Underlying these two 
objectives is a key theoretical concern with identifying and examining a series of ‘self­
management’ techniques developed by safe motherhood leaders. By self-management
6 According to the WHO (2008), a health system comprises “all organisations, institutions and 
resources devoted to producing actions whose primary intent is to improve health. Most national 
health systems include public, private, traditional and informal sectors. The'four essential functions of 
a health system have been defined as service provision, resource generation, financing and 
stewardship.”
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I mean the range of practices and strategies that actors within the Initiative engage in 
to pursue their common policy objectives and to secure the survival of safe 
motherhood as an expert group. The third objective was to then critically evaluate 
the extent to which the ‘self-management’ practices that have been adopted are likely 
to ensure the survival of safe motherhood as a policy community and to translate 
into effective strategies for the survival of women throughout pregnancy and 
childbirth.
This thesis draws upon, and brings together, literature from anthropology 
and policy studies, as I set out below. It builds on earlier ethnographic research 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) on the role of the 
evidence-based medicine movement in shaping intemadonal maternal health policy, a 
project of which Dominique Behague and I were co-principal investigators (see 
Behague and Storeng 2007 and Chapter 2 for details).71 use a multi-method 
approach, which includes the review of documents (including scientific literature, 
policy documents and grey literature), in-depth interviews with actors from the main 
organisations involved in international-level work on safe motherhood (such as 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, academic institutions and NGOs), and participant 
observation in international meetings, conferences and within the academic domain.
1.1. Safe motherhood as a global assemblage
Today, global health initiatives are so pervasive that it is easy to forget that they 
constitute a relatively recent development that has emerged as a result of great 
changes within international public health. The establishment of networks such as 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative is emblematic, in fact, of a broader shift from 
‘international’ to ‘global’ health (Brown et al. 2006). Whereas international 
collaboration in health in the late 19th and early 20th centuries accompanied the 
growth of the modem bureaucratic state and its need to protect its territorial interests 
against threats such as infectious disease (Weindling 1995), the term ‘global health’ 
reflects the linkages and transnational flows of people, ideas, commodities and
7 This project was initiated in 2004 and completed in April 2007 and aimed to examine how 
researchers and policy-makers in the international maternal health field engage with the ideas and 
values of ‘evidence-based policy-making,’ the extension of the basic tenets of evidence-based medicine 
(the explicit attempt to use science to guide and evaluate clinical practice) into public health policy.
The specific objectives of this research explored first, the circulation of evidence between policy­
makers and researchers; second, actors’ views on the use of different kinds of evidence; third, 
epistemological constraints on evidence-based policy-making and, finally, how research could more 
effectively guide policy-making and programme development (Behague and Storeng 2007).
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ideologies that characterise health in today’s interconnected world (Nichter 2008; 
Janes and Corbett 2009). Global health is intimately connected to issues of national 
security, economic development, globalisation, human rights and global governance 
(Fidler 2004). In this context, the Safe Motherhood Initiative must be seen to be in a 
process of emergence. Its development has unfolded in the midst of institutional 
struggles in the international health field and in response to competing framings of 
the idea of health itself. While these elements recur throughout the thesis, it is useful 
to briefly outline the main institutional struggles and ideological and intellectual 
developments against which the Safe Motherhood Initiative has developed.
Since the mid-1980s, international governance for health has shifted from 
being dominated by inter-govemmental collaboration within international health 
organisations, to a complex structure of multiple organisational types and public 
private partnerships, such as the global health initiatives described above (Fidler 
2007; Gostin and Mok 2009). Following its formation as the UN’s specialised agency 
for health after the end of the Second World War, the WHO was a representative 
body for its member states and the undisputed leader of international health 
collaboration (Fee et al. 2008). However, the Safe Motherhood Initiative was in fact 
formed in the midst of a contest for dominance over the governance of international 
health, in which the WHO saw its authority threatened and gradually subsumed. This 
was due in part to the WHO’s own economic and institutional problems, which 
enabled better-resourced actors, notably the World Bank, to assume a leading 
position in international health work (Ruger 2005; Brown et al. 2006). The rise of the 
World Bank as a global health actor in turn reflected a broader shift with the rise of 
neoliberalism as a dominant political ideology within international development 
assistance.8 Ever since the early 1980s, the WHO has had to constantly reposition 
itself within a shifting set of power alliances resulting from the growing involvement 
not only of the World Bank, but also of the private sector, including philanthropists 
such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (hereafter the Gates Foundation), and a 
growing number of civil society or non-governmental organisations (Brown et al. 
2006). Over the past decade global health initiatives have become a ubiquitous 
feature of this landscape, and while they often incorporate the WHO and other UN 
agencies, they are autonomous from them and are, in fact, largely governed by 
donors’ interests and priorities (ibid.).
8 ‘Neoliberalism’ denotes a form of liberalism favouring free markets (see Chapter 3).
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The emergence of such an ‘architecture’ of competing interests has had 
important implications for international governance for maternal health too.
Although the WHO has a constitutional mandate to protect maternal health, the 
weakening of its position by the mid-1980s meant that the remit for ‘safe 
motherhood’ was divided between the WHO and other UN specialised agencies, 
including the World Bank, and several NGOs who together comprised a Safe 
Motherhood Inter-Agency Group (LAG) (see Chapter 3). With time, this group has 
become increasingly influenced by donors and NGOs and now competes with many 
other disease-specific initiatives.
The institutional struggles that have characterised global health over the past 
two decades are underpinned by a deeper and more entrenched ideological tension 
between polarised framings of public health. At one end of this polarity is the view of 
health as a basic human right that should be available to all and collectively provided, 
while at the other end lies a view of health services as a product that should be 
provided and determined by the market place (Lee and Goodman 2002). While the 
WHO has often been associated with the former of these framings, the World Bank 
and many of today’s dominant global health initiatives have been associated with the 
latter (Cueto 2004).
Over the past three decades, these often polarised conceptions of public 
health have given rise to different policy approaches to health improvement and 
reforms of the health sector (discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4) (Standing 
2002; Mills 2005). Those pursuing ‘health for all’ as a social good have often favoured 
‘comprehensive’ approaches incorporating attention to social, economic and 
biomedical determinants of health through ‘horizontal’ programmes, seeing health 
improvement as inseparable from social and economic development. By contrast, 
others have favoured ‘selective’ or disease-specific approaches delivered through 
‘vertical’ programmes, often with a more narrow focus on achieving measurable 
impact on health targets (Mills 2005; Brown et al. 2006; McPake 2008). Such vertical 
programmes have been encouraged in recent years by the disease-specific and target- 
oriented nature of the MDGs and other international health campaigns. The debate 
about the merits and challenges of these different approaches was formative in the 
creation of the Safe Motherhood Initiative and has, as this thesis will show, 
permeated policy debates and strategic developments within the field ever since.
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Such ideological positions have, in turn, become institutionalised within 
different epistemological traditions and analytical approaches too. Notably, as 
neoliberal ideas have gained influence within the international health field, they have 
become reflected in the creation of normative criteria for evidence and priority­
setting and resultant analytical tools, such as burden of disease and cost-effectiveness 
analysis. These tools are then applied in global health policy to ‘translate’ neoliberal 
values into decisions about the allocation of limited resources (Lee and Goodman 
2002:109). The reliance on such tools is itself an expression of the more general shift 
towards ‘audit cultures’ within the context of Western, neoliberal societies (Lambert 
2006). Anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (2000) coined the term ‘audit culture’ to 
describe a cultural shift characterised by a bias towards quick, visible productivity, 
driven by the perceived need for transparency and accountability that increases as 
trust in the authority of public sector institutions wanes. Audit culture, although 
characterised by Strathem as a quintessentially British phenomenon, has been 
transposed to international development work and global health policy. Mosse and 
Lewis (2005), for instance, show how various aspects of audit culture, such as the 
demand for ‘accountability’ in terms of performance indicators like the ones 
associated with the MDGs, have permeated the heart of international development 
and the management of aid. Under the guise o f ‘evidence-based’ practice and the 
need for ‘transparency’, such demands for accountability have replaced the more 
explicit and now largely discredited forms of donor conditionalities associated with 
neoliberal structural adjustment policies of the 1990s {ibid).
The rise of the evidence-based movement in medicine and its subsequent 
expansion to public health and, eventually, to health policy and almost all areas of 
social policy, can also be seen as a manifestation of this broader cultural shift 
(Dobrow et al. 2004; Lambert et al. 2006). Evidence-based medicine, developed 
primarily in the UK and the US, is an explicit attempt to use scientific knowledge, or 
“clinical evidence [derived] from systematic research,” to guide and evaluate clinical 
practice (Sackett et al. 1996:73). Evidence-based policy-making, the expansion of this 
paradigm from clinical practice into decision-making about policy, is said to enable 
policy-makers to move away from a form of health politics based on popular support 
or ideology, to a more legitimate approach based on scientific fact (Klein 2000). In 
the global health field, increasingly stringent demands for evidence to justify donor 
investment and government action on health can be seen as the result of an emerging
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tendency to express the values of public health through technical, evidence-based 
goals (Walt 2008). An ethnography of the Safe Motherhood Initiative offers an 
interesting vantage point onto the impact of such changing epistemological 
frameworks on the competition for global health resources. The rise of the evidence- 
based medicine paradigm, for example, has been associated with acute anxieties, with 
key actors claiming that problems relating to measurement and the inability to prove 
the impact of proposed programmes have contributed to the neglect of maternal 
health relative to other global health issues (Behague and Storeng 2008).
As set against this institutional, ideological and epistemological context, the 
Safe Motherhood initiative is perhaps best thought of as an example of what Ong 
and Collier (2005:13) have called “global assemblages.” Ong and Collier use the term 
to refer to the emergence of new social, political and epistemic configurations 
associated with the structural transformations and reconfigurations of society that 
accompany globalisation. The ‘making’ of the Safe Motherhood Initiative cannot be 
understood, therefore, in isolation from its institutional, political and intellectual 
context.
1.2. Gaps in the social science literature on global health
The rapid changes to the international health field briefly outlined above have in 
recent years captured the interest of scholars, including medical anthropologists, 
health policy analysts and historians of public health. However, as I outline below, 
literature in this area is in its infancy and important gaps remain in this literature on 
the role of global health initiatives in the broader health policy process. The actual 
process of policy development and, crucially, the perspectives of the actors who 
make up such initiatives, for instance, have received little attention. In the 
subsections below, I provide a brief overview of how the subfields of health policy 
analysis and medical anthropology have examined global health and public health 
policy, before discussing how these approaches have informed my own analytical 
approach and effort to address gaps in the existing social science literature on global 
health.
1.2.1. Health policy analysis
Health policy analysis is an applied multi-disciplinary, social science approach to 
public policy with the remit of explaining the interaction between institutions, 
interests and ideas in the policy process (Walt et al. 2004). The policy process can be
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understood as the way in which problems, or health issues, come to be defined as 
‘political’ problems, the remedies that are devised for dealing with them, the 
implementation of those solutions, the evaluation of the impact that the solutions 
have, and the way in which that evaluation itself feeds back into the process of policy 
formulation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993:xi). For the past 15 years, new 
approaches have been developed to deal specifically with health policy analysis in, 
and as it pertains to, low- and middle-income countries.9
Until the mid-1990s, much policy analysis applied rationalist or instrumental 
models to understand the policy process, often considering the policy process in 
terms of incremental, discrete stages, and mostly focusing on the role of 
governments in devising policy (Buse et al. 2005). Scholars interested in international 
health policy found such models, developed for studying policy in the US and 
advanced democratic systems, inadequate for examining the policy environments of 
low- and middle-income countries, which tend to have weaker regulations, regulatory 
capacity and monitoring systems (Walt and Gilson 1994). Instead, they identified a 
need for attention to global decisions as well as domestic actions. As Walt and her 
co-authors (2008:309) argue, this is because these countries often lack purchasing 
power as leverage to influence types and quality of services delivery and are often 
dependent on external donor funds in setting the policy agenda. Health policy 
analysts subsequently advanced analytical models that tried to take into account the 
complex interplay between the actors devising policy and the context in which policy 
is formulated, and the power relationships that come to bear on this process (Walt 
1994; Gilson and Raphaely 2008). This was a clear departure from previous 
approaches that focused largely on content and design of policy.
The notion o f ‘policy transfer’ has been of major intellectual interest to 
scholars of international health policy, and is clearly of relevance to any study 
examining the work of global health networks such as the Safe Motherhood Initiative 
(Lush et al. 2003; Ogden et al. 2003; Walt et al. 2004). Policy transfer has been 
defined as “the occurrence of, and processes involved in, the development of 
programmes, policies, institutions etc. within one political and/or social system 
which are based upon the ideas, institutions, programmes arid policies emanating 
from other political and/or social systems” (Dolowitz and March 1996:3). When 
applied to the transfer of policies from international to the national or even sub-
9 For the first ever review of health policy analysis in low and middle income countries see Gilson and 
Raphaely (2008).
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national level, studies of policy transfer draw particular attention to the distinction 
between voluntary and coercive policy transfer. Where policy is transferred 
voluntarily, policy-makers learn about experiences elsewhere and choose to adapt 
them to their own contexts (Culpeper 1997; Killick 1998). By contrast, coercive 
policy transfer implies that policies are imposed, often by international organisations 
or donors who may influence policy choices at the national level by, for instance, 
tying financial or technical assistance to policy conditions (Hiscock 1995; Okuonzi 
and Macrae 1995; Sundewall et al. 2009). Authors have examined the effects of policy 
transfer on the operational implementation of policies and programmes at the district 
or health facility levels in specific countries, often showing how transfer that lacks 
local ‘ownership’ or that fails to take local context adequately into account can fail in 
implementation (Stone 1999; Gilson and Raphaely 2008).
Policy analysts have paid less attention, however, to what Walt and colleagues 
(2004:191) term “the bread-and-butter” work of international organisations and 
actors and how they devise, adopt, adapt and then promote global policies. This 
includes not only the role of intergovernmental agencies such as the WIIO, but also 
that of various policy-advisors, scientists and advocacy specialists operating at the 
international level (Gilson and Raphaely 2008). Existing studies suggest that the role 
of international organisations and certain NGOs is particularly important in ‘agenda­
setting’ and in formulating, adapting and promoting global guidelines, while 
international-level researchers play distinct roles in informing, evaluating and 
legitimating international policy (Stone 2002; Lush et al. 2003; Ogden et al. 2003; 
Doyle and Patel 2008). Yet, an identified gap remains in the literature, which I hope 
to help address, on how policy initiatives emerge and develop, and what part 
international organisations play in promoting such initiatives, internationally and 
nationally, as policies assumed to represent global “best practice” (Walt et al. 
2004:191).
Those interested in the important question of how international policy 
agendas are established have paid particular attention to how advocates of different 
health issues manage to exploit “windows of opportunity,’ as mentioned above. Such 
analyses often draw on Kingdon’s (1984) ‘multiple streams’ theory of agenda-setting, 
which conceives of the policy process as having a random character, with problems, 
policies and politics flowing along independent streams, which merge at particular 
junctures, creating windows of opportunity in which governments decide to act. For
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instance, some have adapted Kingdon’s framework to study health policy issues, 
including relating to safe motherhood (Reich 1995; Shiffman and Smith 2007).
Others have emphasised the role of agenda-setting, focusing events and dedicated 
advocacy in these processes (Reich 1995; Birkland 1998). But a possible critique of 
such studies is that while it is often possible to identify the window of opportunity 
that gives global health initiatives the legitimacy to promote specific policies, doing so 
does not tell us why specific policies are selected and pushed as global best practice 
(Walt et al. 2004).
Frustration with applying formal policy frameworks and theories to complex 
policy processes has led many policy analysts to abandon strict adherence to a 
specific theoretical model and recognise the need for more open-ended forms of 
analysis, ones that can take account of the “characteristic complexity and messiness 
of [policy-making] processes” (Czamiawska-Joerges 1992:16). Health policy analysts 
have recently come to acknowledge that their approach should become more 
deliberative, less top-down, more sensitive to expanded networks, and more 
interpretive (Walt et al. 2008). In order to capture the social dynamics of policy, 
analysis must take into account “people’s stories, their understandings, their values 
and beliefs as expressed through language and behaviour,” argue Ilajcr and Wagenaar 
(2003:8; cited in Walt et al. 2008). In effect, such comments suggest a growing 
appreciation within policy studies of the potential benefits of a more anthropological 
approach.
1.2.2. Anthropology o f  global health
Within anthropology, and specifically medical anthropology, global health has also 
been identified as a separate sub-area of research. The approaches taken to studying 
it have been somewhat different from those of health policy analysts. A recent review 
of the literature in this area identifies interrogation, analysis, and critique of 
international health programmes and policies as one of four principal contributions 
that anthropology has made to advance understanding of global health (Janes and 
Corbett 2009). Other important anthropological contributions include, first, 
ethnographic studies of health inequities in political and economic contexts; second, 
analyses of the impact on local worlds of the assemblages of science and technology 
that circulate globally; and, finally, analyses of the health consequences of the 
reconfiguration of the social relations of international health development (ibid.).
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According to Janes and Corbett (2009), anthropological critiques of health 
policy should emphasise the formation, dissemination, and local consequences of 
expert knowledge forms (see also Whiteford and Manderson 2000; Castro and Singer 
2004). This implies a focus both on the processes of policy making -  i.e. examining the 
ideological and political-economic relations that influence decision-makers and the 
policy-making process — and on the consequences of policy making — their impact on 
their intended beneficiaries. However, mirroring the gap identified above in the 
health policy literature, to date, very few anthropologists have explored in detail how 
“the substances of international health policy-making — knowledge, ideology, politics 
of representation, competing vested interests, processes of persuasion and advocacy, 
etc. — come to constitute it” (Janes and Corbett 2009:174). Anthropological interest 
in health policies has instead been directed primarily towards interrogation, analysis 
and critique of the consequences of such policy at the local level.
This is not to deny the importance of existing work in this area. Justice’s 
(1986; 1987) work on the gap between policy-making and international health 
programme implementation in Nepal, for instance, is a good example of early 
ethnographic analysis of the problems that often arise as a result of differences in 
culture and interpretation between international and national bureaucratic settings 
and those of the local villages receiving services. Anthropologists have thus shared 
policy analysts’ interest in the transfer of policies, but have been distinct in the 
localised nature of their analyses. This has particularly been the case in ethnographic 
studies of reproduction and childbirth. From the late 1980s onwards, the gradual 
médicalisation of childbirth and the wholesale export of a ‘technobirth’ model from 
the US to other countries reignited interest in the earlier comparative study of 
childbirth practices. Such studies brought specific attention to a frequent discrepancy 
between the biomedical ideas driving health planning and local knowledge and 
preferred practices in relation to childbirth, some incorporating critiques of 
internationally-sponsored safe motherhood programmes (e.g. Jordan 1983; Jeffery et 
al. 1988; Inhom 1994; Davis-Floyd and Sargent 1996; Allen 2002; Hampshire 2003; 
Jenkins and Inhorn 2003). Moreover, Ginsburg and Rapp (1995) were particularly 
influential in bringing together a feminist critique of the control of reproduction 
through population policy, global planning and international development initiatives. 
They argued that reproduction can be seen at once as a critical site of the local/global 
interface, and as a site of social stratification.
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In a similar vein, others have shown how structural violence -  defined as a 
set of large-scale social forces, such as racism, sexism, polidcal violence, poverty and 
other social inequalities rooted in historical and economic processes (see Farmer 
1999) -  become inscribed in public health problems such as high levels of maternal 
mortality, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (Scheper-Hughes 1993; Farmer 1999; Janes 
and Chuluundorj 2004; Pfeiffer 2004; Fassin 2007). Fassin (1992; 2001) in particular 
has drawn critical attention to the tendency of both social scientists and public health 
specialists to blame people for their health problems, or assign unhealthy behaviour 
to cultural factors rather than examine structural impediments to health.
‘Critical’ anthropological analyses of global health policy and programmes 
(e.g. Morsy 1995; Singer and Castro 2004) have often taken their cue from critical 
ethnographic studies of development practice more broadly, dating from the late 
1980s and 1990s (see e.g. Escobar 1994; Ferguson 1994; Scott 1998). Such critical 
analyses of development have tended to see policy as a rationalising technical 
discourse concealing hidden purposes of bureaucratic power and dominance. As 
Mosse (1995) explains, critical anthropologists have often treated the failure of 
development efforts as self-evident, seeing these as interventions isolated from the 
history and social and political realities of the countries in which policy was 
implemented. Whereas earlier ethnographic work on development policy took an 
‘instrumental’ perspective focusing on stated goals and planning (similarly to early 
health policy analysis as discussed above), critical ethnographic approaches have 
focused on undisclosed ends or effects. In particular they have drawn attention to the 
way in which development policy’s models mimic those of colonial rule by expanding 
bureaucratic power and reproducing hierarchies of knowledge — but doing so in ways 
that conceal subjugation (Mosse 1995; Mosse and Lewis 2005). Similarly, critical 
anthropologists interested in global health policy have conceived of health policy as a 
process that unfolds in “a world of competitive social interests, opposed class 
agendas, unequal genders, and overt and covert power conflicts” (Castro and Singer 
2004:xiii). The anthropologist’s task is thus, according to Castro and Singer, one of 
uncovering how health policy may in fact reproduce ‘structural violence’ {ibid)
While such critical perspectives are invaluable in drawing attention to 
structural impediments to health, a resultant problem is that on some levels they also 
‘black-box’ the policy process itself, for instance by seeing the transfer of policy from 
international to local level as inherently insidious. Significantly, in Unhealthy Health
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Policy, Castro and Singer state that their specific anthropological contribution is “to 
critically review the intended or unintended negative impact of policy on the lives and 
well-being of people targeted by social policies” (Castro and Singer 2004:xiii, 
emphasis added). On one level, such accounts deny the agency of the beneficiaries of 
policies, casting them as mere passive subjects. This is a critique that has been 
persuasively made by those arguing for a ‘critical-interpretive’ medical anthropology 
that seeks to incorporate the perspectives, pragmatism and resilience of sufferers into 
the critical analysis of structural determinants of health (Lock and Scheper-I Iughes 
1996; Lock and Kaufert 1998). But analyses carried out in the critical tradition can 
also be seen to disregard the agency of those directly involved in the policy process, 
including policy advisors and donors, either by ignoring these actors’ practices and 
intentions altogether or by treating their behaviour as inherently self-interested.
In anthropological analyses of global health policy, those formulating and 
promoting policy are often represented as if  driven by a universalising set of 
assumptions, devoid of appreciation for the complexities and local implications of 
the advice they brandish. Nichter (2008:2), for example, draws attention to “key 
social representations” or “master narratives” perpetuated by global health actors 
that dominate health and development discourse and that tend to simplify and frame 
problems in a limited way. Hardon (2005), also critical of policy-makers, asserts that 
their work often entails a focus on “magic bullets” and oversimplified prescriptions 
that deny the complexity of local realities. While anthropologists may be right that 
global-level policy-makers simplify complex local realities through master narratives, 
they rarely pay corresponding attention to how such master narratives arise and what 
social and political struggles go into their making. The fact that policy-makers may 
not only create and disseminate, but also resist and modify such narratives is rarely 
the subject of analysis. Conversely, by contrast to their interest in documenting how 
individuals are constrained by poorly conceived health policy, anthropologists have 
paid little attention to the broader structural, political and ideological constraints 
operating on those formulating policy. As Fairhead and Leach (2003) note, there has 
been a tendency in critical anthropological analyses of science and policy towards 
“monolithic” structural analysis that obscures the diverse views, actions, interactions 
and everyday dilemmas experienced by scientists and policy-makers.
Ideally, an ethnographic study of safe motherhood -  and indeed any other 
area of global health policy — should span the dynamic interactions between the
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different levels at which policy ideas are conceived, formulated, promoted and 
implemented. However, there is also a clear need for in-depth study to try to 
understand how^/o/W-level policy initiatives form, the role that international actors 
play in this process and the way in which such actors themselves interpret the 
broader global health context of which they are part, as well as their own position 
within it. Although international-level actors do not always dictate the design of 
health services in low-income countries, they do create an overall policy climate 
within which governments develop plans for health, as well as influence the uptake, 
formulation, financing and implementation of policy in low-income countries (Lee et 
al. 2002a). Given the preoccupation across both policy studies and anthropology with 
the mismatch between global prescriptions and local realities, understanding how 
such global prescriptions develop is of utmost importance. It is only with greater in- 
depth understanding of the challenges that global health initiatives face and create 
that an insightful debate about whether and how global campaigns should be 
sustained can move forward.
My decision to conduct an ethnographic study of the transnational policy 
community that makes up the Safe Motherhood Initiative — rather than to examine 
the impact of this Initiative’s global policy recommendations in a specific country or 
locale (as others have done) — responds to the recent call for anthropologists to 
become more sophisticated in ‘studying up’ and to carry out ethnographies of 
multiple stakeholders in health systems, donor communities and emerging global 
health networks (Pfeiffer and Nichter 2008). If, as Pfeiffer and Nichter (2008) assert, 
a central component of anthropology’s mission is to study social organisation and the 
distribution of resources, then studying these within the multi-sited domain of global 
health seems an equally legitimate ethnographic endeavour as studying the more 
bounded communities in which anthropologists have been more accustomed to 
working.
1.3. Analytical approach
In this historically informed, ethnographic study I take the safe motherhood policy 
community and the global health arena within which it is situated as my ‘field site.’ 
This implies a focus on actors that are part of transnational networks that have, 
furthermore, changed over time and suggests an approach that differs from 
conventional ideas about what constitutes ethnography, as I reflect on in Chapter 2.
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Before outlining the contents of the empirical chapters, I want to briefly set out the 
main elements of the analytical perspective I take. This includes, first, a focus on 
actors and networks; second, a focus on practices; and third, an historical perspective 
on the development of expert communities and global health policy.
1.3.1. Actors and networks
A starting point for my analysis is the importance of incorporating people’s own 
understanding of their values, beliefs and histories into the analysis and to take into 
account the social dynamics between different actors. In order to do so, I conceive of 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative as a network of experts in maternal health that is 
relatively small (perhaps a few hundred people globally) but positioned strategically to 
devise and advocate solutions to maternal ill health and mortality (cf. Lee and 
Goodman 2002). This is a network that creates knowledge, formulates policies and 
advocates solutions to donors and governments in low-income countries and those 
charged with implementing policy at the national and sub-national levels. Their 
advocacy also has an internal dimension, as when representatives of UN agencies 
advocate for a greater focus on maternal health within their own organisations. The 
safe motherhood network I examine extends into universities, professional 
organisations for health workers and a growing number of advocacy groups and 
other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating at the international level.
Reflecting an interest in networks, over the past two decades social scientists 
have advanced many different theoretical formulations to capture the rise of what has 
been termed the ‘network society’ (Castells 1996). None of these formulations 
perfectly captures the Safe Motherhood Initiative, but they are nevertheless useful for 
conceptualising its social configuration. Haas’ (1992:1) notion of the ‘epistemic 
community’ is perhaps particularly useful for conceptualising the safe motherhood 
field; Haas describes an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue-area.” Although 
those who form part of such communities may have different backgrounds and 
disciplinary identities, Haas contends that a number of core characteristics bind them 
together. These include a set of normative and principled beliefs; shared notions of 
validity; and a common policy enterprise (ibid). Control over knowledge and its 
diffusion is considered to be an important dimension of the power of such
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communities.10 Other scholars speak of policy communities or ‘advocacy coalitions,’ 
useful for drawing attention to the tensions that can often be masked by the external 
appearance of consensus (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Reinicke 1999). Within 
such coalitions there is often a high level of agreement on policy objectives, despite 
internal contestation about the means to achieve the objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith 1993). The concepts of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (Keck and Sikkink 
1998) and ‘global knowledge networks’ (Stone 2002), though emphasising different 
aspects, help to highlight the international dimension of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative and others like it.
However named, a central message to derive from the many different 
theories of network formation is the importance of understanding which actors 
actually set the terms for debates, how power is distributed between them and how 
networks diversify over time, in other words, their complex — and often dynamic — 
social configuration (Lee and Goodman 2002). Furthermore, it is necessary to be 
attentive to the fact that while organisational relationships between international 
agencies, NGOs and academic institutions clearly influence the development of 
policies, it is often particular individuals who form networks and who move between 
organisations, create links and modify existing networks (Walt et al. 2004).
1.3.2. Practices
Another crucial insight deriving from analyses of social networks is the importance 
of paying attention to the strategies and practices through which networks seek to 
come together as coherent entities. By looking at safe motherhood actors’ practices, 
as well as their self-representations and narratives, it becomes possible to move away 
from rationalist understandings of the policy process as a neat and linear process of 
‘problem identification,’ ‘evidence production’ ‘formulation of solutions,’ 
‘implementation’ and ‘evaluation’ — as the development of safe motherhood policy
10 Social scientists have also expanded on the traditional actor-centred perspective of anthropology to 
include not only human actors, but also the other elements. This notion has been best articulated as 
‘actor-network theory,’ an approach to social theory that originated in the field of science studies, 
most usually associated with the work of Michael Callon and Bruno Latour (Latour 1983; Latour 
2005). Within this theoretical perspective, networks comprise not only human actors, but also the 
non-human elements, ideas and technologies they deal with (Latour 2005). Originally developed to 
describe how scientists operate in laboratory settings, if applied to policy networks this framework can 
help draw attention to the strategies for relating different elements -  including human actors, but also 
theories, ideas and practices -  together into a network so that they form an apparently coherent whole. 
Contrary to the schematic and static notion of networks that has sometimes characterised policy 
analysis, it is a core part of this theory that networks are inherently transient and are therefore 
constantly made and remade.
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has sometimes been depicted in the public health literature (Weil and Fernandez 
1999). By focusing on practices as well as narratives, it becomes possible to show that 
the policy process is fundamentally social, characterised not just by rational 
consensus building but also by dispute, discussion and competition (Buse et al. 2005). 
Policy-making is not simply intended to extend dominance and hegemony, as some 
anthropologists have implied, but can rather, following Mosse (1995; 2004), be 
conceptualised as a process within which actors compete to win legitimacy for 
different policies.
As specified in the description of my research objectives above, part of that 
competitive work involves different forms, and varying degrees, of ‘self­
management,’ by which I mean the range of practices that actors within the Initiative 
engage in to pursue their common policy objectives and to secure their own survival 
as a policy community. I will demonstrate that actors at times work against their own 
inclinations or interests in light of an understanding that such practices will ultimately 
prove helpful for the realisation of policy or professional objectives. Thus, various 
efforts to influence the policy process through research, advocacy and policy-making 
can be seen as part of the more deeply wired agency of the initiative’s policy 
community.
Gieryn’s (1983; 1995) notion o f ‘boundary work’ is useful here for thinking 
about specific types of self-management practices that have taken on greater currency 
in recent years with the rise of the evidence-based movement and the emphasis that 
is placed on normative frameworks for priority-setting and evaluation of global 
health activities. Gieryn (1999:4-5) describes the term ‘boundary work’ as “the 
discursive attribution of selected qualities to science, scientific methods and scientific 
claims for the purpose of drawing a rhetorical boundary between science and some 
less authoritative residual non-science.” Here I am interested in exploring in 
particular the way in which safe motherhood practitioners’ efforts to demarcate their 
scientific credibility and legitimacy has become a crucial part of the competition for 
global health resources.
1.3.3. Historical contingency
A final element of my approach is the historical. By this I refer not simply to 
analysing the history of the Safe Motherhood Initiative as trajectories of events. 
Rather, I seek to understand how and why ideas, scientific understandings and policy
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positions change over time, so as to understand the historical contingency also of 
current ideas.
Over time, categories change and take on new meaning. To capture such 
change, the philosopher Hacking (1990; 2007) writes of the importance of paying 
attention to communities that form around specific issues or interests, but also the 
diverse categories, institutions and histories that these communities come up against 
in practice. Crucially, Hacking draws attention to the way that traditionally accepted 
meanings become redefined as a result of the interaction between these diverse 
elements. His framework implies a ‘genealogical’ approach to history, building 
directly on the work of Foucault (1977). Such an approach involves first discerning 
shifts in ideas, knowledge or policy through an ‘archaeological’ perspective and then 
looking to ethnography to understand how and why these shifts have come about. 
For Foucault, genealogical investigation is neither a quest for origins, nor an attempt 
to restore historical continuity {ibid.) Instead, such investigation is a way to document 
the battle that gave rise to the dominance of one set of values over another. The 
intention is to say something about the causes of the transition of one way of 
thinking to another, rather than provide a grand scheme of progressive history." 
When combined with ethnographic attention to the present, Hacking and Foucault’s 
ideas can help to highlight how concepts, ideas and social configurations that are 
seen as axiomatic — such as ‘evidence’, for instance — have specific social, political 
and economic origins.
Just such processes as Hacking and Foucault describe can be discerned within 
safe motherhood. The insights of such authors help to show that the field did not 
undergo a linear history of scientific achievement. Rather, the shifts in policy, 
research and advocacy positions that I will discuss in this thesis came about as the 
result of a struggle between different visions for public health, as well as different 
epistemological frameworks and professional interests. In order to grasp this, we 
need to pay attention to the way in which disputes, discussion and competition shape 
policy developments and understandings of safe motherhood, at the same time as 
placing safe motherhood within a broader history of global health. An historically- 1
11 A good example of the use of such an approach is provided by Simon Szreter’s (2004) writing on 
historical anthropology in the context of demography. Szreter examines the historical and political 
circumstances in which categories have their provenance and reassesses their uncritical application 
across space and time.
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informed ethnographic perspective on the formation of a contemporary global health 
initiative is well placed to take such an approach forward.
1.4. Outline of the thesis
The analytical approach I have sketched above is reflected in the methodology I have 
used, outlined in Chapter 2. That chapter starts with critical reflection on what it 
means to conduct an ethnography of global health initiatives and policy, before 
describing the specific methods used to collect and analyse the data. I then present 
the findings in two main parts. In Pari I, comprised of Chapters 3-6,1 address my 
first specific objective by examining the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s own particular 
policy vision and the way that vision has been modified and adapted in response to a 
series of external pressures. In Part 11, comprised of Chapters 7 and 8 ,1 address the 
second specific objective by reflecting on the role of normative ideas about evidence 
and the relationship between scientific expertise and authority within global health 
discourse and practice. I do so by examining the practices of academics and advocacy 
specialists in particular -  both sub-groups that play important roles within global 
health initiatives. In the final concluding chapter I address the third objective of this 
thesis, by offering a critical evaluation of whether global health initiatives are 
conducive to improved health systems and health outcomes.
Part I  begins with Chapter 3, in which I delineate the establishment of the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative and analyse its original policy vision in relation to the 
broader debate about comprehensive and selective approaches to health -  debates 
that came to dominate the international health community in the 1980s. I 
demonstrate that despite its targeted objective of improving maternal health and 
survival, the Safe Motherhood Initiative advocated for a comprehensive vision that 
did not simply address the direct causes of maternal deaths, but instead involved a 
combined preventive and therapeutic, social and medical approach as the best means 
of achieving safe motherhood. An overarching aim was to develop health systems’ 
capacity to deliver such integrated care.
In Chapter 4 1 describe and analyse the challenge of realising, or achieving 
uptake of, this comprehensive vision during the first ten years of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative’s operation. I show how during this time safe motherhood 
programmes in many low-income countries became reduced to donor-driven 
‘selective’ or ‘vertical’ programmes, often focusing on the training of traditional birth
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attendants (TBAs). In trying to account for why the Initiative’s original 
comprehensive agenda — and especially its emphasis on health system development — 
was neglected, I juxtapose safe motherhood practitioners’ own explanations with a 
broader historical perspective. By doing so, I argue that although many have faulted 
safe motherhood policy for lacking strategic focus and causing confusion about its 
priorities, the neglect of the Initiative’s comprehensive agenda also related to the fact 
that it was incompatible with the neoliberal approach to development and 
international health that came to dominate international health during this period, as 
well as with the reality of weakened health systems.
In Chapter 5 I argue that the Safe Motherhood Initiative responded to a 
decade of failed implementation and changing political realities, including entrenched 
preference for disease-specific approaches to public health, by reformulated 
international safe motherhood policy recommendations. I analyse the process that 
saw the original social agenda de-emphasised in favour of policy targeted at averting 
deaths from obstetric complications. I argue that the ‘branding’ that went into 
defining a new strategic focus on professional healthcare providers and emergency 
obstetric care as key priorities for achieving safe motherhood was, in fact, an effort to 
redirect international and national policy attention onto much-neglected health 
system development. The ethnographic findings in the chapter also highlight the 
social negotiation and conceptual shifts that were necessary to achieve support within 
the initiative for this ‘rebranded’ policy vision -  one that appealed to, rather than 
challenged, priority-setting frameworks that had become dominant in international 
health in the decade since the Initiative’s launch.
Chapter 6 then turns to examine how the safe motherhood movement 
responded to a further set of challenges stemming from the fact that the global 
health field, by the first decade of the new century, was becoming very fragmented 
and competitive. Specifically, I focus on the efforts to create a Partnership for 
Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH). I argue that this was at once an 
effort to curb extreme competition from new global health initiatives such as the 
Global Fund, and an attempt by international organisations and donors to comply 
with a new discourse within global health and development practice, which specified 
the need for greater aid effectiveness through ‘harmonisation’ and ‘integration’ of 
global health efforts. I analyse practitioners’ ambivalent responses to this 
development, showing how the challenges of achieving ‘integration’ between
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maternal, newborn and child health on some levels reinforced competitive tensions 
and gave rise to new forms of self-management of the safe motherhood community, 
including efforts to emulate for maternal health the process that led to the creation of 
the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria.
Part II begins with Chapter 7, in which I trace the development of an 
academic subfield specialising in the epidemiology of maternal health and evaluation 
of safe motherhood interventions in low-income countries. I examine how research 
practices and priorities within this field have shifted over time in response to 
challenges faced by the broader Safe Motherhood Initiative, including the need to 
comply with narrowing definitions of what constitutes scientifically credible and 
policy-relevant evidence. I identify some of the challenges that researchers in 
international academic institutions encounter in their work. Ib is includes, first, the 
difficulty of balancing both academic and donor-driven demands for ‘gold standard’ 
research with growing recognition that country-level policy-making and 
implementation requires other, more operational forms of knowledge. Second, it 
entails managing an identity sometimes tom between that of academic, policy advisor 
and advocate.
Chapter 8 is the final empirical chapter. In this chapter I reflect on the role 
that scientific authority, health statistics and evidence play in the work of advocacy 
specialists within the broader safe motherhood field. I show how appeals to 
‘objective’ justifications for prioritising maternal health and for pursuing specific 
policies have gradually replaced more explicitly value-based argumentation. I further 
argue that this shift has taken place in response to advocacy groups’ transnational 
remit, as well as in response to their perceived need for new ways to present and ‘sell’ 
safe motherhood, but may also contribute to unduly depoliticising the struggle for 
women’s health.
In the concluding chapter I provide a review of the main findings and reflect 
critically on the various forms of self-management that have gone into the ‘making’ 
of the Safe Motherhood Initiative. I assess, on the basis of results from this thesis as 
well as evidence from studies of the broader global health field, whether such 
intensified issue-specific advocacy, research and policy activities are likely to be 
beneficial to the professional community specialising in maternal health. Finally, I 
reflect critically on whether the eventual ‘success’ of the safe motherhood advocacy 
coalition is likely to translate into improved health systems and ultimately, improved
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survival for women. In doing this, I hope that my research will help to critically 
examine the widespread, if implicit, assumption that the success of a single advocacy 
issue, as measured through the rise of a global health initiative and growing political 
commitment to a specific health problem, will necessarily lead to health 
improvement.
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C h a p t e r  2
2. METHODOLOGY
In this chapter I provide an overview of the methodology of the thesis. Because the 
empirical evidence I present is derived from an ethnographic study, I start by briefly 
reflecting on what is meant by ethnography in the context of my research. This is 
followed by an overview of the methods that I used to collect the data: in-depth 
interviews, participant observation and document review. In conclusion I describe 
my approach to analysing and interpreting the data.
2.1. Ethnography
Debates about the distinctive nature of ethnography have a long and unresolved 
history within anthropology. Ethnography can be thought of as a set of activities -  
ethnographic fieldwork comprised of, for instance, participant observation, open 
interviews or other qualitative field research methods — and as the product of those 
activities, the ethnography or a written description of the social life of particular place 
or community or, indeed, of an institution (Gellner and Hirsch 2001). Ethnography 
in both senses relies on the inclusion of the ‘native’s’ point of view, a characteristic 
that can be seen as one aspect of growing démocratisation or critique of established 
relations of power. Often associated with Malinowski’s (1961 (1922)) pioneering 
ethnographic fieldwork of the Trobriand Islanders in the early 20th century, many 
anthropologists today consider participant observation, commonly thought of as total 
immersion in a particular social environment, to be the basis of the ethnographic 
method. In-depth interviews, involving face-to-face interactions with an informant 
selected for their particular involvement in or knowledge of a social environment, are 
also generally considered to be an important method (Bernard 1994). Furthermore, a 
key aspect of the ethnographic approach is that it should contextualise its findings, 
pay attention to questions of power and inequality, emphasise both what people say 
and do, look closely at the use of language, and be reflexive of the researcher’s 
ambiguous position within the research context (Bernard 1994). It is also widely 
agreed that what makes ethnography distinctive is its commitment to methodological 
‘holism,’ which implies accepting that in principle anything in the research context
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can be relevant and should potentially be taken into account (Gellner and Hirsch 
2001:9). Such ‘holism’ is in contrast to the countervailing trend towards control, 
measurement and quantification of outputs that characterise some of the other main 
disciplines concerned with global health, including epidemiology (Janes et al. 1986; 
Inhom 1995).
How we think about ethnography is clearly modified when the focus of 
analysis moves from the villages and relatively bounded communities that were the 
focus of classical ethnographic studies and onto the kind of complex transnational 
social configurations of which the Safe Motherhood Initiative is an example. In 
classical anthropological studies, fieldwork, comprising both participant observation 
and interviewing, was usually carried out in a discrete local community or bounded 
geographical area. Participant observation implied prolonged interactions and 
observations in face-to-face localities with the aim of understanding the total social 
configuration of the chosen field.
What constitutes the ‘local’ in the context of global health, however, is 
contested (Ong and Collier 2005). Janes and Corbett (2009) therefore argue that 
anthropologists interested in global health need to take a pragmatic view on what is 
understood by the ‘local.’ In doing so, they build on Ginsburg and Rapp’s (1995:8) 
assertion that, “ [t]he local is not defined by geographical boundaries but is 
understood as any small-scale arena in which social meanings are informed and 
adjusted.” In general, though, a focus on the global level requires that 
anthropologists respond to Nader’s (1972:289) call to “study up,” or “to study the 
colonisers instead of the colonised, the culture of power rather than the culture of 
the powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the culture of poverty.” An 
ethnographic focus on the global also inevitably implies that the field of research 
becomes both more complex and more unbounded. Moreover, an analytical focus on 
policy itself requires reconceptualising the ethnographic ‘field’ as a social, political or 
even epistemic space that is articulated through a clear set of self-identifications 
relating to professionalisation and embedded relations of power (rather than to a 
specific geographical locale) (Shore and Wright 1997:14; Wedel and Feldman 2005).
In the mid-1990s, responding to the new conditions imposed by 
globalisation, Marcus (1995) proposed an adaptation of long-standing models of 
ethnographic research labelled ‘multi-sited ethnography’. Marcus’ aim was to link 
global and local-level analyses within a single study and thereby be able to
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accommodate within the analysis the effect of the “capitalist world system” on local 
experience {ibid.). The principles of multi-sited ethnography rapidly gained popularity 
within anthropology (see Nader 1996). Of particular interest here is the multi-sited 
approach developed by Fairhead and Leach (2003) to study the politics around 
biodiversity and conservation in Trinidad and Guinea, an analysis that paid particular 
attention to the interface of science and policy. For Fairhead and Leach (2003:3) a 
multi-sited ethnography implied a study that spanned from “international 
organisations and networks, through national bureaucracies, scientists and activists 
and their local staff and activities, to the complexities of everyday life.” Their 
approach highlights the importance of identifying the processes by which different 
strands of science and policy come to shape each other and gain authority within the 
broader social field of which they are part. Although my study focuses on global-level 
debates and traces the impacts of these debates on the everyday life of experts rather 
than geographically bounded local communities, it can be thought of as multi-sited in 
that it is attentive to the different scales, levels, sites and actors that together 
comprise the international or ‘global’ field of safe motherhood.
A focus on ‘global-level’ activities also alters one of the most important 
aspects of ethnography, namely negotiating access to informants and field sites. In 
conventional fieldwork sites, such as villages or other small social units, access is 
often negotiated through discussions with state and local bureaucracies (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). The process of obtaining access to global policy elites and to sites in 
which political and scientific decisions are made, however, implies different rules of 
interaction than those that apply when studying the intended beneficiaries of policy. 
Studying policy and scientific elites requires, for instance, awareness of the particular 
procedures that may exist within elites for establishing access, as well as how these 
might become muddled when an outsider takes on an ‘insider’ status through 
participation (Gellner and Hirsch 2001). With this in mind, I now go on to consider 
briefly on my own position within the ‘multi-sited’ field I have been studying, before 
describing the specific methods I used to collect my empirical data
2.2. Positionality
Anthropologists often reflect critically on their own positions as simultaneous 
participants and observers within complex social and institutional arrangements, and 
particularly on the resultant social obligations and ethical considerations (Gellner and
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Hirsch 2001). Mosse (2006), for instance, has written instructively about the 
challenges of conducting research within policy communities of which one is also 
part, based on his personal experience of working as an advisor within a bilateral 
development project while also observing it ethnographically. I Ie depicts an 
irresolvable tension between studying inside an organisation, and therefore accepting 
its aims and agenda, and studying the organisation itself. This tension, he argues, 
comes to the fore in particular in writing and disseminating the results of 
ethnographic analyses, which may be contested by informants (ibid.). Anthropologists 
and historians working with public health institutions have similarly contemplated the 
specific challenges of conducting ethnography within their own professional sphere, 
including the predicament of becoming part of the history and social processes that 
they are studying (Lambert 1998; Berridge 2001; Lambert and McKevitt 2002; Dehue 
2004; Heckler and Russell 2008).
In keeping with such discussions, it is useful to reflect briefly on my own 
position during the time I conducted my doctoral research. The fieldwork and write­
up of this research was part-time (from 2005 to 2009) while I worked as a research 
fellow in medical anthropology within an inter-disciplinary research group 
specialising in maternal health, at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine (LSHTM). December 2006 and January 2009 I had full funding through a 
doctoral fellowship from the Norwegian Research Council. My doctoral research was 
conducted alongside my other research within a number of large-scale, international 
research collaborations during this time. The first was the Immpact project (the 
Initiative for Maternal Mortality Programme Assessment), which ran from 2001 to 
2006 as a multi-country research project to improve methods for evaluating the 
effectiveness of large-scale programmes designed to reduce maternal mortality and 
improve maternal health. This was funded by an ‘alliance’ of donors, including the 
UK Department for International Development (DflD), the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and the Gates Foundation. The second 
project was the “Towards 4+5’ programme, funded by DflD until 2010, comprised 
of partners in the UK, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Nepal and 
Pakistan. This is a research consortium that aims to first, develop and consolidate the 
evidence base for the reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality and morbidity 
and second, to get evidence into policy and practice at the international and national 
levels. A third collaboration was an inter-disciplinary research project into the long­
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term social and economic consequences of surviving severe obstetric morbidity, 
funded through a joint grant from the Economic and Social Research Council UK 
(ESRQ and the Hewlett Foundation from 2006 to 2010.
My position within this broader research environment and my participation 
in these specific projects both facilitated my research and bestowed upon me a 
specific set of responsibilities, including a responsibility to respect the confidentiality 
of my colleagues, some of whom became informants, as well as a need to be sensitive 
towards the complex motivations behind their practices and accounts. An advantage 
of being part of a public health research environment is that I was routinely exposed 
to scientific and policy debates within the maternal health field and within the public 
health field more broadly, including through many lectures, seminars and discussions 
about the challenges of managing relationships with funders and advancing 
professional demands. Such interactions inevitably impacted on my understanding of 
the issues I have chosen to emphasise and on the analytical perspective and methods 
I developed.
On one level, my position gave me an ‘insider’ status that enabled me to 
access research sites, to ask meaningful questions and, hopefully, to present an 
accurate depiction of the field’s dilemmas and practices (Walt et al. 2008). I was also 
able to establish a broad network of contacts that facilitated my access to informants. 
At the same time, the fact that I was a newcomer to the field, as well as a social 
scientist within an expert field dominated by epidemiologists and clinical specialists, 
meant that I was also often an ‘outsider,’ perhaps permitting me to probe and be 
curious about questions that real ‘insiders’ might have taken for granted.
Furthermore, the fact that I was clearly identified with the academic sphere, rather 
than with UN agencies, donor agencies or NGOs, influenced my interactions with 
informants from these other domains. This is also necessarily reflected in my 
analytical perspective and my decision to make research practices a central part of my 
analysis. I hope that the relatively long timeframe of my research means that I have 
been able to avoid the risk of excessively superficial and incomplete analyses 
associated with short time-frame research. In presenting my findings I have sought to 
be sensitive to the nuance and complexity of my informants’ statements — both on 
the record and o ff—but I also acknowledge any shortcomings in my ability to 
capture the subtleties of the tensions and pressures under which my informants 
work.
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2.3. Ethics
The LSHTM Ethics Committee approved my study, as well as the ESRC-funded 
research project on evidence-based policy-making upon which the doctoral research 
builds. In addition to complying with the Committee’s principles and guidelines, I 
have conducted the research according to the American Anthropological 
Association’s (1998) code of conduct for qualitative research and participant 
observation. This implies commitment to being open about the purposes, potential 
impacts and sources of support with funders, colleagues and persons studied, and 
providing information to relevant parties affected by the research.
An important part of ethical conduct involves obtaining informed consent 
from individual participants in the research. According to the American 
Anthropological Association (2004), informed consent includes three key 
components: communication of information, comprehension of information, and 
voluntary participation. I bore the responsibility for ensuring that participants were 
fully informed of the intent of my research, how the information they offered would 
contribute to the research and the anticipated risks and benefits they could expect to 
incur through their participation. This was ensured through my own oral explanation 
to potential participants and through an ‘information sheet’ approved by the Ethics 
Committee, which was presented to each informant prior to the interview. The sheet 
specified the objectives, potential risks and procedures for ensuring confidentiality. 
Individual participants’ informed consent was documented through their signature 
on a consent form, also approved by the Ethics Committee (see the Appendix). 
Documenting informed consent for participant observation is, of course, less 
straightforward than for in-depth interviews (Fleuhr-Lobban 2003), given that 
participant observation is a less formal method that involves observing everyday 
interactions and behaviours as they play out. Instead of individual informed consent,
I therefore obtained permission to attend meetings and conferences for the purpose 
of participant observation from conference organisers and those convening meetings.
I decided to conduct all interviews in confidence (rather than offering 
confidentiality as and when requested) because I anticipated that doing so would 
encourage individuals to feel at ease about participating in interviews. Although 
maintaining informants’ confidentiality necessarily compromises the historical value 
of the interviews, I felt that doing so was important to minimise the risk of 
exacerbating tensions or factions between individuals or sub-groups, and to
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encourage the participation of informants whose individual position may be 
discrepant with that of their affiliated institution. When offering their consent, 
informants were given the option of specifying the additional condition that not be 
quoted directly and that no personal data about them be presented in the analysis.
In presenting the findings I have protected informants’ confidentiality and 
anonymity by citing interviewees by position rather than by name or, if necessary, by 
generalising perspectives, especially perspectives expressed during participant 
observation where individual consent was not documented to the same extent as in 
in-depth interviews. I have also taken care to generalise about organisations if 
identifying a specific organisation is likely to jeopardise individual informants’ 
anonymity. Because the worlds of research and policy are tightly interconnected it 
may still be possible to identify individuals in the presentation of the findings. The 
risk associated with this is partly compensated for by the fact that the research 
focuses on aspects of people’s lives that are already in the public domain.
2.4. Methods
The study’s empirical findings derive from the combination of three main 
ethnographic methods: participant observation, in-depth interviews and document 
review. These methods were first elaborated in the context of the ESRC-funded 
ethnographic project on evidence-based policy-making mentioned in the introductory 
chapter conducted from 2004-2007; in subsequent years, from 2005 onwards, I 
expanded upon them specifically for the purposes of my doctoral research.
2.4.1. Participant observation
Participant observation carried out within the broad ‘field’ of safe motherhood was 
an essential component of my methodology and took place throughout the duration 
of my research. Although day-to-day participation within the safe motherhood field 
and within the global health field more generally inevitably formed a backdrop for 
my observations, I conducted more ‘formal’ participant observation at specific 
focusing events for safe motherhood research, advocacy and policy. I identified such 
focusing events through informal contact with individuals in the field, and by 
searching the online events calendars on various organisations’ websites. My research 
coincided with a particularly active period for safe motherhood advocacy, including 
the marking of the twentieth anniversary of the launch of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative, as well as the thirtieth anniversary of the Alma-Ata Conference on Primary
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Health Care, an event that was formative in informing the original policy vision for 
safe motherhood (see Chapter 3).
I attended around twenty separate such focusing events, some as an active 
participant and others primarily as an observer. These included a high-level meeting 
to define the strategic objectives for a new Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and 
Child Health (PMNCH); a major dissemination symposium for the Immpact project; 
events relating to the launch of a ‘Global Business Plan’ to accelerate progress 
towards MDGs 4 and 5 (on child survival and maternal health respectively); the 
launch meeting for a Lancet special series on maternal survival; a major conference 
entitled Women Deliver (convened to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative); the first global conference on unsafe abortion; and the first 
international conference of the Countdown to 2015 Initiative, an initiative that 
monitors progress towards MDGs 4 and 5. My research also coincided with a period 
of intense political activity relating to global health more generally, as reflected in the 
buzz around the MDGs and political initiatives such as the International I Iealth 
Partnership, formed by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2007, as well as global- 
level debates about the appropriate role of health research in broader global health 
efforts. Towards the end of my research, public debates about the benefits and 
drawbacks of the dominant role that global health initiatives have assumed within 
global health governance intensified, creadng an important backdrop for my analysis 
and my decision to engage directly with this debate in the concluding chapter of the 
thesis.
Many of the relevant events for participant observation took place in 
London, where I was based for most of the study, providing easy access. However, I 
also undertook several overseas trips to attend focusing events and to conduct in- 
depth interviews. This included trips lasting from several days to several weeks to 
New York, Washington D.C., Geneva, Aberdeen, Mexico City, New Delhi and Oslo. 
During these trips I visited the headquarters of organisations including the WHO, 
UNFPA (The United Nations Population Fund), UNICEF (the United Nations 
Children’s Fund), USAID, Norad (the Norwegian Directorate for Development 
Assistance) and a range of NGOs. I also conducted opportunistic fieldwork with 
international players that happened to be in countries that I was visiting for other 
research projects (especially Burkina Faso).
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I kept detailed field notes of my observations from these events. Some 
sessions at conferences and meetings were also recorded (always with the permission 
of the organisers) and transcribed. All but one organiser granted me access to use an 
event as a venue for fieldwork; my request to record sessions and interview 
participants at one high-level meeting I attended was also denied to avoid 
overburdening participants during the meeting.
2.4.2. Document review
Alongside participant observation, I undertook a comprehensive review of academic 
and international policy literature. It is worth noting that the use of documents in 
ethnographic analysis differs from the way they tend to be used in some social 
scientific disciplines, including in policy analysis. While policy analysts often rely 
heavily on written documents, including public witness testimonies and legal 
documents, unlike anthropologists they tend to treat these as straightforward sources 
that reveal the inner workings of the policy process (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993). By contrast, anthropologists have argued that policy documents can be treated 
as cultural texts or classificatory devices, as “narratives that serve to justify or 
condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function 
to empower some and silence others” (Shore and Wright 1997:15). The way I have 
opted to use documents in my analysis sits somewhere in between these two 
extremes, since I use documents both to provide ethnographic depth, for instance of 
how key debates have been represented in editorials and letters, and to provide 
historical data on key events and developments. My document review also helped to 
devise a time-line of key focusing events, policy shifts and important actors within 
the field.
I searched literature spanning the past thirty years to build up a picture of 
how maternal health and mortality have been dealt with in the international sphere 
and to discern trends in research and policy recommendations. I identified literature 
by searching for key works relating to international safe motherhood policy and 
maternal health in developing countries in electronic databases (PubMed, Web of 
Science, Popline, id21). I also conducted physical searches of the libraries of 
international organisations and electronic searches of the web pages and online 
document resource lists of a wide range of organisations. I conducted some archival 
research at the WHO to provide background context, but access to material from the 
previous 20 years was restricted and the archive was thus of limited use for
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discerning the more recent history of the safe motherhood field. Therefore, I 
collected additional materials during field visits to organisations in the various 
countries listed above. Two colleagues, both of them key players in the field, also 
gave me access to their private document collections spanning three decades.
The range of sources I consulted ensured that this review was 
comprehensive. It included many kinds of documents: policy documents; peer- 
reviewed articles; a range of grey literature including unpublished research reports; 
proceedings from conferences and meetings; newsletters (such as the WIIO- 
published newsletter on safe motherhood); policy briefs; online resources; and 
editorials; and letters to the editor of scientific journals. The scope of this review was 
kept manageable by focusing on prominent policy documents and frequently cited 
sources. In addition to documents on maternal health, the review also included some 
documents pertaining to broader public health issues, such as more general WI IO 
policy statements and reports, commentaries and editorials and advocacy materials.
2.4.3. In-depth interviews
I conducted in-depth interviews with an opportunistic sample of informants 
specialising in international-level work related to maternal health and safe 
motherhood, including from all the main agencies and organisations involved in the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative (these are described in below, in subsection 2.5). The 
selection of informants was purposive (rather than systematic), an appropriate 
method when studying socially complex phenomena such as the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative and the sensitive views of specific types of informants.
I used a number of methods to identify individual informants. An initial list 
of names and contact details of actors within the safe motherhood field was 
compiled for the purpose of the ESRC-funded study on evidence-based policy­
making. This list was built up through informal discussions with various stakeholders 
active within the safe motherhood community, especially colleagues at the LSIITM, 
as well as through web-based searches of organisations’ websites to identify recurrent 
names. In order to supplement this initial list and to ensure a broad range of 
participants, I adopted an approach described by Lee and Goodman (2002) to 
identify key players in policy networks within the international health field. This 
involved mapping current and past initiatives and inquiring about individuals who 
had been active at different times, consulting databases to identify frequently cited 
authors of scientific papers and main policy documents. I also reviewed participant
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lists from the main safe motherhood focusing events. Finally, some additional 
informants were identified trough ‘snow-balling’ when interviews generated 
recommendations for others to approach.
I contacted potential interviewees by e-mail or in person at meetings or 
conferences and asked them to participate in a fully confidential interview. 72 
interviewees agreed to participate (see Table 1 below). Five potential informants 
declined to participate, citing time constraints or limited knowledge of the field, while 
around 10 of the potential informants I contacted did not respond to the interview 
request. The aim of having a relatively large sample si2e for qualitative research was 
to include the perspectives of a range of different kinds of actors within the field, to 
achieve a comprehensive coverage of the members of the field and to achieve a 
certain range of different perspectives from informants of diverse institutional types.
All the interviewees provided written informed consent. Almost all of the 
interviews were face-to face (the remainder by phone), either during my visits to 
informants’ home institutions, during conferences or during informants’ visits to 
London. A proportion of these interviews included topics that had been specifically 
developed for the ESRC-funded study described in Chapter 1, and as such 
contributed data to both studies. Most informants were interviewed once in 
interviews lasting one to three hours, but three were interviewed twice or more.
Many others participated in informal follow-up discussions. I conducted the majority 
of these interviews, while Dominique Behague conducted 17 of the interviews that 
included topics specifically pertaining to evidence-based policy-making. Three of the 
interviews were conducted jointly. The interviews were recorded with informants’ 
consent and all the recorded interviews were fully transcribed, about half of them by 
two research assistants. Only one informant did not consent to the interview being 
recorded. In that case, a summary of the main points and detailed notes of the 
discussion substituted for a verbatim transcript. In addition to recording the 
interviews, I kept notes of impressions that emerged during the interviews.
The interviews followed an interview guide intended to loosely structure its 
content. This guide was revised during the fieldwork period take into account and 
probe into unexpected findings, as is customary in ethnographic research (Bernard 
1994). While the original interview guide was developed within the ESRC-funded 
study and therefore focused on understandings of and use of evidence for policy­
making and implementation within the maternal health field, the revised interview
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guide was much broader, and sought to elicit informants’ accounts of their histories 
and experiences within the field, including the various advocacy, research and policy 
initiatives that they had been involved in over the years. This included questions on 
views regarding the appropriate strategic focus for the Safe Motherhood Initiative, 
and informants’ perceptions of the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s position within the 
global health field and changes to this position over time, among other topics. I 
adapted this guide for individual participants to tap into their specific experiences and 
areas of expertise. Open-ended interviews aimed to elicit insights not only into 
informants’ opinions, but also details of their actual practices and experiences.
2.5. Description of sample and informants
The Safe Motherhood Initiative is a loosely configured community with boundaries 
that have changed and expanded over time, but that links actors and organisations 
from across a number of institutional domains into a recognisable and relatively 
coherent whole. Today, what can be thought of as the safe motherhood community 
comprises actors based in inter-governmental agencies and multilateral donor 
organisations; bilateral development agencies; academic and other research 
institutions; non-governmental organisations, including advocacy groups, and private 
philanthropic foundations; and professional organisations. Interviewees came from 
all the main international agencies and organisations involved in the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative and the international safe motherhood community as a whole 
was well covered in the in-depth interviews.
The safe motherhood network is international in nature. While it is 
predominandy located in international organisations based in high-income countries, 
it increasingly also extends to corresponding institutional venues in low- and middle- 
income countries. However, because I was primarily interested in conducting 
ethnographic research into global-level dynamics I prioritised recruiting informants 
working in international organisations and institutions. Nevertheless, the sample also 
included nine informants based in low-income countries, including policy advisors, 
researchers and programme managers. Moreover, some of the international-level 
actors were originally from low-income countries and many others had extensive 
field-based and clinical experience from such countries.
Both institutions and individuals can be thought of as safe motherhood 
‘actors.’ It is not always straightforward to separate the perspectives and practices of
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institutions and individuals, and individuals vary in the extent to which they reflect 
the institutional culture and position of their affiliated institutions. Within the 
institutions identified, I aimed to recruit a broad range of informants with different 
kinds of experience. Although the Initiative has expanded considerably over the past 
twenty years, I quickly became aware that many of those who played prominent roles 
in its formation continue to be active within the field. Given my interest in tracing 
developments over time, I decided to focus on individuals with long-lasting 
experience and internationally recognised expertise in maternal health. I Iowever, I 
also included many newer entrants to capture the expanded nature of the 
international safe motherhood network. Over half (48 out of 72, or 66%) of my 
informants were female.
Table 1 summarises the type and number of institutions and the number of 
informants drawn from each institutional group. Although I have designated each 
informant to a specific category for the purpose of clear presentation, in reality there 
is some degree of overlap between the different groups and individuals have shifted 
between the categories over time. While the great majority of the informants can be 
considered ‘full’ members of the safe motherhood community, a minority (around 
10) can be considered ‘partial’ members, having significant affiliations and interests 
also in other public health subfields, including child health, neonatal health, 
HIV/AIDS and health systems. About ten of the informants self-identified as 
reproductive health activists rather than safe motherhood specialists, although their 
interests included pregnancy-related health and survival or ‘safe motherhood.’ Four 
informants self-identified primarily as child health specialists, but were collaborators 
within maternal health projects. Informants were recruited from each of the main 
categories of institution, although there was a heavier concentration of informants 
from the academic sphere than from other institutional settings, reflecting my 
specific interest in research practices. Below I provide brief contextual descriptions 
to introduce the different institutions from which informants were drawn.
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Total number of institutions Total number of informants
U N  ag en c ie s 3 13
B ila te ra l ag en c ie s 3 11
A c ad e m ic  in s titu tio n s 12 29
N G O s o r  fo u n d atio n s 9 19
Total 27 7 2
Table 1: Categories of informants
2.5.1. Multilateral agencies
The multilateral agencies I focused on (WHO, UNFPA and UNICEF) were 
founding members of the original Safe Motherhood Inter-Agency Group (IAG) that 
in 1987 was charged with overseeing implementadon of the initiative and remain 
important actors in the global health policy sphere. They are all members of a 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCII) that in 2005 
subsumed the original IAG. The WHO in 2005 established the Department for 
Making Pregnancy Safer, while the other agencies are also involved in a range of 
specific activities or fund programmes that can be designated as safe motherhood- 
related. Historically, these agencies have played a prominent role in setting standards 
and policy recommendations within the field and in providing technical advice and 
financial assistance to governments and NGOs working on safe motherhood issues 
in low-income countries. Informants from these agencies were drawn primarily from 
the international headquarter level (rather than regional offices) and included high- 
level officials specialising in maternal and reproductive health issues, as well as several 
high-level policy advisers working on more general issues like health systems and 
evaluation.
2.5.2. Bilateral agencies
A range of bilateral development agencies has played important roles within the safe 
motherhood field, funding activities at the country level, as well as the activities of 
international NGO and research groups. Bilateral donors can be seen as advocates 
for greater financial and technical attention to safe motherhood, and as targets for 
such advocacy. Although the IAG originally excluded bilateral donors as official
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members, donors played an important role in shaping safe motherhood policy and 
research in the Initiative’s early years and have gained an increasingly prominent 
position in recent years, including as full members of the PMNCI I. I focused on 
three bilateral institutions that have played significant roles in the field, both by virtue 
of the volume of their contributions and for other reasons, as specified below.
USAID is the dominant government donor in the international health field. 
While being an important actor within safe motherhood globally, compared with 
other development agencies it has often been seen to pursue a unilateral and 
conservative agenda. This has especially been the case in the area of reproductive and 
maternal health, where its work has been subject to the restrictions associated with 
the ‘Mexico City policy’ first introduced by Ronald Reagan in 1982 prohibiting the 
use of federal funds to support organisations that provide abortions or support 
abortion-related work. This policy was later rescinded by Bill Clinton but reinstated 
by George W. Bush in his first day in office as US President, after which it became 
known colloquially as the ‘global gag rule’ (Office of the Press Secretary 2001).12
DflD has also been a leading donor to international health, both through 
contributions to the multilateral system and through bilateral aid. During the period 
of my fieldwork it was the only bilateral donor to have formulated a dedicated 
maternal health strategy. DflD characterises itself as unusual among development 
agencies for its focus on strengthening government systems and ownership in 
countries and for taking innovative approaches to funding programmes via 
government bodies (Carlson 2007). It sees itself as championing “underdog causes” 
such as abortion and leading for change in development practice {ibid.).
A third important bilateral agency, Norad (a directorate of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), has in recent years become an important player within 
the international safe motherhood field. Norad is, on some levels, taking forth a 
Norwegian ambition to be a leader in international gender and reproductive health 
and rights debates (Austveg and Sundby 2005). I included this agency primarily 
because, though a special initiative by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, it has been a 
main supporter of a recent global advocacy campaign for maternal health. This 
reflects die Prime Minister’s desire to involve Norway in international efforts to 
achieve progress in global health, focusing initially on expanding vaccination 
coverage to reduce child deaths and subsequendy expanding to include action on
12 This policy was reversed by President Barack Obama on 23 January 2009 (Nasaw 2009).
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maternal survival (PMNCH 2009c). In addition to Norad interviewees, I also 
interviewed informants from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who 
specialise in global health issues more generally.
2.5.3. Non-governmental organisations
Non-govemmental organisations (NGOs) or civil society organisations have come to 
play an important role within global health initiatives in recent years in terms of 
advocacy, research and service provision and programme implementation (Doyle and 
Patel 2008). Given my interest in global-level debates, I focused on recruiting 
representatives from NGOs involved in advocacy and, to a lesser extent, research. 
Specific organisations have not been identified by name to protect the confidentiality 
of informants. However, they included those NGOs that were founding members of 
the IAG in 1987 and some more newly established NGOs who specialise in maternal 
and reproductive health, based primarily in the US and in the UK. Some of these 
groups are private philanthropic foundations and fund their own maternal health 
programmes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. There is also some overlap in the 
remit of such groups and academics, with a number of NGOs conducting research 
and specialising in the dissemination of scientific evidence.
2.5.4. Academic institutions
Within the academic research sphere I recruited informants primarily from 
prominent European and North American universities with a reputation for expertise 
in international maternal health research, with a minority of informants being from 
African and Asian research institutes and universities that collaborated with Western 
institutions (six informants). These academic institutions have not been identified by 
name in order to protect the confidentiality of informants.
I focused on interviewing prominent researchers with extensive experience in 
the field, on the basis of an assumption that they would have knowledge of changing 
research trends and experience of the interface between research and policy. The 
sample also included less experienced researchers who were able to comment on 
their first impressions of the politics and social relations driving the academic 
network of which they were part. Among the researchers were three researchers 
specialising in child health, while some researchers specialised in both maternal health 
and another area, such as neonatal health. The majority of my academic informants 
had public health training, including in disciplines such as epidemiology and
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demography, and many also had previous clinical training and field experience from 
healthcare settings in low-income countries. Epidemiology was the most frequent 
disciplinary background among this group, reflecting its dominance within academic 
public health during the past fifty to sixty years (Berridge 2001). In order to reflect 
the increasingly multi-disciplinary nature of international public health research, I also 
interviewed a smaller number of social scientists, including sociologists, policy 
analysts, health economists and health system analysts.
2.5.5. Professional organisations
Finally, I included informants from those professional organisations for midwives 
and obstetricians that are the most prominent organisations at the international level: 
the International Confederation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) and the 
International Confederation of Midwives (ICM.) Although professional organisations 
are commonly said to have been late entrants into the field, they have come to play 
an important role within international debates on safe motherhood, especially as they 
pertain to clinical standards and guidelines and the notorious human resource crisis 
affecting health systems in many low- and middle-income countries (see e.g. 
WHO/ICM/FIGO 2004; Phumaphi 2006). Members of these organisations 
overlapped with the categories discussed above, and as such do not appear in a 
separate category in Table 1.
2.6. Limitations
Although I interviewed a broad selection of informants and believe that I achieved a 
comprehensive coverage of the safe motherhood community, a number of important 
limitations must be noted with regard to my sample. A natural, but unfortunate, 
consequence of my focus on the international level is that I collected limited data on 
the perspectives of actors based in low-income countries. Although my fieldwork 
provided opportunities for observing interactions between practitioners from 
different settings, it would no doubt have been instructive to elicit the perspectives of 
a larger number of country-based actors on the international-level dynamics I was 
studying, as well as to trace their effects on national-level policy debates. Doing so, 
however, would have compromised my commitment to understanding, in an in- 
depth manner, the broad cross-section of international-level actors that constitute the 
safe motherhood field and the networks that they form at the global level.
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A second limitation is that I did not obtain substantive data on the 
perspectives of actors working within other global health initiatives. Although the 
study included interviews with several informants specialising in child and newborn 
health, this was not sufficient to enable analysis of alternative perspectives on the 
competition between global health initiatives in which the Safe Motherhood Initiative 
participates. This posed a particular limitation in my analysis of responses to recent 
efforts to integrate the advocacy coalitions for maternal, newborn and child health 
into a single partnership (discussed in Chapter 6). Given my effort to develop a full 
picture of the international safe motherhood field, however, it would have been 
unmanageable to include also a wide range of informants specialising in other 
subfields.
Third, I did not conduct formal interviews with some of the major global 
health donors, including the Gates Foundation and the World Bank. Both of these 
organisations are highly influential actors within global health governance, funding 
and policy, towards which many of my informants’ advocacy efforts were directed. In 
part, their omission from my interview sample results from my initial decision to 
focus on those actors who self-identified as being involved in advocating for priority 
to be given to safe motherhood, rather than the target of advocacy. Moreover, the 
initial search for key actors within the field did not elicit the names of respondents 
based in these donor organisations. However, as my research progressed I became 
aware of a number of individuals within these organisations who can be considered 
at least partial members of the safe motherhood community. Interviewing such 
individuals would have likely added nuance and depth to the ethnographic data. 
Interviewing representatives of donor agencies and foundations would also have 
allowed a critical comparison of representatives’ own perspectives on their 
institutional culture, practices and priorities and my other informants’ perspectives on 
their behaviour. Despite several attempts in 2007, however, I was unable to obtain 
interviews with current World Bank employees and did not receive a reply from one 
past employee that I contacted. I was unable to access representatives of the Gates 
Foundation, reflecting well-known challenges in accessing these high-level actors. 
However, the lack of formal in-depth interviews was partly offset by extensive 
participant observation at events, including global health conferences and research 
meetings, in which these donors had a strong presence, as well as by analysis of 
documents pertaining to their activities and positions.
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Given the increasingly prominent position assumed by Gates Foundation 
since I started my doctoral research it is clear that future studies would benefit from 
eliciting key informant perspectives from within this organisation, as well as from 
other private and public funding bodies. In addition, future studies could also 
usefully advance a comparative perspective on the work of different global health 
initiatives and the interactions between them, and trace in more detail the effects of 
their global-level debates on local processes. This would help to elucidate the 
interplay between local experience and global-level proscriptions.
2.7. Analysis
With reference to anthropological methods, Bernard (1994:452) defines “analysis” as 
“the search for patterns in data and for ideas that help to explain why those patterns 
are there in the first place.” Beyond this general definition, qualitative data, which 
tend to be the basis of anthropological or ethnographic analysis, can be analysed in a 
variety of ways, some more structured than others.
The policy studies subfield, which also relies predominantly on qualitative 
data, has tended to use more structured analytical frameworks than has been 
customary in anthropology. Many policy analysts have applied the “stages heuristic” 
model, which divides the policy process into discrete stages such as “agenda-setting,” 
“formulation,” “implementation” and “evaluation” (Laswell 1956; Buse et al. 2005). 
Much of the work within this tradition has focused on one or other of these stages, 
often applying the “streams” theory of agenda-setting (see Chapter 1) (Kingdon 
1984). However, in reality such analysis comes up against the challenge that it is 
difficult and indeed rare to be able to identify a clear-cut group of decision-makers, 
or an event which can be pinpointed as the moment when a particular decision was 
made (Weiss 1986:223). I am therefore reluctant to systematise policy in terms of 
ideal types, because doing so can obscure the social negotiations and contradictions 
that go in to  policy-m ak ing. Indeed, the focus on cohesion and shared n o tion s  o f  
validity in many of the theoretical formulations that have been influential in policy 
analysis run counter to the tensions, contestations and competing interests that often 
exist within apparendy cohesive networks. For such reasons, I have drawn on 
analytical approaches from anthropology, which, on the whole, tend to be less 
structured and more iterative or inductive (although it is worth noting that
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anthropologists also vary in the formality and schematic nature of the analytical 
methods they use).
The method of analysis I have used can best be described as thematic. 
Thematic analysis is a largely inductive approach to data analysis that aims to be 
attentive to emerging themes, contradictions and discrepancies in the data (Pelto and 
Pelto 1978; Bernard 1994). The ‘data’ here consists of interview transcripts, field 
notes and the various documents described above. From a practical perspective, a 
thematic analysis entails familiarising oneself thoroughly with such data before 
searching for a pattern both in the data and, by implication, in how the informants 
presented, ordered and systematised their perceptions, experiences and practices, 
before then ‘extracting’ themes for analysis. Within my study, this quite mechanical 
process involved reading, re-reading, and underlining, noting, coding and extracting 
text.
In order to facilitate the management of a large dataset, I imported transcripts 
into NVivo, a software package for organising and analysing qualitative data. I also 
used NVivo for my initial coding of the transcripts for broad themes, which I later 
extracted from the individual documents and grouped together so that I could study 
specific sub-themes in more depth. NVivo was also useful for conducting key-word 
searches across all the transcripts, as well as for identifying specific passages for 
further analysis. I supplemented my initial computer-aided coding with manual 
coding of transcript printouts for specific themes and sub-themes.
The initial stage of analysis was concurrent with data collection inductive and 
aimed to identify emerging themes. Initial themes then fed into revised versions of 
the interview guide. This was a process that was also informed by feedback and 
discussions following presentation of preliminary findings at a number of meetings 
and conferences. A period of consolidated analysis followed after the end of the main 
period of data collection, starting in mid-2008. By contrast to the early inductive 
stages of the data analysis, this later stage was more deductive. I aimed to confirm 
emerging themes, identify uniformity and inconsistencies across groups of 
informants, conduct sub-analysis of different informant groups and juxtapose 
informants’ accounts against more ‘objective’ evidence, for instance documentary 
evidence, to build up an accurate picture of the trajectory of key events.
Following Spradley (1979), I looked for evidence of social conflict, 
contradictions, things that people did in managing social relationships, methods by
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which they acquired and maintained status and prestige and insights into how they 
solved conflict. I also tried to be particularly attentive to how my informants depicted 
their own professional histories and the history of the safe motherhood community. 
My research covered a period of over twenty years and informants reported on a 
range of activities and shifting policy, research and advocacy priorities during this 
period. In part to compensate for written historical sources, but also to gain specific 
individual insights, I used interview data as ‘oral history’ in conjunction with 
documentary sources to build up the historical timeline and account of the safe 
motherhood movement.
The later, and more deductive, stage of the analysis involved combining 
different analytical perspectives and uses of data, depending on the aims and specific 
objective that I was addressing. In a general sense, in order to analyse how safe 
motherhood practitioners have come to understand the field’s problems and position 
within the global health field and their own ‘diagnostic’ of this situation, I relied 
heavily on the findings from in-depth interviews, supplementing these with accounts 
relayed in written documents. More specifically, studying the enduring debate 
between comprehensive and selective approaches to health and its impact on 
international safe motherhood policy and practice (the first specific objective) 
entailed examining both its historical origins and contemporary manifestations. In 
order to discern the origins of the debate, I relied on secondary historical analysis 
from the emerging literature on the history of international health collaboration, as 
well as on primary materials, including reports and policy documents and debates 
held in scientific journals between the proponents of each of these approaches. To 
delineate how this debate has impacted on safe motherhood policy I analysed specific 
policy documents and statements from the Initiative’s start and onwards, comparing 
them with more general international health policy statements. I also relied on the 
testimonies of participants in these debates, treating these as ‘oral history’ accounts to 
corroborate and expand on available written documentation.
I used a slightly different approach in order to examine how research and 
advocacy practices have responded to the debate about comprehensive and selective 
approaches and the broader tensions within the international health context this 
debate reflects (my second specific objective). Here I relied more heavily on findings 
from participant observation and in-depth interviews. In order to address my third 
specific objective -  to assess whether the field’s various self-management practices
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are likely to further its survival and be conducive to health improvement — I also 
drew on secondary literature, including several recent reviews evaluating the existing 
evidence on the impact of global health initiatives, notably of initiatives focusing on 
HIV/AIDS, on country health systems and on governance for global health.
Maternal health experts’ preoccupation with writing their own history 
provided an important backdrop for the analysis. While professional historians have 
in recent years studied the history of global health since the formation of the WIIO 
after the Second World War (e.g. Brown et al. 2006; Fee et al. 2008), they have yet to 
write about the Safe Motherhood Initiative. Indeed, when I visited the WI IO 
archives the archivist revealed that I was the first researcher during her tenure to 
request materials on WHO’s maternal health policies, with tuberculosis and malaria 
being more popular topics. The dearth of professional historical studies on 
international maternal health policy, however, is in contrast to collection of historical 
overviews of the field’s development written by maternal health specialists 
themselves (e.g. Rosenfield 1997; AbouZahr 2001; AbouZahr 2003; Starrs 2006). 
Written by public health practitioners without training in historical theory or 
methods, these accounts have been disseminated in the public health and scientific 
literature, as well as in presentations at international meetings. Over time, elements of 
these accounts have become reiterated, repeated and taken up as semi-official history 
within the public health field, as my own findings show. Interpreting these narratives 
is complex. In the analysis, these narratives both serve as short-hand accounts of the 
field’s history, and as ethnographic data that inform my analysis of how safe 
motherhood actors have come to understand and depict their own history.
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C h a p t e r  3
3. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF SAFE 
MOTHERHOOD POLICY
If one speaks to safe motherhood practitioners, the dominant understanding of 
safe motherhood today is one of a field that has failed to deliver on its original 
promise. Various explanations for this lack of success are put forward, but the 
problem is often understood to be that the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s original 
policy recommendations were simplistic and misguided, based on a widespread 
and erroneous belief that improving women’s status and education and putting in 
place preventive health approaches would reduce maternal mortality (see I Iorton 
2006; Starrs 2006). Today, we are told, strategies are more “appropriately 
focused” on averting maternal deaths through treatment of obstetric 
complications (Rosenfield et al. 2007:1396). These interpretations form a 
working history of the safe motherhood field, one that most practitioners are 
familiar with, but also one which is partial and which obscures as much as it 
reveals. The primary problem with such accounts is that they situate safe 
motherhood policy-making processes outside of the political-economic and 
policy context in which they occurred. Reincorporating the elements of this 
history that are left out is an essential starting point for a full and proper 
evaluation of this history’s significance today.
In this chapter I analyse the emergence of the Safe Motherhood Initiative 
and the first set of international policy recommendations for achieving this 
Initiative’s goals. I examine these in relation to a broader, enduring policy debate 
that continues to mark global health politics even today. In short (and as 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 1), this policy debate concerns the relative merits of 
comprehensive versus selective approaches to public health. While a comprehensive 
approach implies action on both social and medical determinants of health 
selective approaches have a more explicit focus on targeted, medical approaches to 
addressing specific, priority diseases (Mills 2005). Comprehensive approaches 
involve action at all levels of the health system through ‘horizontal’ programmes, 
selective approaches imply programmes with a ‘vertical’ design, usually targeted
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at one level of the health system. Discussions about the relative merits of these 
approaches are polarised, and, as I show below, reflect different framings of 
health, as well as power struggles between institutions that often have very 
different ideological starting points. Revisiting this enduring debate in relation to 
safe motherhood policy is essential because it provides an important backdrop 
against which the Initiative formulated its goals and policy proposals. In fact, I 
would argue that tensions between comprehensive and selective approaches to 
public health created the main impetus for the creation of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative.
Disease-targeted, vertical programmes are often thought of as one of the 
core characteristics of today’s global health initiatives. In this chapter, however, I 
want to show that the Safe Motherhood Initiative in its early years — and, as later 
chapters show, on many levels still today — deviated from what we might 
associate with or expect from a policy community advocating for a specific 
health issue. By analysing the original safe motherhood policy vision in some 
detail, I aim to show that the Safe Motherhood Initiative presents a rather 
interesting case of a policy community that, although focusing on the ‘disease- 
specific’ goal of reducing maternal mortality, promoted a comprehensive (rather 
than a disease-specific) approach to health.
The Initiative’s history thus serves to highlight that it is neither self- 
evident nor inevitable that a health initiative promoting attention to a specific 
health issue or disease should adhere to a narrow, disease-specific approach to 
public health, as is often assumed today. Instead, at the pivotal moment of its 
formation, the Safe Motherhood Initiative was at the forefront of promoting a 
social-based vision of public health, resisting the reduction of public health 
solutions to ‘magic bullet’ disease-targeted technologies of the kind associated 
with so many of today’s global health initiatives.
3.1. An overview of competing framings of health
While my main aim here is to analyse the emergence of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative and its particular policy vision, doing so first requires a broader 
discussion of what I characterise above as a debate between comprehensive and 
selective approaches. While coming to a head around the time of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative’s launch, in many ways, the debate about the relative
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merits of these approaches was not new. Historians insist that there have always 
been tensions between social and disease-based visions of public health (Brown 
et al. 2006). They are not necessarily incompatible, but they have often been at 
odds {ibid.). Indeed, the tensions between these approaches are discernable in the 
early history of international health collaboration. As I show in the subsections 
below, such tensions shaped in formative ways the early decades of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), always intersecting with broader institutional 
power dynamics.
3.1.1. Social versus technological agendas in international health 
collaboration
Historians of public health have shown that disease-based and technological 
approaches to health improvement were at the core of much early international 
health collaboration (Weindling 1995; Bim 2006). For instance, the primary 
purpose of early international health organisations (such as the International 
Office of Public Health in Paris, established in 1909, and the I Iealth 
Organisation of the League of Nations, set up in 1923) was the control of 
epidemic disease across national borders {ibid.). According to Weindling (1995), 
the work of international health organisations was also driven by a desire on the 
part of the colonial powers these organisations represented to transfer the 
benefits of medical progress to their colonies.
Like today, philanthropic organisations played an important role in this 
process, especially in the international health work of the United States. In a 
study of international health organisations’ work in Mexico, Birn (2006) argues 
that international health cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s was characterised by 
a reliance on a “technobiological” paradigm. This entailed technical and 
biomedical solutions to health problems, driven in turn by the primacy of donor 
needs, emphasis on budgetary incentives, and a dependence on transnational 
professionals, often trained in the donor countries. For instance, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s (a major American philanthropic foundation) activities in Mexico 
clearly demonstrated a continuing struggle between global and local needs, the 
tensions between funders and community agencies and the power struggles 
ensuing from differing concepts of ‘public health’ {ibid.).
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While much early international health work may have focused on 
technological and biological solutions to health, the growth of international 
health collaboration itself also coincided with the emergence of welfare states 
and bilateral welfare schemes in European colonies, leading to an emerging social 
agenda in health. This included a concern for maternal and child welfare, which 
contrasted with the initial goals of infectious disease control (Manderson 1992; 
Balinska 1995; Weindling 1995). This social agenda became manifest in the early 
work of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN’s specialised health 
agency formed on April 7,1948 (Fee et al. 2008).
The founders of the WHO shared a social vision of health. Indeed, the 
WHO’s constitution officially defined health as “a state of complete, physical, 
mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” 
(WHO 1948:100). This broad definition reflected the view that the WIIO and its 
member states must take responsibility for tackling the social and environmental 
determinants of illness as part of the UN’s broader commitment to protect 
human rights (Irwin and Scali 2007). As such, the WHO’s mission was not only 
to advise on the provision of health services and disease control, but also to 
work with national governments and other UN agencies to improve nutrition, 
housing, sanitation, recreation, economic and working environments, as well as 
other aspects required to achieve health progress (Cueto 2004).
Despite this broad remit, the political context of the post-World War II 
period, marked by Cold War power struggles and decolonisation, impeded 
implementation of a social approach to health (Mills 2005). Instead, it favoured 
one focusing more on health technologies delivered through targeted campaigns 
{ibid). The Soviet Union’s temporary withdrawal from the UN and its agencies in 
1949 granted the US great influence over the international development and 
health agendas. Irwin and Scali (2007) argue that despite the key role of the US in 
shaping the WHO constitution, in practice, American officials were reluctant to 
pursue a social model of health improvement because of the perceived 
ideological (communist) implications of doing so during the Cold War era.
Subsequently, international health became characterised by a series of 
programmes targeting diseases such as malaria, smallpox, tuberculosis and yaws 
that were delivered in a vertical manner as disease-eradication campaigns, mostly 
separate from overarching public health provision (Werner and Sanders 1997).
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Historians have since interpreted the emergence of such vertical programmes as 
the application of American-style development theory to health, characterised by 
the promotion of technologies brought in from outside to eradicate disease, 
generate economic growth and create markets for US expansion to help in the 
battle against communism (Brown et al. 2006). These were short-term 
interventions designed to bring about results rapidly.
While disease eradication campaigns had some notable successes -  
especially the eradication of smallpox in 1980 — they also exposed some of the 
limitations of relying on targeted approaches. For instance, it is widely claimed 
that the disease-specific focus of these campaigns exacerbated problems in many 
developing countries relating to the concentration of health services in urban 
areas and poor access to services for people living in rural communities (e.g. 
Brown et al. 2006). A WHO campaign to eradicate malaria, initiated in 1959, also 
illustrates the limits of vertical disease-eradication programmes. The campaign 
had been developed amid enthusiasm about the prospects of insecticides to kill 
mosquitoes, the vectors of malaria. But problems emerged from the mid-1960s, 
resulting in part from greater than expected resistance to insecticides and 
realisation of the environmental damage caused by toxic insecticides (Brown et 
al. 2006; Fee et al. 2008). It soon appeared that malaria eradication programmes 
were failing (Carson 1962; cited in Fee et al. 2008). According to Fee and 
colleagues (2008) such setbacks resulted in growing understanding in the late 
1960s and 1970s of the need for an underlying infrastructure of health services 
and health education to support malaria control efforts and other vertical 
programmes in disease prevention and health promotion. A sign of such 
recognition is that in 1969, the World Health Assembly (the WHO’s governing 
body) concluded that malaria could not be eliminated in the absence of a 
comprehensive rural health service (ibid.). By the mid-1960s, the evident failure 
of disease-eradication programmes to meet the needs of poor and rural 
populations thus fed into a renewed concern for the social, economic and 
political dimensions of health, which intensified throughout the 1970s, 
underpinned by a shift in development theory overall (Newell 1988).
3.1.2. ‘Health for all’ and comprehensive primary healthcare
The emergence of decolonised nations and the spread of nationalist and socialist
movements during this period led to new development theories that emphasised
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long-term economic growth instead of short-term technological intervention 
(Brown et al. 2006). At the national level, health-based movements came to play 
an important role in political change, including in anti-colonial struggles (Werner 
and Sanders 1997). Cueto (2004) describes the expansion of community-based 
programmes built on grassroots participation in many countries, especially across 
Central and South America and Asia. In Africa too, there was growing 
momentum around developing functioning health systems in countries that, after 
gaining independence from colonisers, had been left with a hospital-based 
system benefiting only the urban minority {ibid.).
In line with this vision, the WHO was involved in efforts to expand 
healthcare at the primary level during the 1950s and 1960s, alongside the disease- 
eradication programmes described above. For instance, the WIIO had supported 
many governments in low-income countries in setting up maternal and child 
health (MCH) divisions as part of a broader effort to expand healthcare to the 
community level (Campbell 2001). Although there is scant documentation of 
specific international work in maternal health during this period, one WI IO 
official who worked in several developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s 
recalls in her professional memoirs that the WHO established MCI! services in 
the countries where she worked, as part of the agency’s more general work in 
primary healthcare (Barton 1998). This included programmes for training of 
midwives and traditional birth attendants, and establishment of antenatal care 
services and referral mechanisms to hospitals. This was in addition to more 
general efforts to improve health and nutrition levels and to overcome massive 
challenges posed by weak health systems and healthcare provider shortages 
(ibid.).
National level movements and activities fed into growing international 
momentum to promote the health of poor and rural populations in low-income 
countries. By the early 1970s, an international social movement formed around 
the promotion of health as a social good, a human right and an issue of social 
justice. This ideological vision was debated within the WHO, where it was most 
vociferously championed by Halfdan Mahler, a Danish public health physician 
appointed as the WHO’s Director-General in 1973. Mahler promoted the slogan 
“health for all by the year 2000,” and insisted that comprehensiveprimaty healthcare 
was the best strategy for achieving health for all (Cueto 2004).
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In 1978, the WHO collaborated with UNICEF to convene the Alma-Ata 
Conference on Primary Health Care, held between 6 and 12 September 1978 in 
Alma-Ata in the Soviet Union (now Almaty, Kazakhstan). At the conference, 
participants affirmed the right to health as a state of complete, physical and 
mental well-being (WHO and UNICEF 1978). The Alma-Ata Declaration on 
Primary Health Care was adopted by WHO member states and called for urgent 
national and international action -  supported by UN agencies, multilateral and 
bilateral donors, NGOs and health workers -  to develop and implement 
comprehensive primary healthcare, particularly in developing countries (WIIO 
and UNICEF 1978).
Comprehensive primary healthcare entailed both a philosophy of health 
as part of socio-economic development, and attention to the most peripheral 
level of the health system at which the basic health needs of the majority of 
people would be met (Cueto 2004; Irwin and Scali 2007). Its focus was thus on 
equity as well as on effectiveness and efficiency, to be achieved through the 
implementation of preventive, rural, peripheral and “appropriate” services and 
inter-sectoral collaboration, as well as participation of local communities. A main 
premise of this approach was the idea that specific disease control efforts should 
not be delivered as isolated vertical programmes, but should, instead, be 
integrated into a broad range of health and social services (Fee et al. 2008). As 
such, the realisation of the highest possible level of health required action not 
only in the health sector, but also in other social and economic sectors, such as 
agriculture and food, industry, education and housing (WHO and UNICEF 
1978). Action in such social sectors was considered necessary to address causes 
of ill health such as malnutrition, unsafe drinking water, sanitation and lack of 
knowledge about health (¿bid.). While the Declaration emphasised community 
participation in planning and implementing healthcare, it was also explicit that 
the state held ultimate responsibility for providing adequate social and health 
sector services (ibid.).
The Alma-Ata Declaration recommended a series of measures for 
improving people’s access to healthcare. These included, first, shifting the 
concentration of resources from hospitals in cities to services delivered at the 
primary level of the health system, in rural areas where the majority of the 
population in many low- and middle-income countries lived (WHO and
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UNICEF 1978). Achieving ‘health for all’ would thus involve establishing a new 
infrastructure consisting of a system of health posts and centres to replace the 
‘disease palaces’ of the post-colonial era (Fee et al. 2008). A second set of 
recommendations was related to human resources and called for the deployment 
of ‘mid-level’ healthcare providers as well as community-based health workers in 
order to overcome shortages of qualified doctors, a recommendation that was 
inspired by the success of the ‘barefoot doctors’ of communist China (ibid.).
Perhaps because the Alma-Ata Declaration was innovative in drawing 
attention to the need for community-based services to improve access, it has 
often with hindsight been erroneously assumed that the approach called for 
action only at this basic level of healthcare. In fact, the designation ‘primary 
healthcare’ is somewhat of a misnomer. While Alma-Ata became famous for 
calling attention to the need for primary level or community-based healthcare, 
the Declaration also insisted that countries must develop a network of hospitals 
and a referral system to supplement activities at the most peripheral ‘community’ 
or ‘primary’ level of the health system (Van Lerberghe et al. 1997; Turshen 
1999:24). Indeed, in 1981 Halfdan Mahler, then WHO’s Director-General, made 
an often-cited statement that, “a health system based on primary care cannot, 
and I repeat, cannot be realised, cannot be developed, cannot function, and 
simply cannot exist without a network of hospitals” (cited in Van Lerberghe et al. 
1997:801). The prevalent misunderstanding that the primary healthcare 
philosophy referred only to the community-based level has carried over into a 
common misunderstanding about the role of primary healthcare in safe 
motherhood policy too, namely that it implied only low-tech, preventive 
community-based solutions such as training of traditional birth attendants.
In sum, the Alma-Ata vision of comprehensive primary healthcare 
represented a radical and new approach to development and health. It 
epitomised a conceptual shift in the emphasis of public health from curative to 
holistic care, from specialised hospital care to improve access to health posts in 
rural areas, and from biological determinants of disease to the socioeconomic 
determinants of health (Walt 2008). However, as the next subsection highlights, 
despite the initial philosophical and ideological momentum this shift gained at 
the international level and the support it drew from many WI lO member states, 
the Alma-Ata Declaration almost immediately met with considerable resistance.
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3.1.3. Selective primary healthcare
Almost no sooner than the Declaration had been signed did the idealistic vision 
it had articulated begin to get scaled back. In 1979, the year after the Alma-Ata 
Conference, a paper published in the New Ungland Journal o f  Medicine argued that 
the Declaration’s comprehensive vision was unrealistic for poor countries and 
proposed that an interim strategy was needed to begin the process of 
implementing primary healthcare in such countries (Walsh and Warren 1979). As 
a more pragmatic and feasible alternative to the Declaration’s insistence on 
strengthening all aspects of the health system simultaneously, the authors Walsh 
and Warren, both representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation, recommended 
that donors and governments should start by targeting major sources of 
mortality and morbidity through a small number of cost-effective interventions 
whose effects could be easily monitored and measured. As the authors put it, 
“aiming services at the most important diseases is the only rational approach to 
absolute poverty and unsanitary conditions” (Walsh and Warren 1979:967). The 
‘interim’ strategy they promoted was labelled ‘selective primary healthcare,’ a 
concept that was further elaborated at a conference the World Bank and the 
Rockefeller Foundation convened in Bellagio, Italy that same year (Cucto 2004).
Selective primary healthcare heralded the establishment of a technocratic 
and technical approach to setting health priorities. Proponents of the approach 
suggested that specific diseases or conditions would be selected on the basis of 
their prevalence, morbidity and mortality and the feasibility of their control, 
which would in turn be established through assessment of the effectiveness and 
cost of available interventions (Walsh and Warren 1979). As Table 2 shows, 
whereas the comprehensive interpretation of primary healthcare incorporated 
preventive and therapeutic care delivered across the different levels of the health 
system, the selective interpretation implied a focus on simple, relatively low-tech 
interventions. The presumed advantage was that such interventions could be 
delivered directly to households and communities rather than in health facilities, 
thereby effectively sidestepping the need to wait for the development of a 
functioning health system (Freedman, 2003, citing Claeson and Waldman 2000). 
A greater role for private providers and heavy reliance on community health 
workers who would require minimal training and remuneration would, 
proponents argued, improve efficiency (Turshen 1999). Above all, selective
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primary healthcare implied a ‘vertical’ design of health services, targeting specific 
diseases at one level -  usually the community level -  of the health system, rather 
than a ‘horizontal’ approach linking all the different levels of healthcare.
Death and illness among children in low-income countries was quickly 
singled out as a priority health problem for selective intervention, in large part on 
account of the high number of child deaths (Werner and Sanders 1997). 
UNICEF’s Child Survival and Development Revolution, launched in 1982, 
became the flagship selective primary healthcare programme, introducing a series 
of selective interventions that aimed to improve survival of children up to the 
age of five, summarised under the acronym GOBI: growth monitoring, oral 
rehydration therapy, breastfeeding, and immunisation (UNICEF 1986; Cash ct al. 
1987; Black 1996).'3 As I will show below, public health specialists were 
prompted to form the Safe Motherhood Initiative in part in reaction against this 
approach. •
Comprehensive Selective
Overall goal Long-term, sustainable 
health improvement and 
social and economic 
development
Disease eradication and 
measurable progress on 
mortality and morbidity 
indicators
Healthcare provider Primarily state State and non-state, 
including private and NGO
Sector Health and other social 
sectors
I Icath sector primarily
Determinants of health 
addressed
Medical, social, economic, 
political
Medical
Organisation of health 
services
All levels of the health 
system (horizontal), 
primary-level to tertiary 
level
One level of the health 
system (vertical), usually 
primary/community level
Human resource 
strategy
Flexible; community health 
workers, mid-level 
providers and specialist 
providers, collaborative 
approach
Heavy reliance on 
community health workers
Table 2: Main elements of comprehensive and selective approaches to health (Sources: 
WHO and UNICEF 1978; Walsh & Warren 1979)
•3 Family planning, female education, and food supplementation (FFF) were added later, targeting 
women of childbearing age (15-45) (UNICEF 2006).
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3.1.4. A  politically palatable approach?
Selective primary healthcare rapidly surpassed comprehensive primary healthcare 
as the dominant international public health paradigm, in part for practical 
reasons. First, economic downturn, precipitated by the oil crisis of 1979, raised 
prescient concerns about the financing and feasibility of a comprehensive 
approach (financing being an issue that had received insufficient attention at the 
Alma-Ata Conference) (Cueto 2004). The new economic circumstances meant 
drastic reductions in funds for healthcare in developing countries and translated 
into lack of political commitment or ability in many debt-ridden countries to 
implement comprehensive primary healthcare, despite the widespread nominal 
support that had been given to the Alma-Ata Declaration (Claeson and Waldman 
2000; Cueto 2004).
The situation in low- and middle-income countries was exacerbated by 
the fact that there were no significant resources in the WIIO or other agencies 
devoted to training auxiliary personnel, improving nutrition and drinking water 
or creating new health centres (Rifkin et al. 1988). This was in contrast to other 
international campaigns, such as the global malaria eradication program of the 
1950s, where UNICEF and US bilateral assistance provided dedicated funding 
(ibid.). Moreover, the economic crisis also severely restricted the finances of UN 
agencies themselves, including the WIIO, making it even more difficult to 
finance comprehensive approaches (Brown et al. 2006; Fee et al. 2008). The 
economic downturn left WHO member states — who had financed the WI IO’s 
activities through contributions to its regular budget — unable to maintain their 
contributions (ibid). Tire damage this caused to the WHO’s budget was 
exacerbated when the US, the biggest contributor, withheld its contribution to 
the budget due to a dispute over the Wf IO’s essential drugs programme, which 
US officials perceived to contradict US commercial interests and that was 
opposed by leading US-based pharmaceutical companies (Brown et al. 2006).
At the same time, the scaling back of comprehensive primary healthcare 
in favour of a selective interpretation must be seen in relation to broader 
ideological shifts. Some increasingly powerful international health actors, 
including the World Bank and the US government, were opposed to the ‘radical’ 
undertones of the Alma-Ata Declaration and championed a selective approach 
(Irwin and Scali 2007). On an ideological level, selective primary healthcare was
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politically acceptable to the US and the World Bank (which was heavily 
influenced by US interests) because, unlike the Alma-Ata Declaration, it did not 
imply that health improvement was an adjunct to social revolution (ibid.). Indeed, 
the growing dominance of selective primary healthcare as a policy paradigm in 
the 1980s relates directly to the rise of the World Bank as a major player in 
public health during this period. Although the WIIO had been the unquestioned 
authority in international health since its creation in 1948 -  enjoying considerable 
authority within the UN and among its member states -  in the years immediately 
following the Alma-Ata Conference its legitimacy as an international agency 
began to be challenged by the World Bank (Lee and Walt 1992; Walt 1993).
Originally formed to finance reconstruction of Europe after World War 
II, from the 1970s onwards the World Bank began investing in population 
control, health and education in low- and middle-income countries, driven by the 
view that social sector investment to improve these areas would accelerate 
economic growth (Benerji 1999; Ruger 2005). It soon overran the WI IO as a 
financier of international health activities, gradually becoming a global health 
leader in its own right but bringing with it its own particular approach to health 
(Walt et al. 1999). While the WIIO had largely operated according to a model of 
state-led development of the health sector and conceived of health as a matter of 
social justice and human rights, under the influence of the World Bank health 
sector development became subject to market-oriented influence, reflecting the 
Bank’s ideological affiliation with the economic and political model that became 
known as ‘neoliberalism’. According to Sparke (2006), neoliberalism has become 
an umbrella term for the diverse ideologies, policies and practices associated with 
liberalising global markets and expanding entrepreneurial practices and capitalist 
power relations into new areas of life. Also referred to as the “Washington 
consensus” since its main proponents (the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the US government) are based in Washington, D.C.
(Navarro 1998), the core of the neoliberal vision is the idea that markets freed 
from government interference can allocate resources in the best and most 
efficient way and thereby promote common goods, including health (Cobum 
2000). Key assumptions include that the role of the state should be reduced to 
curb inefficiencies and that policies for stimulating growth should be a priority, 
since economic growth is understood to be essential for development, even if  the
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effort to accelerate economic development may involve short-term negative 
consequences {ibid.). Selective primary healthcare was articulated within this 
political ideology, which became increasingly dominant during the early 1980s.
That UNICEF with its Child Survival Revolution should join the World 
Bank and USAID (the US Development Agency) in promoting selective primary 
healthcare may seem curious given its role, only a few years earlier, in 
formulating the Alma-Ata approach jointly with the WIIO. I Iowever, this 
development reflected, among other things, a leadership change within UNICEF 
in 1979, the year after the Alma-Ata Declaration had been signed. UNICEF’s 
new Director, Jim Grant — often described as a charismatic leader who 
masterminded the GOBI approach -  believed international agencies had to work 
within existing political constraints to do their best to achieve short-term success 
by focusing on narrow but feasible interventions (Black 1996; Irwin and Scali 
2007).
3.1.5. A  counter-revolution?
The seemingly successful implementation in the early 1980s of the Child Survival 
Revolution as the flagship selective primary healthcare programme did much to 
bolster support for the approach. Major donor resources were mobilised, and the 
Child Survival and Development Revolution (or the Child Survival Initiative) 
formed what can perhaps be seen as the first global health initiative. Within a few 
years of UNICEF launching the Child Survival Initiative, many in the 
international health community were celebrating the apparent success of GOBI 
at reducing child mortality. According to Cueto, GOBI was in particular 
attractive to donors because it enabled them to tie their inputs to specific 
interventions and outcomes (Cueto 2004:9). The popularity of vaccines -  one of 
the key interventions in the GOBI strategy — had already been secured by the 
announcement in 1980 of the eradication of smallpox, the first disease ever to be 
eliminated through human action (Fenner et al. 1988; Fee et al. 2008).
At the same time, supporters of a comprehensive interpretation of 
primary healthcare vehemendy opposed the selective approach, resulting in a 
polemical debate that intensified during the early 1980s. Some commentators 
declared that comprehensive and selective primary healthcare were 
“irreconcilable” and “diametrically opposed” (Rifkin and Walt 1986). Others 
mounted practical, philosophical and political objections to selective primary
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healthcare. While conceding that selective primary healthcare could effectively 
address the immediate causes of death and ill health from specific diseases, they 
argued that public health involves more than selecting death-reducing technology 
(Newell 1988; Wisner 1988; Walt and Gilson 1994; Werner and Sanders 1997). 
They also derided primary healthcare for failing to address the development of a 
functioning health system and the underlying social and economic determinants 
of health. As one such critic argued, health planning cannot be reduced to an 
abstract task of allocating resources “to maximise a weighted combination of 
effectiveness, equity and efficiency” (Berman 1982:1054).
Not surprisingly, many proponents of a comprehensive approach also 
saw selective primary healthcare as an unwelcome extension of neoliberalism, 
which they opposed on the grounds that it challenged the political vision for 
social justice, equity and state-led development espoused in the Alma-Ata 
Declaration (Turshen 1999; Magnussen et al. 2004:44). One critic was particularly 
scathing, arguing that UNICEF was “dangerously mistaken” in thinking that its 
so-called “revolution” is “a precursor or 'leading edge' of comprehensive primary 
healthcare” (Wisner 1988:963).
Although immunisation campaigns accelerated in developing countries 
after the mid-1980s and dramatically increased immunisation coverage, such 
apparent success did not lessen the debate (Cueto 2004). Wisner (1988) argued 
that UNICEFs approach -  the diffusion of a package of technologies by 
campaigns organised from the top down -  was likely to undermine the social 
basis for comprehensive care. The supporters of comprehensive primary 
healthcare cited above saw oral rehydration solutions championed under the 
GOBI strategy as a ‘Band-Aid’ in places where safe water and sanitation systems 
did not exist (Cueto 2004). These objections rose to a clamour in the pages of 
Social Science & Medicine around the time the Safe Motherhood Initiative was 
being launched, with one author labelling selective primary healthcare a 
“counter-revolution” (Newell 1988).
Cueto (2004), one of the few historians to have written about the history 
of primary healthcare, offers an analysis of this debate, suggesting that it 
illustrates two diverse assumptions in international health in the 20,h century. 
Supporters of comprehensive primary healthcare assumed that diseases in less- 
developed nations were socially and economically sustained. The social and
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economic basis of ill health implied that a political, and not simply technological, 
response was needed. Conversely, supporters of selective primary healthcare 
worked from the assumption that the main diseases in poor countries primarily 
needed technological solutions. In the second half of the chapter I show how the 
work of early safe motherhood advocates was premised very much on the 
former of these assumptions, something that would shape the future 
development of the movement in important ways.
3.2. ‘Where is the M in MCH?’
The Safe Motherhood Initiative was created in the midst of the debates reviewed 
above. In fact, I would argue that a core impetus for the creation of an inidative 
dedicated to maternal ill health and mortality was intense dissatisfaction within 
parts of the international public health community with the growing dominance 
of selective primary healthcare as the main paradigm for international health. 
Indeed, the formation of the Safe Motherhood Initiative can be seen as part of a 
broader effort to revive political commitment to the comprehensive primary 
healthcare or ‘health for all’ agenda as against the broader trend of selective 
approaches. This can be seen both in the framing of the issue of ‘safe 
motherhood’, as well as in the specific international policy recommendations that 
safe motherhood practitioners promoted for achieving it.
By the mid-1980s, commentators noted that “despite international 
commitment to primary healthcare and ‘health for all by the year 2000,’ in many 
countries relatively little attention has gone to maternal health” (Ilerz and 
Measham 1987:5). This statement is indicative of the fact that some public health 
specialists came to equate the scaling back of Alma-Ata with the neglect of 
women’s health in international health efforts (relative to the focus placed on 
saving children’s lives). Public health specialists identified an important gap 
between policy rhetoric and realities, pointing out that although “stated health 
policies stressed maternal and child health and family planning (often noting that 
all three are linked and that neglect of one jeopardises the others),” most health 
budgets for low-income countries allocated less than 20 percent to these issues 
(Herz and Measham 1987:5). Moreover, the bulk of this funding was said to go 
to child health. Such observations reflect growing dissatisfaction in the 1980s 
that women’s health was receiving little attention in international debates, despite
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the fact that healthcare for mothers and children -  so-called MCI I services -  had 
been seen as the heart of the primary healthcare system model (WI lO and 
UNICEF 1978). While MCII services had clearly been intended to benefit 
mothers and children alike as the basis for improved population health, once 
selective primary healthcare became implemented through child survival 
initiatives in the early 1980s, many believed that the maternal component of 
MCH was being sidelined in favour of the interventions targeted at children 
(Rosenfield and Maine 1985).
This point was made cogendy in a highly influential article entitled 
‘Where is the M in MCH.’ This article was written by Allan Rosenficld and 
Deborah Maine (ibid), both public health specialists then based at Columbia 
University in New York who would later become key figures within the safe 
motherhood movement, and published in the medical journal the Lancet in 1985. 
The Where is the M in MCH’ article is often credited with almost single- 
handedly launching safe motherhood as an international health movement, 
because of the scale of the response it galvanised within the international public 
health community. The crux of Rosenfield and Maine’s argument was that 
selective primary healthcare — exemplified by GOBI — was an inadequate model 
for responding to the full range of public health problems of low-income 
countries. While lauding GOBI for expanding access to services in rural areas 
and moving away from the hospital-based model of healthcare characteristic of 
the immediate post-colonial era, they argued that for certain important public 
health problems, selective approaches of the kind promoted by the GOBI 
approach would simply not suffice.
The case of maternal mortality illustrated particularly clearly the 
limitations of selective primary healthcare as a single paradigm for addressing the 
health problems of poor countries. As Rosenfield and Maine (1985) argued, 
maternal mortality is a health problem that cannot be tackled through a selective 
approach comprised of preventive, low-tech and community-based 
interventions. They claimed that such approaches are inappropriate for tackling 
maternal mortality because most pregnancy-related deaths occur following 
obstetric emergencies (including haemorrhage, infection, toxaemia, obstructed 
labour and unsafe abortion) that, on the whole, can be neither prevented nor 
predicted through community-based programmes (Rosenfield and Maine
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1985:84). Instead, to avert deaths from such complications, relatively 
sophisticated treatment is required, such as caesarean section for obstructed 
labour and blood transfusion for massive post-partum haemorrhage (ibid.). Such 
interventions, routinely used in maternity care in Western countries since at least 
the 1930s, had helped to virtually eliminate maternal mortality as a public health 
problem in those countries (Hogberg et al. 1986; Loudon 1986). In order to 
ensure women’s access to such life-saving treatment in low- and middle-income 
settings, it would be necessary to build comprehensive systems of maternity care, 
spanning from the primary or community level to referral hospitals, mirroring 
the model of comprehensive primary healthcare described in the Alma-Ata 
Declaration (ibid).
3.2.1. A  social movement for women’s health
Public health specialists opposed to exclusive reliance on selective primary 
healthcare buttressed the call for comprehensive maternity care systems. Such 
support was further enhanced by the rise of an international feminist social 
movement in the 1980s that was supportive of the need to draw special attention 
to women’s health. As I show below, by the mid-1980s, momentum around the 
need to revive the principles of Alma-Ata and demand for action on women’s 
health converged to create support for the establishment of an international 
initiative dedicated to maternal health.
For feminists, advocating for women’s health was part of a broader 
agenda to improve women’s social status and ensure their rights to work and 
control over their own bodies, including through access to contraception and 
abortion (Turshen 2007). Feminist health activists, primarily from the US, were 
motivated by grave dismay that many women in low-income countries were 
restricted by male family members from seeking healthcare, in part due to a 
general devaluing of women’s lives. As one informant explained, they were 
alarmed by the truth behind the saying from countries such as Bangladesh that 
“it is better to lose your wife than your cow.” For feminists, the aim of ensuring 
women’s autonomy and access to healthcare was, in turn, closely linked to 
demands to abolish population control measures through vertical family planning 
programmes, which sometimes included coercive sterilisation. Since the 1950s, 
such programmes had become commonplace in a number of countries pursuing 
donor-supported population-control policies (Lane 1994; Pearson and Sweetman
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1994; Gruskin et al. 2008). According to Gruskin and colleagues (2008), global 
feminist activism for health impacted on the UN Decade for Women (1976- 
1985), and created a policy context that was receptive to the demand for 
attention to women’s pregnancy-related health.
By the mid-1980s, a group of international experts driven by the 
convergence of feminist and public health concerns, galvanised by the “Where is 
the M in MCH’ article, thus began to promote a new agenda on women’s health, 
driven at least in part by the aim of challenging the growing dominance of the 
popular Child Survival Revolution. During in-depth interviews, informants who 
had been involved in this development described how a network of people 
interested in maternal health and mortality started to form, promoted by the 
links between technical staff at various international agencies and research- and 
advocacy-oriented international NGOs. Following several WI IO-hosted 
meetings in 1985, the first international Safe Motherhood Conference convened 
in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1987, drawing more than a hundred participants.
At the conference, UN member states committed to pursuing the goals 
of improving women’s health and reducing maternal mortality (see Starrs 1987 
for the conference report, including the Call to Action). The conference officially 
launched the ‘Safe Motherhood Initiative’ as a multi-agency effort to formulate 
strategies to deal with the problems of maternal mortality and ill health, as well as 
the underlying issue of women’s low social status. An Inter-Agency Group 
(IAG) was appointed to oversee implementation of the Initiative’s programme of 
action. The IAG consisted of representatives from the WIIO, UNICEF,
UNFPA and UNDP (the United Nations Development Programme), as well as 
the World Bank and NGOs (the Population Council, the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and a newly formed NGO called Family Care 
International (FCI), which was to serve as the group’s secretariat). The fact that 
such a wide range of actors converged reflected growing commitment to 
women’s health, but also the fragmentation of the international health field 
marked by the emergence of the World Bank as a key actor, as noted above.
A result of the complex composition of the IAG was that the Initiative 
was tom between the different institutional agendas and priorities of its 
members. Nevertheless, the fact that its individual members managed to 
promote a relatively coherent agenda despite their diverse institutional affiliations
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serves to highlight that there was a variety of different positions even within the 
various agencies represented in the LAG. For instance, despite the World Bank’s 
overall espousal of the selective primary healthcare paradigm, it was representatives 
of the World Bank who were the main authors of the Initiative’s avowedly 
comprehensive policy agenda, which I review in detail below (see I lerz and 
Measham 1987).
3.2.2. The imperative for action on maternal mortality 
The ‘Where’s the M in MCH’ article drew attention to the technical limitations of 
selective primary healthcare as a response to the public health problem of 
maternal mortality. In the years that followed, public health specialists and 
women’s health advocates went about framing the issue of pregnancy-related 
morbidity and mortality in a way that explicitly rejected not only the selective 
primary healthcare paradigm’s focus on ‘magic bullet’ community-based 
approaches, but also its priority-setting approach. While the selective primary 
healthcare paradigm had formalised the notion that health priorities should be 
selected according to the magnitude of deaths and infirmity attributed to them 
and the cost-effectiveness of the interventions available, the case for ‘safe 
motherhood’ was made rather differently, and was more in keeping with the 
ideological basis of Alma-Ata. The way ‘safe motherhood’ came to be framed 
clearly supports the notion that the Initiative sought to reaffirm the core 
principles encapsulated in the ‘health for all’ agenda discussed above.
A principal argument put forth to justify the call for action on safe 
motherhood was that the high level of maternal mortality in low-income 
countries was not inevitable or natural, but instead represented avoidable loss of 
life. As such, it was a preventable tragedy that governments and the international 
community had an ethical obligation to address. As my informants explained, the 
fact that effective treatment existed to avert maternal mortality was perhaps the 
most compelling argument for action.
Second, advocates posited action on maternal mortality as an essential 
task for international development efforts more broadly. They interpreted the 
fact that women in poor countries continued to die of medical complications 
that had been almost eradicated as causes of death in industrialised countries 
over 50 years ago as a clear indication of the failure of international development 
efforts overall, suggesting the need for a revised response. Indeed, many early
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advocates seem to have perceived pregnancy-related mortality to be so 
interwoven with broad-based development that one Safe Motherhood 
Conference delegate claimed that, “there is no greater indictment of 
development efforts than the high rates of maternal deaths that prevail in much 
of the world” (cited in Starrs 1987:42). To support this view, participants in the 
conference pointed to the discrepancy between maternal mortality rates of poor 
countries and rich ones, where maternal mortality is no longer a major public 
health problem. New statistics provided clear evidence of the inequity 
underpinning maternal mortality. The first global estimates of maternal mortality 
published in 1986 revealed that nearly all -  99 percent -  of half a million 
pregnancy-related deaths annually, occurred in low-income countries (WIIO 
1986). Rates in low-income countries were 200 times higher than those in 
Europe and North America, “the widest disparity of all statistics in public 
health” (Mahler 1987A-668).
At the same time, advocates pointed to the success of Western countries 
in drastically reducing maternal mortality through dedicated health and social 
policies as inspiration for countries still beset by high maternal mortality rates. As 
Mahler (1987^:670) put it to the participants at the first Safe Motherhood 
Conference in Nairobi in 1987, “we need to remember that the industrialised 
countries faced this challenge in the past. For some the change has taken place in 
our lifetime, through dedication and the reallocation of priorities.” According to 
informants, the fact that in certain countries, such as Sweden, maternal mortality 
declines had preceded large-scale socio-economic developments lent further 
support to their call for action.
Further, framing maternal mortality as a social injustice implied an 
obligation on the part of governments and international community to respond 
to this public health problem (Cook and Dickens 2002). Mahler, for instance, 
was adamant that maternal mortality had been neglected first and foremost 
precisely because “its victims are those with the least power and influence in 
society — they are poor, rural peasants and female” (Mahler 1987¿:668).
Interviews with informants who participated in the conference suggest that there 
was broad consensus that, while specific medical complications are the direct 
cause of maternal deaths, such deaths result ultimately from poor women’s 
limited access to healthcare, especially to emergency care, sustained by underlying
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discrimination in areas such as education, employment, property and decision­
making authority.
Although an underlying goal for the Initiative was to improve women’s 
status and autonomy over their bodies and reproductive lives, it is important to 
note that certain of the most controversial aspects of this agenda -  namely 
abortion rights -  were toned down in the Initiative’s public rhetoric, so as not to 
alienate decision-makers with conservative attitudes towards women’s rights 
from supporting the broader call to action. Instead, advocates promoted the idea 
of ensuring safe ‘motherhood,’ which, with its implied focus on childbirth and 
maternal nurturing, they considered to be largely uncontroversial. Indeed, 
informants who were active in the Initiative’s early days explained that they 
deliberately avoided incendiary demands for the expansion of abortion rights.
This was a useful tactic at a time of great religious and political opposition to 
abortion, as manifest in the Mexico City policy introduced in 1984 by US 
President Ronald Reagan, which prohibited allocation of federal funds to 
organisations that provide abortions or support abortion-related work (Finlde 
and Crane 1985). Rather than make demands for expanded abortion rights perse, 
maternal health advocates chose to approach the abortion issue primarily from a 
public health angle. They framed unsafe abortion as a cause of maternal death 
and issued demands for post-abortion care to treat consequences of unsafe 
abortion (including perforated uterus, haemorrhage, infections and secondary 
infertility) as one component of the medical interventions needed to reduce 
maternal mortality.
The very choice of the tenn ‘safe motherhood’ to describe the Initiative’s 
work and goals was motivated by its largely uncontroversial connotations, as well 
as its potentially wide scope. According to one informant who had participated 
in preparatory meetings for the 1978 Safe Motherhood Conference, it was in fact 
the husband of one of the chief authors of the Initiative’s main policy documents 
who “came up with the term one night over dinner.” Although many quibbled at 
first, finding it quite a “strange term,” she explained that consensus rapidly 
emerged around its political value as a catch-all term that was not immediately 
contentious:
One of the things that was so useful about the term ‘safe 
motherhood’ from the very beginning was that it’s something no 
one could say they were against. The most hardnosed
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unsentimental decision-maker or economist has a mother, or has 
a sister or has a wife, or has a daughter. Nobody can say they are 
opposed to reducing maternal mortality. So it’s very useful in 
that sense. And if you take the broad approach to maternal 
health you do bring in issues not just of training of midwives 
and supplying health facilities but also the issues of education 
for girls, for women’s status and women’s rights in society and 
how women are viewed. But you can do so in a way which is not 
so threatening to men and decision-makers who might 
otherwise.. .I’m all for women’s rights obviously, but you do 
find it’s very threatening to some decision-makers. Safe 
Motherhood, at least overtly, is not.
As this quote suggests, although early safe motherhood advocates were
ideologically committed to feminist ideals, they were also clearly attentive to the
political sensitivities surrounding their objectives, shaping the language of their
demands to the political realities of their time. Meanwhile, although they were
careful about the way they publicly portrayed the abortion issue, their framing of
safe motherhood as an ethical, social justice and development imperative
provided a clear challenge to the emerging disease-specific, neoliberal bias in
international health policy. In sum, it seems clear that early safe motherhood
advocates worked from the premise that high levels of maternal mortality in poor
countries were caused by underlying social and economic factors and, as such,
would require a political as well as a medical response. Indeed, at the Nairobi
Conference Mahler (1987úí) advised the public health community to resist the
urge to search for “a single magic bullet that could slay this dragon,” suggesting
that such a search would be futile. Failure to address the underlying social and
economic causes of maternal mortality would mean that the problem would only
increase in magnitude with population growth {ibid).
3.2.3. Saving women’s lives through comprehensive primary 
healthcare
The social vision of public health discussed above is clearly reflected in the 
international policy recommendations on safe motherhood that the IAG issued 
at and around the time of the Nairobi Conference, as I show below. On the 
whole, these policy recommendations echoed the core principles of the Alma- 
Ata agenda. Several important elements stand out.
First, in their call to action, the IAG recommended a combined and 
simultaneous focus on social, economic and medical determinants of health,
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including social sector policy interventions to address the underlying 
determinants of women’s pregnancy-related ill health and death. They urged 
governments and donors to address the full range of causes of high levels of 
maternal mortality within a population: “the chain of poor nutrition, illiteracy, 
lack of income and employment opportunities, poor environmental conditions, 
inadequate health and family planning services, and low social status” (Starrs 
1987:4-5).
Second, the IAG’s health sector recommendations called for a combined 
therapeutic and preventive approach, stretching from the primary to the tertiary 
level of the health system, linking communities with health facilities (Starrs 1987). 
The aim was not only to avert deaths, but also to improve health through a range 
of distinct, but complementary interventions. The IAG identified the district as 
the appropriate level of the health system for administering this model of 
primary healthcare, with separate specific recommended actions for the primary 
(or community) and first-referral levels. In the model that was recommended, the 
primary level included outreach programmes and health dispensaries, posts or 
centres, while the first-referral level comprised “usually a district or cottage 
hospital with 20 beds or more, with capability for blood transfusion and 
caesarean section” (Herz and Measham 1987:19).l4Table 3 summarises the main 
aspects of the proposed health sector strategy.
As Table 3 indicates, according to the IAG’s model interventions 
designed to maintain health and treat minor morbidity should be implemented at 
the primary level. Such interventions included preventive measures and relatively 
simple medical care, such as family planning, prenatal care and supervised 
delivery without complications. Additionally, it was recommended that screening 
for high risk of pregnancy complications should be carried out at this level of the 
health system, if  necessary followed by referral of the patient to a higher level of 
care.
The IAG further recommended that interventions designed to treat 
severe morbidity and avert deaths from obstetric complications be delivered at 
the first-referral level. These interventions included relatively sophisticated
14 This model built on Rosenfield and Maine’s 1985 suggestion for a specific model of a 
comprehensive system that would comprise small maternity centres in rural areas and, for every 
100,000 people, 20-bed rural MCH centres that would be referral centres for high-risk women 
and women with serious complications. The system they proposed was modelled on Taylor and 
Berelson (1968) had outlined in the late 1960s.
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procedures such as caesarean section and blood transfusion. A good referral 
mechanism between the primary and the referral level was seen as essential for 
ensuring women’s timely access to such life-saving care. In addition to this 
recommendation that pregnancy and delivery complications should primarily be 
treated at the first-referral level, a series of community-level experimental 
therapeutic approaches was also proposed, such as antibiotics to treat 
complications of abortions and certain cases of sepsis (Ilerz and Measham 1987).
Primary/community level First-referral (district) 
level
Type of health issue 
addressed
Uncomplicated delivery 
Family planning 
Antenatal care
Antenatal screening for high- 
risk pregnancies 
General healthcare
Complications and 
emergencies related to 
pregnancy, abortion and 
delivery
Type of intervention Supervised delivery 
Detection of complications 
Referral in case of 
complications 
Contraceptive care
Emergency care (c-section, 
blood transfusion etc.) 
Treatment of incomplete 
abortion
(Abortion where legal)
Type of healthcare 
provider
Community health workers, 
including traditional birth 
attendants (supported by 
professional staff)
Mid-level providers 
(specially-trained nurses 
and midwives) (later called 
skilled birth attendants) 
Physicians
Specialists (obstetricians)
Table 3: The IAG's 1987 health sector recommendations for maternal health (Sources: 
Starrs 1987; Hertz & Measham 1987)
While safe motherhood advocates clearly called for system-level change, 
they anticipated arguments about prohibitive costs by arguing that this did not 
imply large-scale investment in new medical technologies or hospitals. As 
informants explained, they argued that a comprehensive maternity care system 
could be implemented with relatively minor investments to improve the 
organisation and management of the health system. What was needed was a 
change in prioritisation away from vertical programmes towards strengthening 
core elements of the health system, for instance by upgrading existing facilities, 
instituting managerial changes and strengthening referral systems. In a similar 
vein, advocates, such as Rosenfield and Maine, also tried to appeal to the broader
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benefits of such investments for existing selective programmes, such as the 
potential to expand family planning services through maternity care, an effort to 
appeal to the World Bank’s and others’ interest in population control (Rosenfield 
and Maine 1985).
A third important element of the safe motherhood policy agenda related 
to how comprehensive health systems would be staffed. This posed an obvious 
challenge, given the short supply of specialists (obstetricians) and physicians in 
most low-income countries. The Alma-Ata Declaration had recommended a 
pragmatic solution to such staff shortages, relying on ‘task shifting’ from more 
specialised to lesser specialised cadres and mobilising a large number of 
community-based health workers without formal medical qualifications -  who 
would require minimal training, supervision and remuneration — to deliver the 
bulk of healthcare at the primary level (WHO and UNICEF 1978). Mirroring the 
Alma-Ata Declaration, the Safe Motherhood Initiative recommended a similar 
pragmatic response. More specifically, the IAG recommended that primary-level 
services be delivered principally by community-based health workers, including 
traditional birth attendants (TBAs), given that professional midwives and 
obstetricians were reaching very few women (Campbell 2001).15
According to informants, TBAs were seen as the ‘default’ birth assistants 
in rural communities. Involving them in formal healthcare delivery was therefore 
understood as a strategy for facilitating women’s access to basic medical care and 
improving referral links between communities and formal, higher-level health 
facilities. The expectation was that improving such links would improve the 
likelihood of women using life-saving biomedical healthcare in the event of a 
pregnancy or delivery complication (Sibley and Sipe 2004). I Iowever, it is 
important to note that the recommendation to involve TBAs in the delivery of 
formal maternal healthcare was premised on the assumption that TBAs would be 
supported by formally accredited biomedical healthcare providers at higher levels 
of care (Herz and Measham 1987). It was never assumed, as has often been
15 Use of community-based and indigenous providers was a point o f convergence between 
comprehensive and selective interpretations of primary healthcare. The Child Survival 
Revolution, for instance, relied heavily on community-based health workers to' implement GOBI 
However, a ma,or difference was that while selective programmes like GOBI focused almost 
exclusively on such providers to implement Vertical’ programmes, within the comprehensive 
primary healthcare model the intention was that community-based workers should be inteerated 
within a horizontal health system and supported by more highly qualified staff.
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claimed with hindsight, that training TBAs alone would reduce maternal 
mortality.
Another important rationale behind the recommendation to involve 
TBAs was the assumption that they could contribute to the goal of inter-sectoral 
development, while also being respectful of local childbirth cultures. TBAs’ close 
community ties and frequent contact with women were thought to put them in a 
good position to teach better health practices to communities and to help change 
attitudes towards women, thereby helping to improve women’s status (see Starrs 
1987). As the Safe Motherhood call to action stated, “improving the skills of 
community health workers and TBAs, providing them with equipment, and 
enlisting their assistance and support in disseminating information to the 
community are critical steps to improving healthcare for pregnant women at the 
community level” (Starrs 1987:30).
While community-based workers were defined as the backbone of the 
primary level of the health system, policy documents were also explicit the need 
for “adequately staffed and equipped health facilities” at the first-referral level, to 
complement community-based care (Herz and Measham 1987:33). In terms of 
human resources to staff higher levels of the health system, the priority was on 
training and deploying formally accredited and biomedically-trained staff 
competent to deliver relatively sophisticated medical care, including surgery such 
as caesarean sections. Given that most low-income countries were known to be 
beset with shortages of both general and specialist physicians, the 
recommendation was that ‘mid-level providers’ (specially trained nurses and 
midwives) rather than doctors should provide such life-saving care {ibid).
Certain medical professional organisations initially resisted the proposal 
to train mid-level providers. According to my informants, such resistance 
stemmed from physicians’ reluctance to devolve their specialist medical tasks to 
lesser-accredited staff, for fear that doing so would undermine their own medical 
authority and threaten their professional turf and status (see also Newell 1988). 
In the end, however, pragmatism appears to have prevailed to create support for 
the proposal on mid-level providers. As Dr. Beverly Winikoff -  a physician 
representing the NGO Population Council -  starkly put it to the Nairobi 
Conference participants, “given the lack of resources and personnel, it isn’t a
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question of nurse C-section versus a doctor C-section. It’s a question of a nurse 
C-section or no C-section at all, and probably death” (cited in Starrs 1987:34).
With its emphasis on combined social and medical, preventive and 
therapeutic care and its call for pragmatic responses to women’s constrained 
access to care, the Safe Motherhood Initiative thus in effect called for 
comprehensive primary healthcare as the best model for achieving the Initiative’s 
goals. This was quite explicitly stated in a commentary Mahler (1987^:668) 
published in the Lancet, which summarised the core elements of the strategy 
described above:
The commitment by all the governments of the world to the 
Health for All Strategy gives a ray of hope. The only solution [to 
maternal mortality] must involve a certain basic equity not 
merely from an ethical point of view, but because these deaths 
strike disproportionately on the poor in remote rural areas. We 
can succeed in making a major impact only by ensuring for all 
women access to the essential elements of preventive and 
promotive maternal health and family planning care — and, 
particularly, essential obstetric care in life-threatening 
emergencies of pregnancy and childbirth. To take this 
combination of preventive and therapeutic care to the most 
peripheral level possible, the only approach which can succeed is 
that of primary healthcare. A well-planned combination of the 
community’s and the families’ own efforts with the inputs of 
governments and agencies offers the best hope of success. Local 
healthcare, however, cannot exist in a vacuum. It needs technical 
and management support.
Although Mahler insisted that primary healthcare is the only approach 
that could succeed, this should not be mistaken as his endorsement of blueprint 
solutions to health problems. Instead of offering universal prescriptions, the 
original set of policy recommendations offered a set of guiding principles for the 
organisation of healthcare delivery, emphasising the fundamental importance of 
simultaneous action in social and health sectors to address maternal mortality as 
a social justice, development and rights issue. While stressing the importance of 
adapting the comprehensive set of recommendations to each country context, 
the bottom line in the policy documents reviewed above was that any safe 
motherhood strategy seeking to bring about major reductions in maternal 
mortality would have to tackle the pregnancy and birth complications and 
emergencies that are the direct cause of the majority of maternal deaths (Herz 
and Measham 1987). Doing so, in turn, would require not the kind of ‘magic
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bullet’ approach espoused by the Child Survival Revolution, but would depend 
on building up functional health systems. As stated in the policy proposals, “the 
system will be no stronger than its weakest element. No maternal health 
programme can work effectively through action at one level only” (I lerz & 
Measham 1987, cited in Starrs, 1987:40).
3.3. Conclusion
The Safe Motherhood Initiative was launched at a decisive moment in the history 
of international health collaboration, and was indeed in many ways a product of 
this moment. Its emergence as an inter-agency coalition incorporating UN 
agencies, including the World Bank, and several NGOs is emblematic of the 
rapidly changing nature of global health governance at the time. Launched to 
temper the dominance of UNICEF’s Child Survival Revolution and its perceived 
sidelining of women’s specific healthcare needs, the formation of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative provides an early example of the impact of growing 
competition for attention and resources in the global health arena. In later years, 
similar processes would contribute to a proliferation of disease-specific 
(selective) global health initiatives.
In this chapter I have shown that the set of international policy 
recommendations for achieving ‘safe motherhood’ that was formulated in 1987 
can best be understood in relation to an enduring ideological struggle between 
competing visions of health. This was expressed in broader policy debates about 
the best overall strategy — comprehensive or disease-specific — for improving 
health in low-income countries. Although the debate about comprehensive and 
selective approaches is today often reduced to a technical debate about the 
relative effectiveness and efficiency of alternative strategies for achieving health 
outcomes, I have sought to draw attention to the ideological and political origins 
of these debates. Highlighting these broader origins is important because 
misunderstanding and misrepresentations about the early competing policy 
visions prevail, muddling efforts to assess their value. For instance, current 
discussions rarely distinguish between comprehensive and selective 
interpretations of primary healthcare. With reference to safe motherhood policy, 
this has sometimes led commentators to describe primary healthcare in terms of 
a set of preventive, community-based interventions -  TBA-training and antenatal
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screening -  rather than in terms of the combined social, economic, preventive 
and therapeutic approach described. On the basis of such incomplete depictions, 
contemporary commentators often denounce primary healthcare as an 
appropriate strategy for improving maternal health. Such misrepresentations, 
though often unintended, feed into rejection of primary healthcare as an 
appropriate response to the challenges of securing safe motherhood on 
erroneous grounds. This, however, is a major simplification and 
misrepresentation of the original primary healthcare vision for safe motherhood, 
which was in fact inherently comprehensive rather than selective.
In the common narrative that circulates of early safe motherhood policy, 
it is often implied that in its early days the field was driven by, in the words of 
one of my informants, “people on a mission,” who recommended misguided 
strategies driven by idealism rather than technical understanding. I Iowever, while 
early safe motherhood advocates were certainly idealistic -  in that they hoped to 
improve women’s social status and health — such idealism co-existed with 
sophisticated appreciation of the need also for specialised curative and 
emergency care to tackle obstetric complications that, without treatment, lead to 
women’s death. More significantly, these advocates should be credited with 
delineating the specific medical requirements for averting maternal deaths, as 
well as for insisting that ensuring access to these interventions would depend on 
functioning health systems. Indeed, this is a message that the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative is still struggling to gamer support for today.
The Safe Motherhood Initiative clearly went against the orthodoxy that 
was becoming established in global health, which favours disease-specific, low- 
tech solutions delivered through vertical programmes, calling instead for revival 
of political commitment to the Alma-Ata Declaration and comprehensive 
primary healthcare. As I explore in the next chapter, this was a call that came up 
against significant obstacles. While ‘safe motherhood’ was taken up as an 
international health issue after the first Safe Motherhood Conference in 1987, its 
comprehensive vision was gradually reduced to a set of vertical programmes of 
the kind that the Safe Motherhood Initiative had originally denounced.
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C h a p t e r  4
4. IMPLEMENTING SAFE MOTHERHOOD
POLICY: THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE
A decade into the Safe Motherhood Initiative the verdict on its performance was 
dismal at best. One analysis of available health statistics concluded that whereas 
there may be certain “grounds for optimism” regarding trends in maternal 
mortality in parts of North Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, the 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa “remains disquieting” (AbouZahr and Wardlaw 
2001:561). Although there was clearly much greater international awareness of 
maternal mortality in low-income countries, one commentary queried whether 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative was an “orphan initiative,” struggling to achieve 
support and funding (Weil and Fernandez 1999). In summarising the history of 
the movement to the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics in 
1997, Rosenfield (1997:8), by now a leader in the field, lamented that “little has 
changed in terms of specific national initiatives in this area.” Certainly it was the 
case that by the end of the first decade, there was a perception that the Initiative 
had fallen well short of expectations, and even that it had “stalled” (Maine and 
Rosenfield 1999). Indeed, as I show in this chapter, in terms of implementation, 
safe motherhood came to be equated primarily with vertical, community-based 
programmes for training traditional birth attendants (TBAs), far from the original 
comprehensive agenda outlined in Chapter 3.
Such lack of progress may seem surprising given the initial widespread 
international commitment to the Initiative’s goals, and the fact that these goals 
were later endorsed at a series of regional and national meetings sponsored by 
the World Bank, UN agencies and others during the first years after the Nairobi 
Conference, including by the representatives of over 90 countries (Rosenfield 
1997; AbouZahr 2003). Moreover, the UN-sponsored Conference on Population 
and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, Egypt in 1994 declared safe motherhood a 
core component of reproductive health and rights and reaffirmed global goals 
for maternal mortality reductions (Dejong 2000). By 1997, ten years after the 
Nairobi Conference, Rosenfield (1997:8) was thus able to note that “virtually all
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discussions of women’s health now contain at least a general reference to 
maternal deaths and most governments of developing countries have pledged to 
fight this long-neglected problem.” Given such attention, one is therefore forced 
to ask: Why so little action?
I aim to answer this question by analysing what I term the 
‘implementation gap,’ or the discrepancy that emerged between stated 
commitment and action on safe motherhood. In doing so, I seek to address the 
question of how it was that the same international agencies that formulated and 
promoted the comprehensive policy agenda discussed in the previous chapter 
came to support a dramatically scaled back set of programmes. How and why did 
international action on safe motherhood come to resemble the selective, vertical 
programmes that the Safe Motherhood Initiative had vehemently rejected as an 
inadequate response to maternal mortality and ill health in poor countries?
In answering this question, I do not provide in-depth analysis of policy 
implementation at the country level, but focus instead on delineating some of the 
more important trends in the work of international organisations in countries 
depending heavily on external financial and technical assistance to the health 
sector, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. In the first section of this chapter I briefly 
describe the safe motherhood programmes that I argue came to represent a 
scaled back version of the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s original policy vision.
This is followed by an analysis of safe motherhood practitioners’ own 
explanations of this ‘implementation gap.’ The practitioners commonly posit that 
the Initiative’s lack o f ‘strategic focus’ and confusion over its priorities translated 
into limited support for its full agenda. In the third section, I juxtapose this set of 
explanations with a broader perspective on the political-economic and policy 
context into which the Initiative was launched. Taking this broader context into 
account, I argue, helps to better understand why, despite its good intentions, the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative struggled so hard to realise itself.
4.1. Comprehensive vision and selective programmes
In the decade from 1987 to 1997 the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s 
recommendation that the international community should support the expansion 
of comprehensive systems of maternity care in low-income countries, backed up 
by social and economic policies to ensure access to healthcare, did not correlate
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with actual practice (AbouZahr 2001; Campbell 2001; AbouZahr 2003; Starrs 
2006). This was especially the case in the donor-dependent countries of sub- 
Saharan Africa, where health systems were the weakest and maternal mortality 
the highest. Although a number of countries developed extensive plans for safe 
motherhood, in large part on the basis of international recommendations, few of 
these plans were actually funded (Starrs 2006).
Donors and intemadonal agencies may have committed in principle to 
policy change to achieve the Initiative’s goals, but there was a striking gap 
between their stated commitments and their actual practices in low-income 
countries. According to informants who were active in the field during this 
period, there was, for instance, limited international support for building up 
referral health systems or for the training, recruitment or retention of accredited 
healthcare providers, including the recommended enhancement of mid-level 
providers’ clinical skills in emergency obstetric care. Nor was there any 
systematic effort to take forward inter-sectoral collaboration to address women’s 
status, education and physical and financial access to healthcare. In fact, 
international action on safe motherhood was largely restricted to a limited set of 
activities that came to resemble the kind of selective programmes that the 
Initiative had denounced as an inadequate solution to the challenge of improving 
pregnancy-related survival. More specifically, during the Initiative’s first decade 
the international community principally supported Vertical’ safe motherhood 
programmes focused on low-tech, largely preventive actions at the community- 
level, most notably antenatal screening for high-risk pregnancies and training 
programmes for traditional birth attendants (TBAs) in biomedical approaches to 
delivery care (Dujardin et al. 1995; Campbell 2001). Such programmes rapidly 
became ubiquitous: by 1994 85% of developing countries had some form of 
TBA-training, up from only a handful of countries in the early 1970s (Fleming 
1994). It was thus TBA-training programmes, supported by international 
agencies, bilateral donors, the World Bank, many NGOs and some low-income 
country governments, that most clearly came to be associated with ‘doing safe 
motherhood.’
However, it is important to note that these programmes bore little 
similarity with the recommended role of TBA-training in the original safe 
motherhood strategy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the IAG had
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recommended that TBAs be involved in safe motherhood, but only as one 
component among many within comprehensive policy change. TBAs, the IAG 
had argued, could help ensure culturally appropriate care, build links between 
communities and formal health services and overcome health worker shortages 
while countries built up professionalised delivery care (Herz and Measham 1987). 
TBAs were to be integrated into existing health systems, so that they could be 
supported by more highly trained workers based in formal health facilities, 
including at the referral level. In practice, however, within donor-supported safe 
motherhood programmes in low-income countries, TBAs generally worked 
without coordinated support from professional healthcare workers, their 
activities developing separately from any overarching health plan (Bergstrom and 
Goodbum 2001; Campbell 2001). For this and other reasons, safe motherhood 
specialists most often describe these early safe motherhood programmes as 
‘piecemeal’. According to Sibley and Sipe (2004), who have conducted perhaps 
the most thorough review of TBA-programmes, one indication of their 
piecemeal nature is that while international agencies often supported TBAs’ 
training through various public sector initiatives, a range of other actors, 
including individuals, NGOs and missions, trained them through the private 
sector, with different training programmes and with focus on different 
competencies.
Another indication of the training programmes’ piecemeal nature was 
their varied content. Sibley and Sipe (2004; 2006) report that most programmes 
sought to upgrade clinical skills to ensure safe deliveries and many also included 
training in expanded functions of prevention, screening of high-risk pregnancies 
(the antenatal screening programmes mentioned above) and referral. Very few 
programmes, however, included content on how TBAs should respond to 
obstetric complications, not even on detection and management of sepsis to 
reduce infection-related mortality and morbidity, a function that could arguably 
have been carried out at the community level (Sibley and Sipe 2004). Moreover, 
only some programmes included clinical practice at a health facility, follow-up 
supervision, and continuing education {ibid.). Informants who were active in the 
field in the Initiative’s early years recalled that within the donor-driven or NGO- 
operated programmes, the content and quality of training was also inconsistent 
and the techniques and training materials used were often inappropriate.
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Later evaluations of TBA programmes have delineated some further 
problems. Anthropologists, for instance, have argued that efforts to involve 
TBAs in safe motherhood failed to foster the intended links between 
communities and indigenous medical and birthing traditions on the one hand, 
and the formal biomedical health sector on the other (Jenkins 2001;Jenkins 
2003; Berry 2006). Others have also shown that indigenous healers’ knowledge 
and skills were often devalued within the training programmes in favour of 
uncritical expansion of a medicalised model of childbirth (Jordan 1983; Davis- 
Floyd and Sargent 1996). Drawing on ethnographic research in Nepal, Pigg 
(1997:238) claims that international agencies’ and health planners’ interest in local 
healers, including TBAs, had little to do with these practitioners’ expertise or 
practice perse, but rather lay “in the potential that exists to channel their practice 
towards health development aims.” Such alleged lack of interest in local healers’ 
knowledge systems is, according to some anthropologists, revealed by the way in 
which international actors used the term ‘TBA’ to designate a whole range of 
people who attend deliveries, without sensitivity to the varied expertise of 
different healthcare providers and to local understandings of what kind of 
knowledge counts as authoritative (Davis-Floyd and Sargent 1996). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, such training programmes for TBAs have been found to have had 
little, if  any, impact on maternal health outcomes (Bergstrom and Goodburn 
2001; Ray and Salihu 2004; Sibley and Sipe 2004).
The situation described above pertains primarily to donor-dependent 
countries and it is important to note that there were, of course, heterogeneities 
between and even within countries. Furthermore, a number of countries, 
principally those that were less dependent on external financial and technical 
assistance, including Malaysia and Sri Lanka, implemented much more 
comprehensive policies than the TBA-training programmes described above. 
These countries were able to incrementally strengthen health systems, train and 
deploy staff, improve access to services at all levels of the system and quality of 
care — policy successes that were rewarded with improved health statistics 
(Koblinsky and Campbell 2003; Pathmanathan et al. 2003). Even so, the 
summary above serves to highlight the magnitude of the gap that developed 
between the stated ambitions and commitments of the international public health 
community and the programmes implemented by international actors operating
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in countries with high maternal mortality. TBA-training, which the IAG had 
recommended as one component of an overarching strategy, in effect became a 
single intervention programme for safe motherhood. This gap occurred despite 
international organisations’ endorsement of the view that pursuing single 
interventions without addressing underlying systemic issues would not achieve 
sustained improvements in maternal health (Mahler 1987b). The question 
remains, therefore: why did such an ‘implementation gap’ occur?
4.2. Explaining implementation gaps
Ethnographic and historical data point to multiple possible interpretations of the 
reasons for the implementation gap described above. Within the safe 
motherhood initiative, many have attributed the limited uptake of the initiative’s 
comprehensive policy vision to confusion and lack of understanding within the 
wider public health community about the requirements for improving maternal 
health. The subsections below explore different aspects of this general 
explanation that were put forth in written accounts, as well as in informants’ 
narratives.
4.2.1. Confusion and a lack o f strategic focus 
Reflecting in 1997 on the limited implementation of the safe motherhood 
agenda, Allan Rosenfield (1997:8) argued that an important reason for the 
Initiative’s apparent problems was “the widespread confusion regarding the 
nature and focus of the Initiative.” In doing so, he identified a perception that 
pervaded many of my informants’ accounts of their field, namely that the wide 
scope of the term ‘safe motherhood’ had created confusion about the priority 
actions for achieving safe motherhood. Within the WIIO, for instance, the term 
encompassed a range of actions related to women’s health, including family 
planning, antenatal care, clean/safe delivery, essential obstetric care, basic 
maternity care, primary healthcare, and equity for women (Maine and Rosenfield 
1999). Although safe motherhood advocates felt that all of these issues were 
important, there was a clear sense that the broad scope of the agenda had in 
effect back-fired. As Maine and Rosenfield (1999:481) observed at the time: 
“some policy-makers and programme managers believe that they are already 
conducting Safe Motherhood programmes because, as they understand it, the 
activities comprise their usual activities — antenatal care, family planning,
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nutrition.” Others, they said, had been discouraged, because they perceived safe 
motherhood programmes to require “dauntingly vast efforts” {ibid.). Rosenfield 
and Maine claimed that where the Child Survival Initiative had succeeded by 
promoting a small and discrete set of interventions, the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative had failed because it had managed neither to specify nor to promote a 
clear ‘strategic focus.’
By the end of the first decade of the Safe Motherhood Initiative, many 
within the field had come to question whether the original framing of safe 
motherhood as part of a broader development and social justice agenda had, in 
fact, been a mistake. A particular worry was that including women’s status within 
the Initiative’s remit had diverted focus from the IAG’s specific 
recommendations for the health sector, and especially the emphasis on general 
strengthening of the health system’s capacity to delivery maternal healthcare. As 
one informant recalled,
When this started in 1985,1987, a lot of really great people 
thought, ‘at last -  a woman’s initiative.’ And they loaded 
everything that you would want a woman’s initiative to be, onto 
this. A lot of it didn’t fit...I mean, there’s certain ways and 
certain contexts in which maternal mortality is an indicator of 
women’s status and there are other ways in which it’s not. Saudi 
Arabia has very low maternal mortality [but] women aren’t 
allowed to drive a car. You know, it doesn’t always work that 
way. But people want it to be., .about nutrition, about women’s 
status in society, about all those things — and it is, but only 
secondarily. It’s like the elephant in the living room is the medical 
system.
This informant’s concern that attention to health system development had been 
sidelined by the simultaneous effort to advance women’s status was common 
among safe motherhood advocates I interviewed.
Informants also explained that confusion about what safe motherhood 
actually entailed in programmatic terms resulted not just from the broad range of 
actions encompassed under the term ‘safe motherhood,’ but also from the fact 
that not all the IAG members backed the full agenda. As one early safe 
motherhood advocate put it at a conference I attended in 2007, “the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative had many adoptive parents among the international 
agencies. We were very happy about that at the beginning, but these agencies had 
different approaches, had different dogmas and had different political 
sensitivities.” Several informants made similar comments, singling out UNICEF
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as being particularly difficult to accommodate within the IAG because, as one 
informant put it, “reproductive health wasn’t its thing, and so every time we got 
into discussions that involved adolescence or abortion it was really hard and we 
spent an enormous amount of time negotiating language that everybody could 
agree.” Informants explained that these tensions had been difficult to contain 
within the IAG and had been damaging to the Initiative’s ability to promote a 
coherent vision. Moreover, one informant claimed that UNICEF had co-opted 
TBA-training programmes to further the goals of the Child Survival Initiative, 
rather than those of the Safe Motherhood Initiative.
4.2.2. Conflating safe motherhood and reproductive health 
Findings from in-depth interviews suggest that the rise of the ‘reproductive 
health’ movement in the 1990s exacerbated the perceived problems noted above 
relating to the broad scope of the original safe motherhood agenda. The 
reproductive health movement sought to shift policy debates away from the 
existing focus on selective programmes of family planning and safe pregnancy 
dominated by activity-specific programmes that were heavily supported by 
donors such as UNFPA, USAID and UNICEF and NGOs (Mayhew 1996; 
Mayhew et al. 2005). Instead, at the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) in Cairo, Egypt in 1994, women’s health activists called for 
governments to realise the right to reproductive and sexual health.16 
Reproductive health was a concept that had broader scope, both conceptually 
and programmatically, than safe motherhood, and safe motherhood practitioners 
came to worry that this new term created further confusion about the distinct 
meaning of ‘safe motherhood.’
The ICDP resulted in stated international commitment to implement 
“comprehensive, integrated reproductive health” (Cohen and Richards 1994; 
Faundes 1996). The Cairo Programme of Action included maternal healthcare as 
just one among a range of services aimed at improving reproductive health in a
16 Whereas the Safe Motherhood Initiative had focused on demands to address women’s 
pregnancy-related health and survival, the reproductive health movement focused more explicitly 
on enabling women to make autonomous decisions about their bodies and reproductive rights, 
and made expansion of access to contraception and abortion one of its principal programmatic 
objectives (Germain 2004). The concept of reproductive health emerged from feminist concerns 
about the coercive nature and narrow demographic targets of population and family planning 
programmes (Cohen and Richards 1994; Petchesky 1995; Hempel 1996; Dejong 2000).
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broad sense, including family planning, sexual health and access to abortion. 
According to informants who were active within the field at the time, many safe 
motherhood specialists worried that this broad agenda was further detracting 
policy attention from health system development and safe delivery care for 
maternal mortality reduction. Such concern stemmed from the fact that although 
the Cairo agenda did include recommendations on safe delivery care, it was more 
explicit in its demand for expanded access to family planning services and 
abortion than it was in securing adequate healthcare for pregnant women (Lush 
and Campbell 2001). One informant even claimed that reproductive health 
advocates lacked interest in the details of obstetric care because of their 
reluctance to focus on ‘motherhood,’ given that their primary objective was to 
promote women’s rights irrespective of their role as mothers.
Moreover, many safe motherhood practitioners I spoke with perceived 
that the conflation of reproductive health and safe motherhood had been 
damaging to the Safe Motherhood Initiative by implicating it -  through its 
association with the broader reproductive health movement — in the vociferous 
debate over abortion rights that erupted in the lead-up to and during the ICPD. 
The controversy over abortion rights was fought out between reproductive 
health activists on the one hand and the Vatican and leaders of many Catholic 
countries and certain conservative governments on the other hand (Finkle and 
McIntosh 1996). Informants explained that the way in which the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative became associated with the abortion debate was 
unwelcome, especially given the LAG’S earlier efforts to avoid direct 
confrontation on the abortion issue (see Chapter 3). Indeed, by one account, 
after the ICPD, safe motherhood came to be seen as “the Trojan horse for the 
introduction of legal abortion” with the consequence that some donors and 
governments who had initially been supportive of safe motherhood became wary 
and withdrew their support (AbouZahr 2003:18).
4.2.3. Nostalgia and romanticism
In addition to confusion about programmatic requirements resulting from 
inappropriate framing and conflation with reproductive health, another set of 
explanations that informants put forth for the limited uptake of the 
comprehensive agenda centred on direct resistance within the broader 
international health field to the Initiative’s emphasis on health system
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development, and especially facility-based obstetric care. According to 
informants, such resistance was itself a reflection of the widespread enthusiasm 
for community-based health solutions that, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
became increasingly pervasive within the broader international health field. 
Enthusiasm for community-based solutions, in turn, resulted in part from the 
apparent success of UNICEF’s community-based GOBI strategy. According to a 
senior WHO official, GOBI’S apparent success in saving children’s lives led 
many of those working on the ground to think that “you could do everything 
with a community health worker and that you really didn’t need access to 
sophisticated medical care.” This, in turn, he claimed, translated into an 
unrealistic belief among some public health practitioners that TBAs alone had 
the capacity to reduce maternal mortality and to a concomitant “over­
discounting” of what was needed for maternity care. Such over-discounting 
translated into poor recognition of the need for ancillary services related to good 
supplies, a professional health workforce and clean and functioning facilities.
According to informants, it was not only proponents of selective primary 
healthcare but also some of those who were ideologically committed to the 
‘health for all’ agenda that contributed to such “over-discounting.” According to 
one informant, many within the broader public health field, especially those 
working on the ground, uncritically equated community-based care with 
culturally relevant, accessible and appropriate healthcare and consequently 
rejected the need for facility-based services, reinforcing support for community- 
based TBA-programmes and resistance to calls for strengthening of hospitals. As 
she recalled: “When I first went to Bangladesh in 1992 and said antenatal care 
won’t reduce maternal mortality, training TBAs won’t reduce maternal mortality, 
it was as if  though I had said there’s no God.. .People were furious.”
Informants also drew attention to the way in which the expansion of the 
home birth movement in certain Western countries encouraged an attitude 
among some women’s health activists that birthing in ‘traditional’ cultures must 
be protected from the sort of excessive médicalisation that had come to 
characterise birthing in the West, particularly in the US. According to one 
interviewee, such activists promoted home birth in low-income countries 
without adequate appreciation for the challenges that TBAs would face in 
responding to obstetric emergencies in the absence of a functioning health
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system. She referred to a misplaced “nostalgia” among women in rich countries 
and even upper class women in poor countries for traditional birthing and a “a 
past that never existed,” adding, “to me, [the past is] a 24-year old woman dying 
in agony after three or four days in labour. You know, that’s not something I get 
nostalgic about.” Conceding that ensuring culturally appropriate and accessible 
birthing care is important, my informant nevertheless insisted that it should not 
take precedence over attention to ensuring women’s access to a health facility 
with the right supplies and technical competencies in the event of an emergency. 
As she put it, “if  I’m dying, I would like a doctor please.” For this and other 
informants, such romantic attitudes reinforced the effect of inadequately 
articulated messages to feed into the neglect of core components of the original 
safe motherhood agenda, particularly its emphasis on health system 
strengthening and strengthening of facility-based care to save women’s lives 
from pregnancy complications.
4.3. An unfavourable context for a comprehensive vision
While the factors discussed above may help to explain why community-based 
programmes for training TBAs received considerable support on the ground, I 
want to argue, however, that they offer an inadequate explanation as to why the 
international organisations that were members of the IAG came to support such 
programmes to the neglect of the more comprehensive agenda they had 
previously espoused. The IAG was not unaware of what was needed. Indeed, an 
IAG statement on traditional birth attendants published in 1992 was explicit that 
although UN agencies were supporting TBA-training programmes, substantial 
improvement in healthcare would not occur “without implementation of 
appropriate technologies and strengthening of referral and support systems” 
(WHO 1992). In the statement, the IAG was firm that trained TBAs cannot be 
expected to reduce overall mortality and morbidity rates “when poverty, 
illiteracy, and discrimination — the underlying causes of these problems -  are not 
addressed” {ibid.). The agency statement further explained that, given inadequate 
funding and support for comprehensive approaches in the broader international 
health and development field, TBA-training would be pursued as an “interim” 
measure until comprehensive primary healthcare could be implemented {ibid.). I 
now turn to look at the broader set of political-economic and policy factors that
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helps to explain why the LAG member organisations may have come to find it 
difficult to commit to more than such interim responses.
4.3.1. Weakened international governance
When trying to understand the behaviour of international actors, organisations 
and donors it is useful, first of all, to place their responses within a broader 
context. Specifically, it is important to take into account that in the early years of 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative, the WHO, perhaps the strongest advocate of a 
comprehensive primary healthcare approach to safe motherhood, was itself beset 
by financial difficulties and weakened authority, compromising its ability to 
support and coordinate comprehensive policy responses in countries (Vaughan 
et al. 1995). Its dwindling regular budget, discussed in Chapter 3, was offset by a 
growing reliance on “extrabudgetary” funding from multilateral agencies, 
including the World Bank, donor nations and private donors {ibid.). In theory, 
the World Health Assembly, the WHO’s representative governing body, 
continued to set the international health agenda, but in reality it was the donors -  
more or less independently of the WHO’s decision-making structures — who 
were now in control of priority-setting (Lee and Walt 1992; Walt 1993; Lee et al. 
1996; Walt 2005).
Health policy analysts have noted that during the early 1990s, lack of 
coordination and poor predictability of financing became major issues, creating 
pressure on the WHO to appeal to external donors by focusing on short-term, 
technical and vertical programmes with clearly defined, dedicated budgets, rather 
than broadly defined health programmes (Rifkin et al. 1988; Godlee 1994). The 
TBA-training programmes that international agencies supported can be seen as 
one of these cheaper, vertical responses.
4.3.2. Economic and health sector crisis in low-income countries
In trying to understand why the comprehensive safe motherhood agenda was not 
fully implemented it is also important to acknowledge that the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative was launched during a time marked by economic crisis and health 
system decline in low-income countries. These circumstances, I would argue, 
severely curtailed the prospects for implementation of the kind of 
comprehensive policy vision outlined at the Nairobi Safe Motherhood 
Conference in 1987. Economic crisis in the 1980s had left many low-income
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country governments effectively bankrupt and critically dependent on external 
assistance, including to fund health and social services. Authors describe how 
already weak health facilities fell into further disrepair during this period, with 
repercussions for service quality and staffing, and flight of patients and staff to 
largely unregulated private sector healthcare services (Turshen 1999; Standing 
2002). More generally, donor-driven projects, private providers and non­
governmental organisations came to challenge the state’s position as the main 
provider of healthcare (Turshen 1999).
Others have noted a mismatch between government and donor 
responses in poor countries during this period, which especially affected the sort 
of services needed to save women’s lives. For instance, at the same time that 
many donors focused their resources on community-based programmes such as 
TBA-training schemes, domestic budgets in many low-income countries 
remained skewed towards tertiary care facilities in cities, as they had been since 
colonial times (Gillam 2008). Hospitals retained their disproportionate share of 
government health expenditure, and domestic professional medical resistance to 
the expansion of community health workers with less training widened the gulf 
between donor-driven community-based projects and national health plans 
(ibid.). There was no organised effort to reorient medical education towards 
primary healthcare in many countries (Cueto 2004). A major consequence of the 
gap between donors’ emphasis on community-based care and governments’ 
continued bias in favour of hospitals was that the levels in between the primary 
and tertiary level were neglected. Specifically, the first-referral level, which in 
1987 had been identified as essential for delivering life-saving obstetric care, was 
‘squeezed out’ of health budgets and neglected in both national and international 
health plans (Task Force on Child Health and Maternal Health 2005; Johnson 
2006).
4.3.3. Structural adjustment and health sector reforms 
A related set of factors was the impact of ‘structural adjustment programmes,’ or 
SAPs, implemented during the first decade of the Safe Motherhood Initiative, 
reinforced by internationally-recommended health sector reforms carried out in 
many low-income countries between the 1980s and the mid-1990s (Breman and 
Shelton 2006). Together, these policy reforms contributed to a climate hostile to
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the implementation of the comprehensive set of policy changes the IAG had 
called for in 1987.
By the 1990s, the World Bank — along with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and supported by the US government — started to look for 
alternative financing mechanisms to overstretched public sector budgets, 
emphasising markets as the basis of public sector reform (McPake 2008). The 
resulting structural adjustment programmes were imposed on many countries as 
a condition for debt restructuring and access to external financial and technical 
assistance. These advocated a diminished role for governments and greater role 
for free markets. This implied a range of fiscal and policy measures, such as 
drastic cuts in consumption and public spending to reduce inflation and public 
debt -  including cuts in health sector spending -  a greater involvement for 
private industry in all sectors, decentralisation and a lower profile for central 
governments (McPake 1993; Navarro 1998; Segall 2003; Di et al. 2007).
Alongside structural adjustment programmes, the World Bank (along 
with the WHO and some bilateral donors) promoted health sector reforms in 
low-income countries during the 1980s to mid-1990s (Standing 2002). Critics 
have seen such reforms as an extension of the privatisation agenda of the 
structural adjustment programmes mentioned above (Sahn and Bernier 1995; 
Turshen 1999; Standing 2002). More generally, health sector reforms were a 
policy response to the weakened public healthcare delivery systems of poor 
countries, which many had come to see as wasteful, inefficient and ineffective 
(Cassels and Janovsky 1998; Brown et al. 2006; Cooper et al. 2007; Irwin and 
Scali 2007). Health sector reforms aimed to address structural problems in the 
health systems of poor countries, including inefficiencies, poor management, and 
inadequate access to services, as well as the poor quality of existing services. 
Specifically, they aimed to improve the performance of Ministries of I Iealth in 
low-income countries through more efficient financial management and human 
resource management (Cassels 1995, cited in Standing 2002). Donor-driven 
reforms mirrored the neoliberal basis of structural adjustment policies. The 
World Bank’s first health strategy paper ‘An agenda for reform’ promoted fee 
payment for health services, privatisation of large parts of health services and 
introduction of private insurance programmes, as well as decentralisation of the 
management of health care (World Bank 1987).
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One effect of such reforms was to reinforce selective approaches to 
healthcare. The World Bank’s (1993) highly influential World Development 
Report ‘Investing in health’ (World Bank 1993) encouraged governments that 
could not afford comprehensive public health services to provide only a 
minimum package of low-cost, selective or “basic” public health services, 
supplemented by a package of “essential clinical services,” leaving “non-essential 
services” to the private sector. Preference for such a selective approach to 
healthcare planning was in many ways institutionalised through the World Bank’s 
new priority-setting framework. The World Bank recommended that low-cost 
interventions to be included in a basic package of publicly provided healthcare 
should be selected through ‘burden of disease’ and cost-effectiveness analysis 
that would ascertain the best value for money (World Bank 1993).
The World Bank proposed that burden of disease and cost-effectiveness 
analyses should incorporate the DALY — or the disability adjusted life year — a 
new summary measure of population health that combined the effect of single 
diseases not only on premature death, but also on morbidity and disability 
(Murray and Chen 1994; Fox-Rushby 2002). The DALY methodology was used 
to establish a ranking of diseases according to their impact on the total ‘global 
burden of disease’ (Murray and Chen 1994). As such, the new priority-setting 
framework reaffirmed core principles of selective primary healthcare. Critics 
exposed the way in which the measures internalised a bias against women’s 
health conditions, including pregnancy-related health problems, in part because 
the disease rankings used were not disaggregated for gender (Sundby 1999; 
Allotey and Reidpath 2002; Hanson 2002). Nevertheless the ‘burden of disease’ 
framework quickly became influential at the international level and was put to 
use for determining priorities in a number of countries.
The growing dominance of such priority-setting tools was on several 
levels unfavourable to the promotion of women’s health issues or to the 
comprehensive approach consisting of the inter-linked interventions that the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative had promoted in 1987. According to one informant 
who was active within the WHO in the early 1990s, the focus on cost- 
effectiveness and efficiency in health sector reforms and its associated analytical 
tools fed into the more general resistance among some within the international 
health community to the expansion of facility-based maternity services noted
105
above. He claimed that many public health practitioners believed that such 
services lacked cost-effectiveness and could not impact the global burden of 
disease in a significant way, since the number of maternal deaths is relatively 
small relative to other major public health problems in low-income countries. 
However, this was not a conclusion that was supported by actual analyses; the 
World Bank’s own analyses identified maternity services, including pre-natal, 
delivery and post-natal care in health facilities as among the most cost-effective 
interventions in low-income countries in its recommended package of “essential 
clinical services” (World Bank 1993). Nevertheless, according to one of my 
informants, the general attention that was paid in policy debates to reduced 
public spending and concentration of “essential” public health services 
engendered a widespread “anti-high-tech predilection” among many health 
policy-makers and planners in which investments were “implicitly deemed — to 
be a luxury and too expensive.” As another of my informants put it: “The idea 
that you would address this big public health issue by strengthening health 
systems would have been so anathema, so contrary to the prevailing economic 
and political trends in the international community’s dealing with the social 
sectors in poor countries.” The perception that facility-based maternity care was 
an unaffordable luxury made sense within this context. As the WHO informant 
cited above put it: “It’s hard to recommend highly skilled, relatively highly skilled 
people working in rural areas when you are spending, you know, $2 per capita on 
health.” Therefore, implementation of both the social agenda and the call for 
comprehensive healthcare embodied in the Safe Motherhood Call to Action 
became increasingly untenable within the broader context of international health.
4.3.4. The path o f  least resistance
The effects of the reforms discussed above likely contributed to the difficulty of 
implementing comprehensive agendas, such as that of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of broad-based policy reform on 
health outcomes and health systems, in part because of the complexity of the 
reforms and in part because of the time-bound nature of the effects. Some of the 
unintended consequences of various forms of structural adjustment have only 
recently been documented, the effects, such as the migration of health workers 
and the now well-established human resource crisis in health, taking time to 
materialise (Breman and Shelton 2006). Nevertheless, although the ‘selective’
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health sector reforms promoted by the World Bank and others were intended to 
improve management of health systems, later evaluations suggest that these 
reforms failed to correct inefficiencies and, in some cases, inadvertently 
contributed to further weakening of health systems (Sparr 1994; Simms et al. 
2001; Breman and Shelton 2006; Haddad et al. 2008; Mohindra 2008).
There is a prevailing consensus that donor-imposed health sector 
reforms were matched by further privatisation of health services, expansion of 
deregulated markets for healthcare and pharmaceuticals and crumbling public 
structures, as well as a burgeoning human resource crisis (Wakhweya 1995; 
Bloom and Standing 2001; Magnussen et al. 2004). This meant that it became 
progressively more difficult to mobilise a professional workforce to support 
community-based services {ibid.). The way in which privatisation and fragmented 
health systems, as well as user fees imposed on services to make up for spending 
shortfalls, restricted people’s ability to access healthcare has also been 
documented, including the effects of user fees on restricting women’s ability to 
access life-saving obstetric care (Borghi et al. 2003; Janes and Chuluundorj 2004; 
Storeng et al. 2008). Freedman’s (2003:104) description of health systems in low- 
income countries at the end of the 20,h century captures some of these 
circumstances:
In vast parts of the world, health centres stand empty and 
deteriorating. In others, they are overwhelmed and unable to 
cope. User fees and exemption schemes have routinely failed to 
protect the poor, with ‘informal’ or illicit payments sometimes 
being the only way health providers can earn a living wage, while 
drug shortages force patients into the streets to find life-saving 
supplies or to forgo needed care altogether. In many countries, 
the public health system is plagued by personnel posting and 
transfer policies that put patients’ interests last, and by 
absenteeism as public employees (sometimes driven by 
necessity) engage in private practice and steer patients 
accordingly. At the same time, massive ‘brain drain’ draws 
trained professionals out of countries while IFI (international 
financial institutions) policies pressure for bans on government 
hiring. Those who remain are often poorly trained and 
supervised, leaving even the best-intentioned providers without 
confidence or skills. Over-worked and demoralised, they can 
barely cope with their workloads, much less follow protocols for 
improved inter-personal relationships with clients. And, all the 
while, patterns of social and gender discrimination that shape 
society as a whole often end up reflected in health systems
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where shocking maltreatment of patients and their families is 
almost routine.
The sort of conditions evoked in this quote are not specific to maternal health 
services, but their impact is captured particularly well through maternal health 
indicators, with continuing high levels of maternal mortality being a 
manifestation of poorly functioning health systems. The heavy reliance on TBAs 
in the Initiative’s first decade should be seen in conjunction with the human 
resource crisis in healthcare delivery that intensified during this period. As one 
informant put it: “it makes sense -  if  you don’t have people [qualified healthcare 
providers], women die.”
In sum, by the end of the 1990s, the toll of economic downturn, 
weakened international governance for health, and the consequences of 
structural adjustment policies and health sector reforms converged, making it 
virtually impossible to implement comprehensive programmes in impoverished 
countries whose already weak health systems had been further weakened and 
fragmented. As others have noted, the fragmented nature of health systems — 
perhaps not surprisingly — reinforced a preference among donors and those 
responsible for programmes that could go around the constraints posed by weak 
health systems and that could be more easily overseen and monitored (e.g. 
McCoy et al. 2001a).
From this perspective, and contrary to safe motherhood practitioners’ 
expressed anxiety, there is in fact nothing unique about the lack of uptake of the 
comprehensive safe motherhood agenda. The scaling back of the original 
comprehensive vision to a limited set of activities was mirrored in neglect of 
more general calls to strengthen the healthcare delivery systems of poor 
countries. The way in which UN agencies, donors and NGOs dedicated to safe 
motherhood often pursued their own objectives in an uncoordinated manner 
instead of working within national health plans was not specific to their efforts 
within maternal health, but was typical of international health action at this time. 
It can be seen as the result of pressure to respond to the exigencies of budgets, 
bureaucracies and existing health system constraints by doing something to address 
public health problems, rather than the result of deliberate design or naive 
expectations that such a limited set of actions would be sufficient to bring about 
health improvement. Within this context, there was also a clear incentive, as one 
informant pointed out, for both planners and programme managers to opt for
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the simplest strategies, as exemplified by the popularity of TBA-training: “it’s 
ideal. You spend rapidly, you make people happy, you redistribute the money to 
the poorest, it’s quick and easy to manage.”
4 .4 . C on clu sion
In this chapter I have identified and described what I term the ‘implementation 
gap’ that characterised internationally-supported safe motherhood efforts in the 
first decade of the Initiative. As shown above, policy recommendations for 
systemic change and health system strengthening were reduced to limited and 
largely preventive, community-based programmes, paralleling the more general 
scaling back of comprehensive primary healthcare in favour of selective primary 
healthcare in the 1980s and 1990s. Although I have not examined country 
examples in detail, my discussion of international trends helps to discern an 
emerging transformation in the very meaning of ‘safe motherhood,’ from the 
term’s initial association with plans for comprehensive, inter-sectoral policies that 
would improve women’s health and pregnancy-related survival to its association 
with community-based, vertical programmes, principally focusing on the training 
ofTBAs.
Implementation gaps of the sort discussed here are not untypical in 
international health. Many authors have noted that mismatches frequently occur 
between international policy recommendations and national- and sub-national 
level implementation, as well as lack of correlation between international 
organisations’ and donors’ rhetoric and their actual practices (e.g. Mayhew and 
Watts 2002; Mayhew et al. 2005). The more pertinent question, of course, is how 
should such gaps be understood? Safe motherhood practitioners’ own accounts 
attribute the limited uptake of the Initiative’s original agenda to technical 
deficiencies in that agenda and in the Initiative’s advocacy approach, including a 
lack of strategic focus that allegedly bred confusion about the Initiative’s 
priorities. These accounts also emphasise that widespread misconceptions and 
erroneous beliefs about the effectiveness of community-based actions, including 
TBA-training, translated into support for such programmes, and, conversely, 
resistance to the Initiative’s emphasis on facility-based services. With hindsight, 
the original decision to recommend the involvement ofTBAs has been rejected 
as erroneous, described as one of “a few strategic missteps” that the Initiative
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initially took and that compromised its success (Rosenfield et al. 2007:1396). 
Similarly, in 2006, an editorial reflecting on the Initiative’s first twenty years 
published in the Lancet commented that the prospects for safe motherhood 
seemed promising after the Nairobi Conference, until strategic mistakes, such as 
pursuing TBA-training programmes, dashed those hopes (Horton 2006). Such 
accounts not only over-emphasise the faith that early safe motherhood actors 
placed in such programmes, but also unduly places the burden for the 
implementation gap within the Safe Motherhood Initiative alone.
I have sought to nuance this sort of account, however, by considering the 
political-economic and policy context within which the implementation of the 
Initiative took place. I have shown that those charged with implementing the 
comprehensive safe motherhood agenda faced distinctly unfavourable odds for 
success. Through a brief overview of the broader political-economic and policy 
context of international health in the late 1980s and 1990s, I have illustrated how 
selective approaches to health improvement, as well as resistance to broad-based 
and systemic change, became gradually entrenched within global level priority­
setting for public health, reflecting economic challenges and changing 
governance structures within international health as a whole. International 
policies for economic recovery and health sector reform contributed to 
fragmenting international health approaches in a way that made it increasingly 
difficult to advocate for and implement a comprehensive approach. On many 
levels, the vertical training programmes for TBAs that I described at the 
beginning of the chapter are thus illustrative of a more general trend.
This chapter highlights the danger, when making historical evaluations of 
international policy initiatives such as that for safe motherhood, of overlooking 
the broader policy and indeed political-economic circumstances into which 
specific policies are implemented. Only a small subset of my informants situated 
the safe motherhood field’s experiences within the broader policy environment 
outlined above. Most informants simply left this broader context largely 
unexamined. Policies are not implemented in isolation, however, but within pre­
existing and dynamic political contexts that can variably facilitate or constrain 
successful implementation. When seen within its broader context, the history of 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s first decade illustrates how difficult it became to 
pursue public health strategies emphasising systemic social and health sector
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changes. The policy context increasingly favoured selective, piecemeal 
approaches. While some actors were clearly opposed to the Initiative’s 
ideological and programmatic aims or were ignorant of its priorities, on another 
level, the neglect of comprehensive health systems in favour of scaled-down, 
vertical interim solutions can be seen as more broadly indicative of international 
health actors seeking the “path of least resistance” within an international health 
field that has become excessively fragmented, weak and difficult to coordinate 
(McCoy 2001b). In the next chapter I reflect on the implications of these 
developments for international policy and advocacy at the end of the 1990s.
I ll
C h a p t e r  5
5. DEFINING THE SAFE MOTHERHOOD 
INITIATIVE’S STRATEGIC FOCUS
A decade into the Safe Motherhood Initiative, the scientific press was replete 
with analyses of a faltering initiative that had lost its momentum and that had 
failed to achieve global-level reduction in maternal mortality (see Rosenfield 
1997; Maine and Rosenfield 1999; 2001:30-31). Reinforcing such assessments 
were dismal statistics suggesting that maternal mortality had not decreased on a 
global level since the launch of the Initiative. In 1996, for instance, UN agencies 
published revised estimates of country-level maternal mortality, which showed 
that the number of maternal deaths was in fact higher than previously assumed 
(WHO and UNICEF 1996). Although there was some indirect evidence of 
maternal mortality reduction in North Africa, Latin America, Asia and the 
Middle East, the situation in sub-Saharan Africa was said to remain “disquieting” 
(AbouZahr and Wardlaw 2001:567). Indeed, despite a few isolated instances of 
success in a limited number of countries the Initiative’s goal of halving maternal 
mortality within a decade had not been met (ibid.).
Within this context, the LAG in 1997 convened a Technical Consultation 
in Colombo, Sri Lanka as part of an effort to revitalise the initiative (AbouZahr 
2003). The consultation was the first element in a comprehensive two-year effort 
to acquire additional funds and to expand activities aimed at reducing maternal 
mortality. More than 300 representatives from UN agencies, academia and 
NGOs gathered in Colombo to discuss an agenda structured around ten key 
‘Action Points’ that had been defined by the IAG in consultation with experts in 
the field (see Starrs 1997 for the conference report). After three days’ 
deliberation, these Action Points were revised and put forth as new global ‘best 
practice’ guidelines for achieving maternal mortality reduction. The IAG’s 
proposals would bring about a major shift in international policy 
recommendations for how countries should go about achieving safe 
motherhood. Earlier calls for a multifaceted strategy linking health, social and 
educational sectors and combining preventive and therapeutic care now gave way
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to the recommendation that safe motherhood programmes should be targeted at 
averting deaths from obstetric complications through professional, obstetric care, 
including emergency care. So major was this shift in policy advice that the 
Colombo meeting is often cited as a turning point in the history of the safe 
motherhood movement. But how did it come about? And how should it be 
interpreted?
In the public health literature, the new focus on professional obstetric 
care is often attributed to new technical knowledge that fed into revised policy 
guidelines and proposals (e.g. Rosenfield 1997; Weil and Fernandez 1999;
Horton 2006; Starrs 2006). Indeed, some commentators have lauded it as a sign 
of a new era of evidence-based decision-making for the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative, in which new research-based knowledge finally forged a technical 
consensus about how best to reduce maternal mortality (Weil and Fernandez 
1999). Contrary to this common depiction, my aim here is to demonstrate that 
the role of international actors in formulating international recommendations is 
in no way a straightforward process of appraising and adapting policy in light of 
new technical knowledge or evidence. Instead, I consider the policy shift that 
took place in the late 1990s as part of a broader ‘top-down’, marketing-driven 
process that was initiated by international agencies and other maternal health 
experts in response to the limited success of the previous decade (cf. Walt et al. 
2004). The aim for these experts was to define a strategic focus for the Initiative: 
one that would assure a place for safe motherhood in international policy debates 
and encourage uptake of the Initiative’s long-neglected recommendations on 
professional obstetric care and health system strengthening.
In the first part of the chapter I show how the IAG from 1997 onwards 
reformulated the international safe motherhood policy agenda to focus on a 
much more targeted set of recommendations than those the group had proposed 
at the Initiative’s launch. I then critically evaluate the reasons behind this shift. 
Doing so entails attention to a crucial sub-story of this policy shift, namely the 
proposal from a subgroup of safe motherhood practitioners to define a very 
narrow strategic focus on ‘emergency obstetric care’ or EmOC. This proposal 
exemplifies many of the broader developments at play, not least because the 
efforts to introduce EmOC as the Initiative’s main strategic focus represented, 
on the surface at least, the strongest possible challenge to the comprehensive
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approach espoused in the early years of the Safe Motherhood Initiative. At the 
onset of this shift, the field was beset with considerable internal conflict. 
However, as I show in the last section, through internal negotiation and 
conceptual modifications, a narrow focus in policy recommendations on EmOC 
came to be reconceptualised not as a rejection of the Initiative’s original 
comprehensive vision, but as a pragmatic starting point for achieving it.
5.1. A new policy agenda: targeting obstetric causes of 
death
The policy recommendations that the IAG first introduced in 1997 and 
elaborated on in the years that followed diverged significantly from the 
Initiative’s original agenda, as summarised in Table 4 below. The table reveals 
that the new recommendations were much more targeted, in two main senses: 
first, they focused on health sector policy exclusively, rather than inter-sectoral 
policy change. Second, they focused on reducing maternal mortality from 
obstetric complications, rather than improving women’s health and survival 
through coordinated attention to social, economic and medical determinants. 
Because this vision was so dramatically different from the original one, it is 
important to understand in some detail what it entailed.17
Perhaps most dramatically, by restricting its remit to primarily issuing 
recommendations for health sector policy targeted at the direct causes of 
maternal deaths, the Safe Motherhood Initiative clearly distanced itself from its 
identity as ‘the women’s initiative’ concerned with promoting women’s status 
and health. Saving women’s lives, rather than improving women’s health and 
survival more broadly, were redefined as the Initiative’s ultimate goalpost for 
success. Significandy, the original emphasis on multiple and interlinked strategies 
to achieve the Initiative’s goals gave way to an emphasis on ‘priority’ 
interventions for averting deaths. Although ten Action Points were specified, the 
primary message to come out of the revised agenda was that countries must 
target safe motherhood programmes at saving women’s lives by treating obstetric
<7 This section’s analysis of the policy shift (including Table 4) is based principally on the 
conference report from the 1997 Technical Consultation in London (Starrs 1997) and a policy 
document on technical interventions issued by the L\G member agencies 
(UNICEF/WHO/UNFPA 1997). These are compared with the conference report from the first 
Safe Motherhood Conference in 1987 (Starrs 1987) and original strategy for reducing maternal 
mortality and morbidity (Herz & Measham).
114
complications. This was justified by the fact that such complications are the most 
important, direct cause of women’s death during pregnancy and childbirth. This 
focus on essentially therapeutic solutions to prevent deaths once complications 
occurred meant that previous recommendations on preventive public health 
approaches -  such as antenatal screening to detect high-risk pregnancies — were 
rejected in favour of the recommendation that all pregnancies should be treated 
as potentially at risk of developing complications. Two, inter-linked 
‘interventions’ were identified as priorities for safe motherhood programmes: 
‘emergency obstetric care’ to treat pregnancy and delivery complications and 
‘skilled birth attendants’ to assist deliveries and ensure access to and provision of 
emergency obstetric care. It was implicit in the recommendations that the first- 
referral level of a district health system would be the main site for delivering 
emergency obstetric care.
‘Emergency obstetric care’ summarised a set of therapeutic responses 
targeted at those women who develop complications during pregnancy, 
childbirth or the post-partum period, including haemorrhage, obstructed labour, 
infection and eclampsia and complications from unsafe abortion. The rationale 
for emphasising emergency obstetric care was that in the absence of such care, 
the obstetric complications listed above would likely lead to a woman’s death. 
The concept of emergency obstetric care designated the ‘signal functions’ or 
medical interventions required within the health system to treat obstetric 
complications (UNICEF/ WHO/ UNFPA 1997). The IAG specified two 
different levels of such care: basic and comprehensive. Basic emergency obstetric 
care included interventions such as assisted vaginal delivery and manual removal 
of retained products, as well as administering of antibiotics, oxytocic drugs and 
anti-convulsants for eclampsia, while comprehensive emergency obstetric care 
included all these functions as well as caesarean section for obstructed labour 
and blood transfusion for massive haemorrhage (ibid.). For convenience, I refer 
in this discussion simply to emergency obstetric care.
The IAG also identified ‘skilled birth attendance’ for every woman as an 
essential intervention to improve safe motherhood. The designation ‘skilled birth 
attendant’ was restricted to refer “exclusively to people with midwifery skills (for 
example, doctors, midwives, nurses) who have been trained to proficiency in the 
skills necessary to manage normal deliveries and diagnose, manage and refer
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complications” (WHO/UNFPA/UNICEF/World Bank 1999:31). The 
definition excluded traditional birth attendants and community health workers, 
even if trained. It was recommended that ‘skilled birth attendants’ should assist 
uncomplicated deliveries, and detect, refer and treat women with pregnancy 
complications.
1987 Call to Action 1997 Action Points
Primary remit of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative Improve maternal health and reduce maternal 
mortality
Improve women’s status
Reduce maternal mortality 
(and serious pregnancy- 
related morbidity/disability)
Health determinants 
addressed
Social, economic and 
biomedical
Primarily biomedical (social 
and economic in as much as 
they directly affect access to 
care)
Approach Comprehensive, multi­
sectoral
Targeted, health sector
Recommended social 
sector interventions
Girls’ education
Women’s empowerment
Women’s economic and 
political rights
Social sector interventions 
recognised as important for 
“long-term” improvement 
but not immediate priorities 
of the Initiative
Recommended health 
sector interventions
Family planning
Antenatal care, screening 
for high-risk pregnancies
Delivery care 
General healthcare
Treatment of obstetric 
complications
Skilled birth attendance
Treatment of pregnancy- 
related complications
Emergency obstetric care 
(EmOQ
Type of healthcare 
provider
Community health 
workers, including TBAs
Focus on mid-level 
providers (nurses and 
professional midwives)
Skilled birth attendants 
No TBAs
Unclear position on 
specialist physicians vs. mid­
level providers
Table 4: The IAG's 1987 and 1997 policy proposals for maternal health (Sources: H en & 
Measham 1987; Starrs 1987; Starrs 1997; UNICEF/WHO/UNFPA1997)
The 1997 Action Points put heavy emphasis on ‘skilled birth attendance’ 
for all women as the main priority for safe motherhood programmes, although 
the concept of skilled birth attendance in effect subsumed emergency obstetric 
care because it incorporated referral of women to emergency care when 
necessary. The report of the Colombo Technical Consultation stated that 
“having a health worker with midwifery skills present at childbirth, backed up by
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transport in case emergency referral is required is perhaps the most critical 
intervention for making motherhood safer” (Starrs 1997:ii). Subsequently, a 
special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1999 agreed targets 
for scaling up global coverage of skilled birth attendants, to 80%, 85% and 90% 
of all births by 2005, 2010 and 2015 respectively 
(WHO/UNFPA/UNICEF/World Bank 1999).
In sum, from 1997 onwards, the comprehensive, inter-sectoral policy 
vision originally associated with the Safe Motherhood Initiative was thus replaced 
with a more targeted set of recommendations designed primarily to avert deaths 
from obstetric complications through treatment of such complications. By 
identifying skilled birth attendants and emergency obstetric care as essential 
interventions for reducing maternal mortality, the IAG very clearly departed 
from its previous emphasis on the inter-related nature of health and social 
policies, as well as its emphasis on both preventive and therapeutic approaches 
by introducing a set of recommendations that appeared much more selective 
than comprehensive in nature. But how did this major shift come about?
5.2. A triumph of idealism over idealism?
At the Technical Consultation, the changes described above were presented as 
the result of a new research-based consensus on the priority interventions 
needed to reverse the disappointing record of the Initiative’s first decade (see 
Starrs 1997). The Consultation report itself claimed that consensus on the Action 
Points had been ensured on die basis of “research, community-based experience 
and technical expertise” and through the involvement of a broad range of expert 
participants, including physicians and midwives “with hands-on experience,” 
researchers and programme staff from governmental and non-governmental 
agencies, as well as policy-makers and programme planners from both donor 
agencies and developing countries (Starrs 1997:1). Indeed, at the meeting one or 
more speakers summarised key facts and findings for each Action Point on the 
agenda and presented case studies to illustrate how that action could be 
implemented at the country level, while subgroups focused more intensively on 
certain sub-topics to identify the most effective interventions.
Participants presented a range of evidence to justify the need for a shift 
in policy focus to professionalised obstetric care (see Starrs 1997 for a list of
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references of these studies). This included epidemiological analyses suggesting 
that an estimated two-thirds of maternal deaths occur around the time of 
delivery, as well as evaluations of antenatal screening revealing a very low 
predictive value for identification of obstetric complications, indicating a need to 
shift focus onto therapeutic approaches, namely emergency obstetric care. 
Moreover, experts presented results from field-based studies showing that 
trained TBAs could not save women’s lives, suggesting that ‘skilled’, 
biomedically-trained birth attendants were needed (see Bergstrom and Goodbum 
2001 for a review of the evidence on TBA-training). To further buttress the call 
for skilled birth attendants, participants presented historical research and case 
studies, demonstrating that in both developed and developing countries where 
maternal mortality had been significantly reduced, skilled or accredited healthcare 
personnel rather than indigenous practitioners had attended the majority of 
deliveries (see Hôgberg et al. 1986; Loudon 1992; De Brouwere et al. 1998; Van 
Lerberghe and De Brouwere 2001; Pathmanathan et al. 2003 for details on the 
evidence presented). Indeed, one presenter at the Technical Consultation 
summarised research showing that the dramatic decline in maternal mortality 
ratios in Western countries in the early 20th century was due to “improved and 
expanded midwifery care, as well as improved techniques (antibiotics, caesarean 
sections, blood transfusions), the adoption of systems to monitor and enforce 
standards for quality of care, and access to care for the majority of women, 
whether in hospitals or at home” (cited in Starrs 1997:6). In sum, the 
recommendation that safe motherhood programmes should prioritise 
professionalised obstetric care was framed as a new ‘technical consensus’ on how 
to most effectively reduce maternal mortality in low-income countries.
Given this emphasis on research-based evidence, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the 1997 Technical Consultation has been heralded in the public 
health literature as signalling a new era of evidence-based decision-making in the 
history of safe motherhood (e.g. Rosenfield 1997; AbouZahr 2003; Horton 2006; 
Starrs 2006). By one account, it was not until the Technical Consultation that 
clarity was finally achieved about which interventions actually work to reduce 
maternal mortality (AbouZahr 2003). Writing in the scientific literature towards 
the end of the 1990s, authors extolled the new policy focus as the triumph of 
scientific rationality over previous idealistic, and misguided, beliefs that social
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interventions like women’s education or enhancing the links between traditional 
and biomedical care could bring about maternal mortality reduction (Weil and 
Fernandez 1999). As Weil and Fernandez (1999:940) put it,
Unknown territory barely a generation ago, the breadth and the 
details of maternal mortality and morbidity in less developed 
countries are now much better known. The most important 
advance, nonetheless, may be that the very concept of maternal 
mortality prevention has changed. We now have a better 
understanding of what can really improve the health of mothers, 
and we are beginning to see, partly because of past errors, how 
to implement truly effective strategies in less developed 
countries.
In referring to the changed “concept of maternal mortality prevention,” Weil and 
Fernandez were implying that maternal mortality had now been appropriately 
reconceptualised as a public health problem and medical challenge, rather than as 
a social problem. As the authors saw it, research had now proved that the 
reduction of maternal mortality in Europe and North America that started in the 
19th century was not due to economic growth or improvements in women’s 
status, “but to the diffusion and professionalisation of obstetric care” (Weil and 
Fernandez 1999:941).
But how exactly did this “change the concept” of maternal mortality 
prevention occur? And how important was new knowledge in bringing about this 
shift? It is doubtless true that research findings played an important role in 
justifying the new policy agenda, and in establishing its legitimacy. The fact that a 
‘technical’ consultation was convened to announce a shift in policy is itself 
indicative of the importance that was placed on giving scientific credibility to the 
new set of guidelines. But I would argue that it is inappropriate to see the new 
policy focus as the direct result of a ‘bottom-up’ assimilation of research-based 
learning from safe motherhood programmes (cf. Walt et al. 2004), not least 
because, in reality, research did not generate genuinely »fit'insights about the 
technical requirements for maternal mortality reduction. In fact, as I illustrate 
below, the recommendations were not as dramatically different from the 
Initiative’s original vision as commentators suggest.
It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 3 that the Initiative’s 
original health system strategy emphasised the importance of skilled birth 
attendants (although not named as such), both as a support to community-based 
workers and to staff first-referral level health facilities. Similarly, it will be recalled
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that the ‘new* focus on strengthening emergency obstetric care capacity was 
contained within the original call to expand comprehensive systems of maternity 
care, an important component of which was ensuring treatment of obstetric 
complications. In fact, despite its new label, ‘emergency obstetric care’ comprised 
medical functions that were almost identical to the list of functions that had been 
specified in the 1987 strategy paper for reducing maternal mortality and 
morbidity in 1987 (Herz and Measham 1987). ‘Emergency obstetric care’ was 
thus little more than a reformulation of this original set of clinical 
recommendations, presented now as research-driven policy solutions with 
presumed universal validity, lending new credibility and emphasis to old ideas, 
rather than presenting genuinely new insights. As one informant put it during an 
interview, “from the beginning we were saying pretty much the same thing -  it 
was just that now we had better evidence for it.”
Significantly, that professional obstetric care was in 1997 put into focus 
should not be misinterpreted to imply — as Weil and Fernandez claim -  that 
maternal health specialists now dismissed, on the basis of revised evidence, the 
significance of comprehensive, socially-informed policies in maternal mortality 
decline. On the contrary, there is evidence that the mainstream of maternal 
health advocates remained committed to the view that maternal mortality and ill 
health reflect underlying social disadvantage and could be improved through the 
promotion of norms, regulations and investments, as well as through policies 
designed to ensure equitable access to healthcare. Although influencing social 
policy was declared outside of the Initiative’s remit, the 1997 Technical 
Consultation report was explicit that maternal mortality is “a social injustice that 
governments are obliged to remedy through political, legal and health systems” 
(Starrs 1997:ii). Indeed, the report insisted that “efforts must be made to give 
women more autonomy and choices through social and economic policy 
changes, such as increasing education for girls and women, expanding access to 
income-generating opportunities and giving them opportunities to leam life 
skills” (Starrs 1997:1).
As such, I would argue that what was presented and promoted as 
research-driven policy change can more appropriately be seen as a reformulation 
or adaptation of existing policy that repackaged policy recommendations in a 
new way. Through such reformulation, the IAG sought to bring into focus the
120
original, but neglected, aspects of safe motherhood policy recommendations, 
notably professional healthcare providers and emergency obstetric care. To the 
IAG, doing so implied reducing the emphasis on, but not rejecting, broader 
social and health sector changes addressing women’s social status and general 
health. Recommendations for professional care and emergency obstetric care 
that had originally been presented as essential components of a multi-faceted and 
inter-sectoral policy strategy were now put forth as core, biomedical 
interventions that should be prioritised in order to achieve maternal mortality 
reduction.
Such repackaging can be understood as part of a sustained effort by safe 
motherhood advocates to define a ‘strategic focus’ for the Initiative. This was 
perceived to be necessary because of the belief discussed in the previous chapter, 
that an excessively broad policy agenda had detracted attention from the original 
core, health systems recommendations for averting maternal death. In order to 
achieve such a focus, other components of the original policy vision were de- 
emphasised. They were de-emphasised not because they were considered 
unimportant, but rather in order to achieve an unequivocal and unmistakable 
policy focus on the importance of professional obstetric care, the aspect of the 
original agenda that had, during the previous decade, been almost systematically 
neglected in favour of vertical, community-based safe motherhood programmes. 
The way in which the safe motherhood field reformulated its international policy 
recommendations thus pursued a very pragmatic goal of redirecting the focus of 
current international and national safe motherhood activities away from the sort 
of Vertical’ community-based TBA-training programmes that had become the 
mainstay of international safe motherhood work during the past decade. Indeed, 
discussions held during the Technical Consultation reveal that TBAs were 
excluded from the definition of a ‘skilled birth attendant,’ not because their 
contributions were considered worthless, but rather to discourage government 
officials from resorting to them as substitutes for professional providers (Starrs 
1997).
In addition to the pragmatic goal of reorienting policy, a clearer strategic 
focus on technical interventions to avert maternal deaths represented an effort 
by the Safe Motherhood Initiative to appeal to the dominant priority-setting 
ethos that had become entrenched in international health during the preceding
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decade. Within this ethos, different health issues -  and indeed different health 
policies -  were increasingly seen as ‘products’ to be sold to donors and 
governments. In light of the rising dominance of neoliberal ideas within 
development planning and the Initiative’s limited success in achieving uptake of 
its comprehensive agenda, the turn to a concise set of messages to encourage 
appropriate action on safe motherhood made considerable sense, even if this 
entailed downplaying other important aspects for the sake of clarity. Defining 
unambiguous messages and ‘marketing’ these became a strategy for securing 
support for previously neglected policies, and also served to ensuring a place for 
safe motherhood on the global health agenda, amidst intensified competition 
from existing and emerging global health issues like IIIV/AIDS. But none of 
this had anything to do with new technical insights about what was actually 
needed in order to save women’s lives. Rather, it was a strategy that was 
practically and politically motivated. The extent to which this was the case is 
illustrated most clearly by examining the proposal by a subgroup of safe 
motherhood actors that the Initiative should make ‘emergency obstetric care’ 
alone the strategic focus for its advocacy and recommendations.
5.3. EmOC and the ‘branding’ of safe motherhood policy
In the aftermath of the 1997 Technical Consultation a subgroup of safe 
motherhood practitioners proposed that international safe motherhood 
recommendations should be even more narrowly targeted than the Action Points 
that had been endorsed at the Colombo meeting. They argued that in countries 
with weak health systems and few healthcare workers, maternal mortality efforts 
would be best directed at ensuring life-saving care for those women who develop 
pregnancy and delivery complications -  estimated to be about 15 percent -  
rather than the other recommendations that had been emphasised, including 
providing access to a skilled birth attendant to every pregnant woman (Maine 
and Rosenfield 1999).18 This subgroup, consisting of key US-based public health 
specialists and later incorporating UN agencies too, proposed to the rest of the 
movement that rather than simply re-orienting advocacy around the ten Action 
Points specified at the Colombo meeting, it would be an advantage to make 
emergency obstetric care alone the strategic focus of the Safe Motherhood
18 See Hussein and Clapham (2005) for a discussion of the implications of this debate for 
managers of safe motherhood programmes.
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Initiative and centre international advocacy on the message that improving “the 
quality of, access to, and utilisation of emergency obstetric services” should be 
the priority for countries (Maine and Rosenfield 1999:481). While acknowledging 
that other aspects, especially accredited healthcare providers, were important, 
proponents argued that focusing narrowly on creating support for emergency 
obstetric care was, from a strategic perspective, preferable to a primary focus on 
the providers of that care. The main justification for this argument was that 
emergency obstetric care is the most essential component of saving women’s 
lives, without which other actions aimed to improve safe motherhood will fail to 
reduce maternal mortality within a population. For instance, it was argued that 
ensuring access to skilled birth attendants to all women will not reduce maternal 
mortality in the absence of emergency obstetric care to treat the acute 
complications that cause most maternal deaths (Paxton et al. 2005).
While this technical justification was important, another dimension of the 
rationale behind a recommended strategic focus on emergency obstetric care 
seems very much to have been that such a focus would help to simplify, package 
and disseminate safe motherhood policy recommendations in a new and 
compelling way. Unlike the original comprehensive vision or even the 1997 
Action Points, a focus on emergency obstetric care implied attention to discrete, 
clinical interventions that could be synthesised into an ‘essential clinical package’ 
for saving women’s lives. As some informants explained, such a package could 
be marketed as a single policy solution, thereby increasing its appeal to donors 
and other decision-makers. The attraction was also that it was a package that, 
unlike a comprehensive strategy of inter-linked policies, could, be ‘costed’ and 
evaluated in order to ensure good value for money for donors and governments.
‘Branding’ emergency obstetric care or EmOC as the solution to maternal 
mortality can be seen as a strategy that was in many ways modelled on 
UNICEF’s successful promotion of GOBI as a universally valid set of policy 
prescriptions. With GOBI, UNICEF had succeeded in building a recognisable 
‘brand’ for this policy package, using the catchy acronym ‘GOBI’ as a reminder 
of the four main activities needed to reduce child mortality (growth monitoring, 
oral rehydration for diarrhoeal disease, breastfeeding, and immunisation). 
According to Maine and Rosenfield — who were strong advocates of a focus on 
emergency obstetric care -  it was the way in which GOBI gave governments and
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international agencies “a short list of actions required to prevent deaths among 
young children from the most common causes” that had secured UNICEF’s 
Child Survival Revolution’s success (Maine and Rosenfield 1999:481). By 
contrast, they perceived that the long list of actions subsumed under the term 
‘safe motherhood’ had overwhelmed and confused decision-makers (as discussed 
in Chapter 4). As one informant put it, “a multiplicity of strategies acts as a 
disincentive for donors to act.”
Mirroring the GOBI brand, ‘emergency obstetric care’ boiled safe 
motherhood policy down to its essence -  the discrete clinical interventions for 
obstetric complications, without which, experts believed, maternal mortality 
would not be substantially reduced. Like GOBI, emergency obstetric care could 
be summarised through an acronym — EmOC — that could help disseminate the 
policy idea globally while also clarifying its priority status for achieving maternal 
mortality reduction. This adoption of a marketing logic represented a particularly 
interesting development, because while the Safe Motherhood Initiative at the 
beginning was framed in opposition to and as a rejection of UNICEF’s 
simplified GOBI strategy, ten years later key safe motherhood advocates were 
now taking on board more than a few lessons from the GOBI branding success.
A further attraction was that focusing on EmOC made it possible to 
discuss and present safe motherhood policy within the terms of reference of the 
normative criteria and tools that had been introduced by the World Bank in the 
early 1990s and that quickly became influential within international health policy 
and priority-setting (Murray and Acharya 1997; Murray and Lopez 1997; Ilyder 
et al. 1998). The strategy implied action targeted at specific diseases with clinical 
solutions and was therefore more amenable (certainly more so than a 
comprehensive policy approach) to the sort of analyses valued by burden-of- 
disease specialists. Specifically, the discrete, clinical interventions subsumed 
under the term ‘EmOC’ could be assessed for cost-effectiveness more easily than 
the multiple, interacting policy components implied by comprehensive approach 
spanning health and social sectors. Because it incorporated medical interventions 
with ‘known’ clinical effectiveness, it was possible to argue that EmOC, despite 
its higher absolute costs, was a more ‘cost-effective’ way to save lives than 
cheaper, but less effective strategies, such as TBA-training. As Maine and 
Rosenfield (1999:482) argued in an influential commentary:
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It is often assumed that improving emergency obstetric care is 
too costly. This assumption implies that other solutions exist 
that are equally effective but cheaper. In the case of maternal 
mortality, this is not true. No matter how many resources are 
devoted to improving women’s education and nutrition, or to 
prenatal care and training traditional birth attendants, no 
substantial reduction in maternal mortality will result without 
access to emergency obstetric care. Effectiveness, in turn, 
strongly influences cost-effectiveness. An intervention that is 
not effective can never be cost-effective. Therefore, seemingly 
less expensive interventions, such as antenatal care and 
traditional birth attendant training, are much less cost-effective 
than providing emergency obstetric care. The one exception to 
this rule is the provision of family planning services at the 
community-level, which will help to decrease numbers of 
unwanted and unplanned pregnancies.
As this quote suggests, by appealing to the logic of cost-effectiveness, advocating 
for EmOC was seen as a way to discourage the use of TBA-training programmes 
and preventive, community-based programmes as the foundation of safe 
motherhood efforts, while also challenging resistance to expansion of facility- 
based emergency care by appealing to the dominant decision-making logic.
When compared with more broad-based or comprehensive demands, the 
EmOC strategy can also be seen as a policy brand that appealed to the apparent 
political preference for discrete interventions with both tangible and immediate 
benefits. This was important for the safe motherhood field, my informants 
claimed, given a widespread impression that a major reason that international 
actors and governments had been unwilling to implement the full comprehensive 
agenda was that they were reluctant to commit to solutions whose benefits could 
take decades to materialise, including skilled birth attendance. Achieving 
universal coverage of skilled birth attendants -  as the Action Points called for -  
could take decades given the weak capacity of midwifery schools in sub-Saharan 
Africa (AbouZahr and Wardlaw 2001). Although the process could theoretically 
be sped up by upgrading existing staff or alternative cadres, the skilled birth 
attendance message nevertheless implied a long-term commitment with few 
immediately visible results (Buttiens et al. 2004). By contrast, it was argued, 
improvements in EmOC could be achieved relatively quickly, by making a series 
of managerial and fiscal changes and by upgrading existing health facilities rather 
than building new ones (Maine and Rosenfield 1999). On the basis of this 
rationale, EmOC advocates insisted that if  a strategy targeted at improving the
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availability and quality of medical treatment of obstetric complications was 
embraced, substantial reductions in maternal deaths would be possible in a 
relatively short period of time {ibid.).
Finally, a safe motherhood policy rebranded around EmOC — with its 
technical and medical focus — offered a convenient way to distance safe 
motherhood from its association with the politicised reproductive health 
movement, which many felt had damaged its ability to generate support (Lush 
and Campbell 2001). In addidon to the controversy surrounding the demand for 
abortion rights discussed in Chapter 4, by the late 1990s the reproductive health 
movement had also come under criticism for being too idealistic and all-inclusive 
in its demands (e.g. Basu 1997). The proposal to focus advocacy on EmOC can 
thus be seen as an effort to extricate the Initiative from its damaging association 
with the broader reproductive health movement, in part by honing in on 
technical life-saving solutions designed to improve the credibility and appeal of 
the Initiative’s policy proposals.
5.3.1. “Support but an awful lot o f  undercurrent”
While treatment of obstetric complications had been part of the original safe 
motherhood policy recommendation, the narrower focus on EmOC discussed 
above clearly simplified that original approach. It also deviated in important ways 
and certainly in emphasis from the socially-grounded, comprehensive vision that 
early safe motherhood advocates -  many of whom remained key actors within 
the field -  had initially rallied around. It seems remarkable, therefore, that there 
was seemingly widespread support for the policy shift within the Initiative.
In part this might be explicable because, as one informant put it, “I think 
what the EmOC people did is try to get everybody [on board] and the bulk of 
folks in maternal health went there as we didn’t have anything else.” It was also 
certainly the case that strong pressure from some of the more dominant actors 
within the Initiative was brought to bear on others to support the revised policy 
focus. Informants described calls from the staunchest EmOC proponents for all 
practitioners to back a coherent and cohesive agenda. Many suggested that 
publicly challenging the narrower policy messages, and especially the 
recommendations on EmOC, would have been interpreted as disloyalty towards 
the movement as a whole and damaging to its struggle for survival. One 
informant even went so far as to liken the strongest EmOC advocates to
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members of a “cult.” As she recalled it, “if  you didn’t ‘believe’ [they] would 
literally cut you o ff .. . [they] lambasted people that would even discuss the fact 
that you could work in [the community].. .1 mean, seriously, there were times 
when it was ridiculous.” As this last quote reveals, for some the Initiative’s 
members the narrowed focus was not unproblematic. One academic I 
interviewed, for example, lamented the tensions that had arisen with a colleague 
during debates about how to publicly promote the Initiative’s agenda:
She was very big on being very clear and narrow and specific. I 
remember her writing that maternal mortality was not ‘the 
woman’s initiative,’ so everything to do with maternal 
empowerment couldn’t come into maternal.. .and it wasn’t 
[about] morbidity and so it was a very narrow mortality focus.
The same thing with EmOC. To me, I interpret her trying to be 
very clear and correct and I think she was, but it was at a great 
cost of antagonising people.
Interviews with other informants confirm that there had indeed been more 
disagreement and discord within the policy community than is conceded in 
polished and condensed policy documents and advocacy materials, especially 
regarding the proposal to focus advocacy narrowly on EmOC. As one informant 
stated: “I think the EmOC message was, what’s the word, it was a bit far from 
the sense that, I mean, there were a lot of people who rallied but there was also 
an awful lot of undercurrent and people going “wait a minute, we’re missing 
some pieces here’.” Such undercurrents reflected a series of core concerns.
Not surprisingly, at the heart of many informants’ unease had been some 
considerable discomfort that promoting EmOC as the strategic focus of safe 
motherhood policy oversimplified the process of population-level maternal 
mortality decline. The idea that professional care and EmOC would be essential 
components of any policy initiative for mortality decline was not in itself 
contested, but many felt uncomfortable about publicly distancing themselves 
(albeit for well-founded strategic reasons) from the social, political and economic 
agenda they still believed was important for addressing the underlying 
determinants of maternal mortality, and that they themselves remained 
personally committed to. There was a sense that the baby had been thrown out 
with the bathwater. These informants had worried in particular about the 
potential backlash for the broader reproductive health agenda of promoting a 
more narrow policy focus on maternal mortality reduction (rather than the
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broader concept of maternal health). This included fears that reproductive and 
pregnancy-related morbidity would be further neglected in international health 
policy debates as a result of the intensified focus on reducing mortality alone, 
rather than improving women’s health in a broader sense.
More generally, academics in particular had felt uncomfortable that 
promoting EmOC as the field’s strategic focus oversimplified the dynamics of 
maternal mortality reduction. They had worried especially that research findings 
had been used rather selectively to support the new recommendations: The same 
historical analyses that had been used to justify the focus on skilled birth 
attendants and emergency obstetric care also pointed to the importance of 
favourable social policies, including promotion of norms and regulations to 
empower midwives and investments to ensure equitable access to healthcare. 
However, one of the authors of these studies complained that public 
presentations of these findings downplayed these latter points in favour of an 
emphasis on the technical aspects (see De Brouwere et al. 1998). Similarly, noted 
several informants, case studies from Malaysia and Sri Lanka that had been used 
to justify recommendations on professional obstetric care had also pointed to the 
role of context-specific policy implementation and the importance of health 
policies articulated around the idea of universal access to healthcare and the 
elimination of financial barriers (Koblinsky and Campbell 2003; Koblinsky 2003). 
In fact, the case studies had highlighted the importance of a context-specific and 
incremental approach, suggesting a more complex reality than what was being 
communicated through the universalising language of global-level advocacy.
Maternal health specialists, notably those working at the programmatic 
level in countries with high maternal mortality, had also worried that the 
Initiative was making TBAs scapegoats for the failure to improve maternal 
mortality rates. They queried the IAG’s justification for now rejecting a role for 
TBAs on the basis of research showing that they could not save women’s lives 
when, as originally envisaged, their role had not even included life-saving care.
As one informant put it to me in an interview conducted ten years later, “of 
course the research showed that they couldn’t save lives -  they were never 
trained to do so.” A number of informants claimed that pinning the blame on 
TBAs obscured that it was not TBAs’ lack of skills that had been the real 
problem in countries as much as the fact that TBAs worked in isolation from any
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functioning health system, without supervision, follow-up or support. Referring 
to a World Bank-sponsored TBA-training programme, one informant said, “we 
knew in 1991 why that World Bank [traditional] midwife programme wasn’t 
going to work -  because they had no medical backup.” At a time when most 
countries with high maternal mortality had extreme health worker shortages and 
health systems with poor links between communities and health facilities, the 
sidelining of TBAs -  who played other important roles, especially in areas under- 
served by formal health services -  had been considered particularly worrying.
Many informants had also been reticent to transfer an oversimplified set 
of messages to diverse country contexts and thereby contribute to the 
formulation of inappropriate policies and programmes. One issue, informants 
explained, had been concern that the targets for skilled birth attendance would 
lack credibility and therefore be dismissed outright by countries experiencing 
severe human resource crises and established traditions of home birthing with 
‘traditional’ or lay providers. Another was the implication for health system 
organisation of de-emphasising the Initiative’s original focus on community- 
based care in favour of an exclusively facility-based approach. In theory, ensuring 
access to emergency obstetric care did not necessarily imply that all women 
should deliver in a health facility, but rather that all women should have access to 
a facility that can provide emergency obstetric care in the event that they 
experience complications. However, safe motherhood specialists had worried 
that those implementing policy would misinterpret the focus on EmOC as a 
proposal for universal institutionalisation of childbirth. This, in turn, might not 
only lead to neglect of the primary level of care but also to higher demand for 
institutional deliveries that health systems in low-income countries would be 
unable to absorb, thereby potentially compromising quality of care and 
contributing to higher, rather than lower, numbers of maternal deaths in 
hospitals.
Finally, the exclusive advocacy for EmOC also raised fears of excessive 
médicalisation of childbirth, as exemplified by one WHO official’s letter to the 
editor of the Lancet in 1999, in which she warned that “identification of major 
obstetric interventions as the core of safe motherhood programming risks over­
intervention, iatrogenicity and inappropriate use of scarce resources” (AbouZahr 
1999: 2085). The author also worried about concomitant neglect of care in
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normal birth, important for preventing certain kinds of complications and 
ensuring timely treatment or referral of obstetric complications and emergencies. 
She further warned that the emphasis on skilled providers and emergency 
obstetric care might be misinterpreted as a recommendation for the use of 
highly-specialised staff, a misguided policy for African countries where doctors 
are in short supply (ibid.).
5.3.2. EmOC as a strategic entry point for systemic change 
Those who proposed a strategic focus on EmOC were not unaware of or 
unsympathetic toward such underlying concerns that existed within the safe 
motherhood policy community. But, these actors also seem to have recognised 
that their vision for rebranded safe motherhood policy would fall apart without 
the full support of the movement. This may explain their perceived ferocity in 
seeking to persuade others of their approach. Through frequent editorials, 
opinion pieces and articles in the scientific press and through advocacy at 
meetings (e.g. Maine 1997; Freedman 2003; Paxton et al. 2005), EmOC 
proponents sought to convince the wider safe motherhood community to back 
the proposal for more targeted policy advice and advocacy. In many ways, this is 
an effort that is still actively being made within the movement today. I would 
argue that the gradual process of building support within the safe motherhood 
community for a much narrower strategic focus has involved bringing about 
important shifts in the way in which the movement relates to and makes use of 
advocacy.
A first conceptual shift has been to see advocacy for EmOC not simply 
as a call for a socially unengaged biomedical solution designed to avert deaths 
from obstetric complications, but rather as a strategic entry point for broader 
health system development. Proponents have argued that advocating for EmOC 
can help prompt governments and donors to upgrade health facilities, 
infrastructure and training schemes for healthcare providers in ways that benefit 
not only maternal health and survival, but also the health system as a whole 
(Maine and Rosenfield 1999). While the same could be said for advocacy for 
skilled birth attendants, EmOC proponents have claimed that by focusing on the 
system into which health workers must be integrated (rather than the person 
who attends the birth) it becomes possible to force attention onto cross-cutting 
health system issues. As such, EmOC can be seen as an essential first step
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towards expanding not only life-saving care, but also more routine care related to 
maternal and reproductive health and even public health services more generally. 
Furthermore, proponents have argued that a focus on EmOC can direct 
attention to questions of access to healthcare, because ensuring access to EmOC 
implies not only making certain that EmOC is in place (which in itself requires a 
health system) but also ensuring that women with complications can and do use 
it (Maine and Rosenfield 2001; Freedman 2003).
In order to dissipate residual fears that focusing on EmOC means 
reverting to an urban hospital model, advocates have also described how it 
instead involves upgrading services that people can reach, including district 
hospitals and health centres, as well as updating hospitals to perform obstetric 
surgery (such as caesarean delivery for obstructed labour) (Maine and Rosen field 
1999). Of equal importance, implementing EmOC implies strengthening links 
with other levels of the health system, such as health centres or first aid posts, 
where a number of the life-saving procedures encompassed by EmOC can be 
delivered. As Maine and Rosenfield (1999:481-482) put it, implementing EmOC 
implies recognising that for “postpartum haemorrhage, which can kill in a matter 
of hours, treatment and first aid (e.g. manual removal of the placenta and 
injection of ergometrine) need to be available at the most peripheral level of the 
health care system.”
A second conceptual shift has been to understand a focus on EmOC not 
only as a way of potentiating health system development, as outlined above, but 
also as a way of galvanising social and political changes and thereby addressing 
underlying social and economic determinants of health. In order to help generate 
such a reconceptualisation, EmOC advocates have claimed that health systems 
should be understood not simply as “delivery mechanisms for technical 
interventions” but rather as “core social institutions” that are fundamental parts 
of social and civil life (Freedman et al. 2005:997). In doing so they have turned to 
the work of Maureen Mackintosh (2001), who has argued that poorly functioning 
health systems are core to the experience of poverty and discrimination and thus 
can also be conceptualised as sites for enacting citizen entitlements and holding 
governments and others to account for the provision of adequate services and 
for non-discriminatory access to such services.
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On the basis of this expanded conceptualisation of health systems,
EmOC advocates have argued that organising claims for safe motherhood 
around a demand for EmOC provides an opportunity to link activism on 
maternal mortality reduction to other important aspects of women’s health and 
social justice and human rights (Freedman 2003:102). For instance, Freedman, a 
human rights lawyer and prominent advocate for emergency obstetric care, has 
insisted that debates about EmOC can be used to remind those responsible for 
the provision of care that ‘access’ involves not simply implementing services in 
health facilities, but also ensuring “physical and financial access to non- 
discriminatory, culturally sensitive, high-quality, facility-based services”
(Freedman 2003:102). By forcing engagement with health systems issues, a 
strategic focus on EmoC can thus come to be seen as an entry point for 
improving social inclusion and justice, with the health system being “a vehicle for 
fulfilling rights, for active citizenship, and for true democratic development — 
poverty reduction in its fullest sense” (Freedman et al. 2005:997).
It is, I would argue, on the basis of such reconceptualisations of what is 
entailed by a strategic focus on EmOC that many within the safe motherhood 
community have become reassured that embracing a more targeted set of 
messages will not necessarily sideline the more comprehensive agenda to which 
they remain committed. Although there were certainly factions within the safe 
motherhood community who resisted the new agenda regardless of these re­
conceptualisations, with time and despite their initial reservations the mainstream 
of the movement seems to have come to appreciate that a targeted advocacy 
focus may not be counterproductive to the Initiative’s original ideological aims. 
Many had come to accept that, despite their somewhat bombastic attitudes, 
EmOC advocates had, in the words of one informant, “articulated things that 
were very important to articulate.”
A considerable number of my informants had thus eventually come to 
appreciate a strategic focus on EmOC as a way of promoting a concrete “do­
able” agenda for structural change. This agenda was judged to have a greater 
chance of winning concessions in the global health policy arena than the original 
all-encompassing and, apparently, overwhelming demands for social, economic 
and health-sector reform that had been ignored in the initiative’s first decade 
(Freedman 2003). As the informant quoted above saw it, “it’s an exciting part of
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history because I think that was what brought maternal health to the forefront 
and made it visible.” As I have also tried to show, however, maternal health 
actors’ engagements with the new realities and the need to adopt a more targeted 
approach have on some levels impacted upon their original comprehensive vision. 
By the turn of the century, safe motherhood became equated much more directly 
with maternal mortality reduction through technical-medical intervention, even 
as its advocates claimed to have retained their original commitments to broader 
social and economic change. From the late 1990s, safe motherhood thus came to 
embody something of a paradox: safe motherhood actors’ practical uptake of the 
new approach required the ideological commitment to the old, at the same time 
as the nature of that original ideological vision was gradually being reshaped in 
light of the challenges of the present.
5.4. Conclusion
International actors’ role in the transfer of policies from the international to the 
national level is not just about promoting and marketing policy packages to 
donors and governments, but also about negotiating political, ideological and 
conceptual, as much as technical, consensus within their own policy 
communities. The policy shift that appeared a decade into the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative was presented as the result of technical or scientific re-evaluation of the 
errors of the past, but can be better understood as the product of a 
reformulation of the movement’s policy vision as part of a new advocacy 
strategy. By shifting the emphasis of the safe motherhood policy agenda onto 
medical interventions designed to avert deaths from pregnancy and delivery 
complications -  skilled birth attendance and emergency obstetric care -  the Safe 
Motherhood Inter-Agency Group aimed to direct policy attention onto those 
aspects of the original safe motherhood agenda that had been neglected during 
the late 1980s and 1990s, namely the need for health systems capable of ensuring 
women’s access to life-saving care. In the interest of defining a clear strategic 
focus, the social and political agenda that had been a core component of the 
original Safe Motherhood Call to Action in 1987 was de-emphasised.
In safe motherhood, the policy shift that was instituted in 1997 thus 
came about as international actors -  primarily the IAG -  adapted and 
reformulated the complex, original international recommendations on safe
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motherhood in order to define a strategic focus for the Initiative. In doing so, 
they sought to present a cohesive and coherent policy agenda for global 
dissemination that appealed to market-oriented donors and to the preference for 
disease-specific, targeted interventions that had become entrenched in 
international health during the preceding decade. This is illustrated particularly 
well by the branding of core safe motherhood policy recommendations as 
‘EmOC.’
In many ways such repackaging was successful in achieving wide-spread, 
global and national-level appreciation for the importance of emergency obstetric 
care delivered by accredited health professionals — rather than trained TBAs — as 
the core of public health strategies for reducing maternal mortality. I Iowever, the 
uptake of the messages has perhaps not been as focused on EmOC as some safe 
motherhood advocates might have preferred. Despite targeted advocacy for 
EmOC, both EmOC and skilled birth attendants are now routinely seen as 
global ‘solutions’ for maternal mortality. This has sometimes resulted in 
confusion about which of these interventions should be prioritised, despite most 
safe motherhood advocates conceding that they are complementary (Butticns et 
al. 2004; Hussein and Clapham 2005). Yet, on the whole, there is little doubt that 
the 1997 Technical Consultation’s Action Points and subsequent strategic 
advocacy targeted at EmOC have helped to achieve greater recognition of the 
importance of professional obstetric care — and to some extent health systems — 
among actors involved in international health efforts. Signs of this include that 
indicators of both skilled birth attendance and emergency obstetric care are now 
often used to measure and monitor progress on maternal health. ‘Skilled birth 
attendance’ was defined as a Millennium Development Goal (MDG) subtarget 
when the UN in 2000 declared improving maternal health one of eight MDGs, a 
move that has been cited as a clear demonstration of “the trust [the skilled 
attendance strategy] inspires at the level of international policy-making” (Buttiens 
et al. 2004:653). Moreover, donors have pledged to support efforts to expand 
coverage of these interventions. A good example is the Gates-funded Averting 
Maternal Death and Disability (AMDD) project that was established at Columbia 
University in 1999 to improve availability, quality and utilisation of emergency 
obstetric care (Maine and Rosenfield 2001). At the same time, the reformulated 
policy messages helped to discourage reliance on TBA programmes alone. In
134
many places, TBA-training programmes have been discontinued, sometimes, but 
not always, replaced by programmes designed to enhance institutional deliveries 
(Rosenfield 1997; Starrs 2006). Most often, however, such efforts have fallen well 
short of the sort of health system strengthening advocates envisaged when 
promoting EmOC.
As I demonstrate in the next chapter, for all the advocacy and branding 
that has gone into the formulation of a new strategic focus for the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative, advocates did not deal head-on with the broader reasons 
for the neglect of safe motherhood, including the bias that exists in international 
health practice against complex health system interventions. Branding of policy 
cannot get around the problem that emergency obstetric care is not a discrete 
intervention that can be implemented in the way that GOBI was. Instead, 
implementing EmOC implies systemic reform. As my informant highlighted, in 
the maternal health field, “we don’t have magic bullets in maternal health...we 
don’t have a vaccine, a vitamin A or something fantastic that we can promote 
and say, ‘this is it’. We have EmOC. But what is EmoC? It is the health system. 
So it is diluted into reform of the health system.” Despite all the careful work to 
gain internal and external acceptance for a more targeted set of 
recommendations, the problem of safe motherhood remained.
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C h a p t e r  6
6. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
INTEGRATION
In the years following the Safe Motherhood Technical Consultation described in 
the previous chapter, the broader global health policy context underwent 
important changes, which would shape the safe motherhood agenda in 
significant ways. On the one hand, rapid escalation of new public health 
problems such as HIV/AIDS and the growth of many strong and dedicated 
initiatives to address these issues created a competitive environment in which 
safe motherhood practitioners felt that they were losing out. This was despite 
nominal political commitment towards the focused policy agenda they had begun 
to adopt since the 1997 Technical Consultation. Although improving maternal 
health was defined as Millennium Development Goal 5 in 2000, there was, by 
2005, a growing sense that safe motherhood risked being eclipsed by the 
stronger, more prominent global health initiatives. Meanwhile, growing 
international pressure to rationalise aid grew out of dissatisfaction with neoliberal 
approaches and concerns that international aid had become excessively 
fragmented, and led to a search for new financing mechanisms and efforts to 
harmonise the aid architecture (Mosse and Lewis 2005). For the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative, while this development was in many ways welcome, as I 
show in this chapter, it also signalled intensified threats to its survival as a distinct 
policy community.
Within this context, the formation of a partnership between the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative and other advocacy coalitions dedicated to promoting 
newborn and child health emerged as one course of action that could help to 
ensure the survival of safe motherhood as a policy issue. Announced at the UN 
General Assembly in September 2005, the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn 
and Child Health (PMNCH) is by its own description a global health partnership 
bringing together “the world’s three leading maternal, newborn and child health 
alliances” around a common mission “to support the global health community to 
work successfully towards achieving MDG 4 and 5” (the Millennium
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Development Goals on child mortality and maternal health respectively) 
(PMNCH 2009b:12). The formation of a Partnership amalgamating the child, 
newborn and maternal health fields can be seen as an ironic development given 
that the Safe Motherhood Initiative was initially created as a reaction against the 
growing dominance of UNICEF’s Child Survival Revolution (see Chapter 3). 
Such coalition-building may also seem surprising in light of the strategic efforts 
described in the previous chapter to revive safe motherhood as a global health 
priority by advocating a focus on specific technical solutions to maternal 
mortality. Nevertheless, by 2005 many maternal health specialists had come to 
see the establishment of the Partnership as an inevitable and necessary 
development to ensure the survival of international policy attention to safe 
motherhood. “We’ve been waiting for this for a long time,” one UN agency 
official said in an interview shortly after the Partnership’s launch. “It needs to 
happen.. .because as a single topic we can’t fight this alone, we can’t survive.”
In this chapter I take this process of partnership formation as my 
analytical focus. I examine, from the perspective of safe motherhood advocates, 
the factors that created the impetus for the launch of the Partnership for 
Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH), as well as safe motherhood 
practitioners’ reactions to the Partnership in the first two to three years of its 
operation. After first describing the broader policy context against which the 
Partnership was launched, the rationale for its creation and its distinct policy 
vision, I turn to reflect on how and why many safe motherhood practitioners 
quickly revised their initial welcoming attitudes towards the Partnership. As I 
show, within just two years of the Initiative’s launch, this initial enthusiasm was 
ceding to scepticism and frustration. Such scepticism stemmed from a 
burgeoning perception that maternal health was being subordinated to other 
policy aims and that the ‘M’ in WINCH’ was in fact in need of renewed 
protection.
6.1. The impetus for partnership
Before describing the specific developments that culminated in the launch of the 
Partnership, I must first review some of the main developments in the broader 
global health field that converged to create the impetus for its establishment.
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6.1.1. Compétition versus integration
In the years following the 1997 Technical Consultation discussed in the previous 
chapter, the international -  or by now perhaps ‘global’ -  health field became 
increasingly complex, fragmented and, not least, competitive. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, during these first five years of the new century a large number of 
public-private partnerships or global health initiatives emerged, competing for 
resources in order to pursue predominantly disease-specific goals (Richter 2004; 
Walt 2005). The rapid expansion of global health initiatives like the Global Fund 
to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria came to highlight the vulnerability of the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative (Graham 2002). Hence, if  the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative had struggled to compete for attention against the Child Survival 
Revolution in its early years (see Chapter 3), the prominence of these new global 
initiatives now threatened it even further.
Perceptions that the Initiative faced serious perils were, however, 
somewhat in tension with external indications that the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative had in fact achieved a certain, renewed prominence and that the 
strategic advocacy that had been initiated around 1997 had, at least on some 
levels, paid off. Most significantly, perhaps, in 2000, improving maternal health 
was declared one of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and one of 
three health-related MDGs, the other two being to improve child survival (MDG 
4) and to combat HIV/AIDS and other major diseases (MDG 6) (United 
Nations 2009). However, while attention and funding to MDGs 4 and 6 grew 
rapidly, many perceived that actual commitment to MDG 5 on maternal health 
lagged behind. Commentaries in the public health literature reveal a perception 
that, despite their stated commitment, donors and governments remained 
reluctant to make necessary investments to strengthen national health systems to 
enable the ‘scaling-up’ of emergency obstetric care and skilled birth attendance 
(Travis et al. 2004; Powell-Jackson et al. 2006; Rosenfield et al. 2006). The 
creation of GAVI (the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation) in 2000 
and, in particular, the Global Fund in 2002, put into sharp relief the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative’s relative failure to attract investment and international 
political will (see AbouZahr 2003). Many also perceived that donor prioritisation 
of HIV/AIDS in particular actually displaced funding away from other global
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health issues, including reproductive and maternal health (Berer 2004; Crossette 
2005; Shiffman 2007/»).
In parallel with, and in many ways driven by, the changes to the global 
health architecture described above, debates about the need to improve the 
‘effectiveness’ of external assistance and aid intensified, due to growing 
recognition that external assistance to low-income countries, including to the 
health sector, had become too fragmented and top-down, unpredictable and 
lacking in transparency (OECD DAC 2005). The debate about aid effectiveness 
had intensified due to concerns that heavy emphasis on project-based and 
donor-driven funding was distorting national planning and priority-setting, but 
also with concern that efforts in the 1990s to address such problems through 
new aid modalities had not come to fruition (Mosse 2005). Such new aid 
modalities included sector wide approaches (SWAPs) and direct budget support 
to low-income country governments, designed in part to improve governments’ 
autonomy over planning and spending (Cassels 1995; Standing 2002). While 
many donors embraced these new modalities, others, including the major donor 
USAID, rejected them. As a result, as Standing (2002) has observed, international 
initiatives such as safe motherhood programmes and Integrated Management of 
Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) continued to operate in parallel, with separate 
budgets and management structures. With the proliferation in the early 2000s of 
new global health initiatives and the establishment of the “new philanthropy,” 
exemplified by the Gates Foundation, vertical approaches to health became 
reinforced, in a way that fitted poorly with system-driven approaches to sectoral 
reform (such as SWAPs) and longer-term planning and financing of health 
sectors (Standing 2002). Indeed, authors note that the unprecedented number of 
donors pursuing often-separate agendas was having detrimental effects on public 
health systems and on the ability of countries to implement coherent health plans 
(Buse and Walt 2000*7/Buse and Walt 2000/»). Worries about such problems fed 
into more general international disquiet about the poor effectiveness of 
international development assistance overall (Mosse and Lewis 2005).
In reaction, by the mid-2000s the principles o f ‘ownership,’ ‘alignment,’ 
‘harmonisation,’ ‘managing results’ and ‘mutual accountability’ gained 
prominence as core ideals that should underpin international aid practices 
(OECD DAC 2005). These principles, contained within the Paris Declaration on
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Aid Effectiveness, were endorsed by more than 100 signatories from donor and 
low-income country governments, multilateral donor agencies, regional 
development banks and international organisations at a high-level international 
forum convened in Paris, France in February 2005 (ibid.). Aid effectiveness in 
this context implied not only efficiency of expenditure, but also a range of 
development-related goals, including improved country ‘ownership’ over 
development spending, signalling a (rhetorical) departure from the now 
discredited structural adjustment programmes and donor conditionalities of the 
1980s and 1990s (ibid). The Paris Declaration can thus be seen as the product of 
a development rhetoric that, according to Mosse (2005), speaks simultaneously 
of neoliberal reform, democratisation, poverty reduction and global governance, 
despite the potential contradictions between these different goals.
The Paris Declaration’s aims for aid effectiveness was, at least in theory, 
widely supported within the global health field, including within safe 
motherhood, since the effect of fragmented governance and disease-specific 
donor-driven projects with separate budgets often translated into neglect of 
cross-cutting health system issues deemed necessary for reducing maternal 
mortality (Task Force on Child Health and Maternal I Iealth 2005). All the main 
agencies involved in the Safe Motherhood Initiative endorsed the Declaration.
At the same time, in speaking to informants it became clear that the 
Declaration also signalled to actors within the Initiative that it would become 
increasingly unsustainable for many different groups to coexist as parallel 
initiatives and raised fears that weaker ones, like the Safe Motherhood Initiative, 
would risk being swallowed up by more powerful initiatives as part of efforts to 
make aid more efficient. This perception was grounded in explicit messages from 
donors that they wished to rationalise and fund fewer global health initiatives.
Together, these somewhat contradictory tendencies — greater 
competition to survive as a single initiative combined with pressure to harmonise 
and integrate development efforts -  converged to create an impetus for the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative to find strategies to protect the status that maternal health 
had achieved through being assigned as one of the MDGs. Partnership 
formation was part of such a strategy. In an interview conducted shortly after the 
Partnership had been announced, one member of its interim steering committee 
explained that safe motherhood actors’ decision to seek merger with other global
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health initiatives had been driven by both implicit and explicit pressure from 
donors who “really wanted to see this field co-ordinated and connected and they 
didn’t want several sets of transaction costs for the funding that they did want to 
put into the work.” Given such views, by 2005 many maternal health specialists 
had come to see the establishment of the Partnership as an inevitable and 
necessary development to ensure the survival of safe motherhood as a global 
health issue.
6.1.2. Defusing competition through partnership 
Within the general context described above, it was the emergence in 2003-2004 
of a new transnational advocacy coalition for newborn survival that perhaps 
provided the most direct stimulus for the Safe Motherhood Initiative to pursue 
partnership formation as a strategy to ensure its own survival. Many safe 
motherhood practitioners perceived the newborn lobby to be a direct competitor 
for donor resources and attention, not least because they thought that donors 
and politicians were more likely to support initiatives to save the lives of 
‘innocent’ newborns than efforts to avert maternal deaths.
Members of this new movement — primarily academics and international 
NGOs such as Save the Children -  argued that newborn survival had been 
neglected in global health efforts, since neither child survival nor safe 
motherhood programmes had focused on preventing newborn deaths. In a ‘call 
to action’ published in the Lancet, advocates argued that addressing neonatal 
deaths is necessary given that each year an estimated four million babies die in 
the first four weeks of life (the neonatal period) (Lawn et al. 2004). Proponents 
of a distinct focus on newborn survival argued that the proportion of child 
deaths that occur in the neonatal period is increasing, such that by implication 
“the Millennium Development Goal for child survival cannot be met without 
substantial reductions in neonatal mortality” (Lawn et al. 2005:891).
Already dismayed that MDG 4 on child survival seemed to be attracting 
greater commitment and resources than MDG 5 on maternal health, many of 
those I spoke with had feared that the promotion of newborn survival as a 
subsidiary goal of child survival would further skew such prioritisation. In order 
to preempt this situation, the IAG proposed to individuals affiliated with the 
newborn survival movement (in particular the newly established Healthy 
Newborn Partnership) to join forces with the Safe Motherhood Initiative. The
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main rationale they presented for such a partnership was the mutual benefits that 
each health subfield could accrue from joined-up advocacy. In meetings, safe 
motherhood advocates argued that newborn survival is so closely related with 
women’s survival and safe delivery that any efforts to improve the safety of 
pregnancy and delivery will also benefit newborn survival. Safe motherhood 
advocates also hoped that the benefits of maternal health interventions for 
newborn survival would help to improve political commitment to skilled 
healthcare providers and emergency obstetric care.
The resulting Partnership for Maternal and Newborn I lealth was formed 
in January 2004, effectively disbanding the original Safe Motherhood Inter- 
Agency Group. A new Partnership secretariat was established in Geneva, 
replacing the New York-based NGO Family Care International (FCI), the NGO 
that had been created specifically to help with the organisation of the first 
international Safe Motherhood Conference in 1987 and that had served as the 
IAG’s secretariat ever since (although FCI retained an important role as an 
advocacy group).
With newborn survival as the link between MDGs 4 and 5, discussions 
soon got underway within the UN agencies and the broader advocacy 
communities about whether it would “make sense” to incorporate the existing 
child survival community into the partnership, so as to jointly advocate for 
resources to achieve MDGs 4 and 5. Meanwhile, there were also ongoing talks 
within the child health community about the need to revive the Child Survival 
Revolution to drive progress on MDG4, a discussion that was, according to one 
informant, driven in large part by USAID. It soon became clear that certain of 
those donors who were particularly strongly committed to the Paris Declaration, 
including DflD in particular, would refuse to handle requests from three 
different partnerships that all claim to be the Partnership, creating an impetus for 
the child health lobby to merge with the new maternal and newborn health 
coalition. As my informant put it, "they said, ‘either you merge or die, you are 
not funded,’ so we decided to merge.” Although my informant went on to add 
that “the pressure came from the donors,” there is perhaps also scope for 
arguing that the donors merely executed, in a perhaps more literal fashion, the 
process begun by the safe motherhood movement itself.
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6.1.3. The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health 
Subsequent to the initial discussions mentioned above, a high-level meeting 
attended by maternal, newborn and child health representatives from across the 
UN specialised agencies, academia, donor bodies and country-level health 
authorities was convened in New Delhi, India in April 2005. The aim of this 
meeting was to discuss the institutional structure and strategic objectives for a 
new partnership. The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health 
(PMNCH) was then officially launched a few months later during the UN 
General Assembly in New York City in September 2005, joining together the 
Partnership for Safe Motherhood and Newborn Health (hosted by the WIIO in 
Geneva); the Healthy Newborn Partnership (based at Save the Children USA); 
and the Child Survival Partnership (hosted by UNICEF in New York). An 
interim steering committee operated until a Director was appointed in February 
2006. At the same time, a small staff was recruited for the secretariat, housed in 
an annex to the WHO Headquarters in Geneva -  although the PMNCII was 
purportedly independent from the WHO. The Board became the PMNCII’s 
governing body and advisory committees were assembled, drawing 
representatives from across six constituencies: donors and foundations, health 
care professionals, multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, partner countries and 
researchers and academics.19 In short, a new institutional structure was created, 
modelled in many ways on the Global Fund and other initiatives like it, especially 
in as far as the Partnership incorporated donors within its governance structure.
The Partnership was framed within the discourse of the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, no doubt reflecting that it was launched just six months 
after the Declaration had been signed. Like the Paris Declaration, the PMNCH’s 
strategic objectives promised to usher in a new era of more appropriate financial 
and technical assistance to low-income countries, entailing the elimination of 
overt conditions on aid and greater country ‘ownership’ of national policy 
processes (PMNCH 2009*). In the spirit of promoting country ownership, the 
PMNCH pledged to advocate for maternal, newborn and child health within 
national development plans and investment plans, rather than to pursue separate 
donor-driven projects {ibid). Related to this was the pledge to ensure that
19 For a full description of these different constituencies see
http://vw..yhQ int/pninçh/abotit/constituencies/en/in,1ev^îrn| acCessed 23.09.09.
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interventions to improve health would be ‘scaled up’ to cover entire populations, 
rather than restricted to small donor-driven and NGO projects reaching only the 
few. As the PMNCH (2009«) itself put it, its aim was “to catalyse implementation 
at scale of national MNCH plans and essential packages of interventions,” while 
also improving equity in the coverage of “essential MNCII services” and raising 
demand for healthcare among underserved populations.
The Partnership also reiterated the Paris Declaration’s commitment to 
the values of “transparency,” “good governance” and “accountability” in 
development work, espousing the imperative of attaining development “results” 
or “targets” (OECD DAC 2005). It promised to achieve measurable results and 
to “monitor and evaluate progress towards Partnership and country level results 
and promote stakeholder accountability” (PMNCII 2009a). Today, these 
strategic objectives have been crystallised, such that the Partnership’s stated 
mission is to help achieve MDGs 4 and 5 by “enhancing partners’ interactions 
and using their comparative advantages” in order to build consensus on and 
promote “evidence-based high-impact interventions and means to deliver them 
through harmonisation,” raise funding through advocacy (with a target of US$ 30 
billion for 2009-2015) and “track partners’ commitments and measurement of 
progress for accountability” (PMNCH 2009b:12). In sum, the Partnership’s 
strategic objectives illustrate how the dictates of aid effectiveness and the 
heightened emphasis on accountability through monitoring of objective 
outcomes have come to provide an increasingly influential code of practice for 
international development in general, and global health in particular.
6.2. Safe motherhood practitioners’ perspectives on the 
Partnership
The irony that the Inter-Agency Group sought to align itself with precisely the 
child health field that it had been created to compete against was not lost on safe 
motherhood practitioners. Yet many expressed hope that the PMNCH could 
help bridge the damaging, and ultimately false, dichotomies between maternal 
and child health that had become established in the 1980s. Some even felt that 
the ‘case’ for maternal health had now been made, such that joining forces with 
child health no longer posed the same threat. As one informant assessed,
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I think there was a need in maternal and child health, the mother 
was always forgotten. So I think in 1987, people perceived the 
distinct need to focus on the mother and think of interventions 
specifically to save the mother. So I think it was important to 
make a strong case that mothers...that childbirth was different. I 
think we’ve made that case now and I think to integrate the 
neonates made complete sense.
Although not all my informants agreed that the threat of maternal health 
objectives being subordinated to child health goals had been defused, most safe 
motherhood specialists did not resist the Partnership, and indeed many 
welcomed it. This was perhaps especially because the previously competing 
subfields now faced a common threat from other prominent global health 
initiatives. Indeed, a main justification for an expanded collaboration was to 
create a “multiplier effect” to enable the Partnership to become a counterweight 
to the HIV/AIDS field that was rapidly assuming a dominant position within the 
broader global health policy domain. The combined annual death toll of maternal 
and child deaths (including newborn deaths) far exceeded that attributed to 
HIV/AIDS, which could help, my informants claimed, to create priority for 
these issues relative to HIV/AIDS. Combining maternal mortality with child and 
neonatal mortality figures also masked that the number of maternal deaths is 
relatively small, which many considered a benefit given the perception that the 
“small” number of maternal deaths had underpinned the international neglect of 
the issue. As one informant put it, “it makes sense to bung in the babies for the 
numbers game.” Moreover, when maternal, newborn and child health were 
addressed alongside each other, the potential to save lives appeared 
correspondingly greater. To this end, the Partnership promoted the slogan “lives 
in the balance” for the PMNCH, drawing attention to the potential that scaling 
up cost-effective interventions would have to save seven million lives that are 
lost annually to pregnant women, newborns and children.
6.2.1. The prospect o f  institutional strengthening 
In addition to the anticipated benefits of joined-up advocacy, another reason for 
initial support for the new Partnership was an expectation that it would help 
strengthen the safe motherhood policy community’s institutional identity. This 
expectation reflected a pervasive view among safe motherhood practitioners that 
part of the Initiative’s enduring struggle to achieve real commitment to 
improving maternal health had to do with the institutional weakness of the
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Initiative itself. A lack of focused institutional representation at the highest level 
was something many felt had hampered the movement’s success. Unlike AIDS, 
which had its own UN agency (the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS or UNAIDS), or child health, which was clearly associated with 
UNICEF, safe motherhood had no directly corresponding institutional platform 
at the international level. Instead, it was dealt with by different UN agencies and 
NGOs coming together in the IAG. Many felt that the ‘inter-agency’ status of 
the initiative had been a serious impediment to achieving progress. Even after 
almost twenty years of advocacy, the predominant view among my informants 
was that the Initiative had a weak public profile resulting from such institutional 
fragmentation. Complaining of poor public awareness and media interest, one 
UNFPA informant said, “you ask people who can cite two or three people who 
are shouting for maternal health in the media, in the public and they will not say 
one.. .You go to the street and you ask people ‘which agency in your opinion 
does maternal health?’ They won’t say anything, but for child health they will 
immediately say UNICEF.”
The Initiative’s lack of public profile was widely attributed to weak 
leadership within the field. “We never had a Jim Grant,” one of my informants 
remarked, referring to UNICEF’s charismatic leader in the 1980s, who 
championed the Child Survival Revolution and the GOBI approach. The 
PMNCH offered a way to enhance international leadership for the issue. In an 
interview conducted just after the Partnership had been formed, one informant 
who was a member of the PMNCH interim steering committee admitted that she 
hoped that the recruitment drive for a Director would enlist someone who could 
act as an effective advocate for maternal health within the Partnership. This 
should preferably be “a man from a developing country,” she explained, who 
could dissociate safe motherhood advocacy from its damaging reputation of 
being simply “a woman’s issue,” while also affording country-level legitimacy to 
the Partnership. Like many others, she later expressed delight with the 
appointment of Dr. Francisco Songane, a former Mozambican Health Minister 
with specialist training in obstetrics, as the Partnership’s Director.
At the level of the UN, some of the officials who had been involved in 
the IAG described the Partnership as a unifying force that could address 
institutional wrangling between the IAG’s different agencies. Although the Safe
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Motherhood Initiative had worked hard to present a united front on the 
Initiative’s vision and policy priorities, areas of disagreement remained, for 
instance in the emphasis that different institutional members placed on 
emergency obstetric care versus skilled birth attendance, and on the extent to 
which community-based services and social interventions should be promoted 
alongside facility-based care. Furthermore, both institutional and funding 
weaknesses had made it difficult to sustain coordinated advocacy for emergency 
obstetric care and skilled birth attendance. Given such concerns, many hoped 
that the PMNCH, with an improved ability to leverage resources and coordinate 
global advocacy, could encourage more joined-up thinking and help disseminate 
a more coherent set of policy recommendations to countries.
In addition to the anticipated benefits for the safe motherhood 
community as a whole, some informants welcomed the Partnership as an 
opportunity to further their individual careers and influence within high-level 
policy debates from which they had previously been excluded. Indeed, many 
welcomed the Partnership’s expanded membership because they felt that the 
IAG had previously been too elitist. As an academic researcher observed, “there 
was definitely unhappiness that it was the same group of women who had been 
involved since the beginning and that this club was too small and too tight.” In 
particular, representatives of international NGOs that had formed around the 
issue of safe motherhood during the past decade seemed to hope that the 
Partnership would open the scope for their own participation in global policy 
debates.
6.2.2. The continuum o f  care
The policy paradigm that was formulated in the Partnership’s early days also 
strengthened initial support for the Partnership among many safe motherhood 
practitioners, in large part because the paradigm resonated in important ways 
with the comprehensive agenda that had been promoted at the Initiative’s start. 
The new policy framework became known as the “continuum of care” and was 
promoted as an integrated, “life-cycle” approach to health improvement, linking, 
in time, care from pregnancy through birth, newborn and young child and, in 
place, the various levels of home, community, and health facilities (PMNCH 
2009tf). The continuum of care thus implied alignment of disease-specific 
approaches, including specific maternal health interventions, as well as attention
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to cross-cutting issues like infrastructure and human resources in the health 
sector. In part because it was endorsed in the World I Iealth Report for 2005 
(WHO 2005), the condnuum of care soon gained credibility as a global policy 
framework.
Many expressed hope that the PMNCH’s promotion of the condnuum 
of care would not only combat fragmentadon in healthcare planning and 
delivery, but also improve support for core life-saving interventions for pregnant 
women, which remaining lacking despite targeted advocacy for EmOC. 
Underwriting such hope was the fact that EmOC was now incorporated as an 
essential element of the continuum of care, implying that also child health 
specialists -  traditionally proponents of selective primary healthcare -  had come 
to acknowledge the benefits of a comprehensive, integrated health system 
approach. As mentioned above, there was also an expectation that growing 
recognition of the benefits of EmOC and skilled birth attendance to newborns 
and thereby to MDG 4 would further strengthen international support for these 
interventions.
Of all advocates, it was in particular those who at the end of the 1990s 
had felt reluctant to advocate for EmOC who appreciated the new continuum of 
care framework. As some explained, this new framework promised to revive 
attention to community-based care alongside, rather than instead of, the 
expansion of facility-based care. Moreover, it bore similarities to the original safe 
motherhood programmatic agenda, bringing back into focus some of the aspects 
that had been de-emphasised in recent years for the sake of political expediency 
(as discussed in Chapter 5). With maternal health interventions posited as part of 
a continuum of care, it became easier to discuss the interplay of community- 
based and facility-based interventions, including a re-appraisal of community- 
based contributions like TBA-training. Although the 1997 Technical 
Consultation had discouraged TBAs’ involvement in safe motherhood 
programmes, many donors, NGOs and governments nevertheless continued to 
support them. A number of my informants therefore considered it inappropriate 
to ignore outright the existence of such initiatives in policy discussions and 
therefore welcomed the community of care’s dual emphasis on community- and 
facility-based care. The idea of a partnership thus ultimately appeared to offer a 
means, even, of reconciling some of the residual tensions within the field arising
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from for the earlier policy move to focus attention exclusively on EmOC (see 
Chapter 5).
As such, barely twenty years after the Safe Motherhood Initiative was 
launched as a counterweight to the influence of the Child Survival Revolution 
and its selective approach, the overlap between maternal and child health had 
come to be reconceptualised not as a threat, but as a strategy for strengthening 
policy concern and financing for maternal health. Within the Partnership, the 
newborn was posited as the Vital link’ between child health and maternal health 
that could help attract policy support for both MDG 4 and 5. Overall, it was the 
PMNCH’s promise to enhance institution-building, shared financing and 
governance structures and, especially, an integrated health systems approach, that 
initially made it so attractive to so many within the Safe Motherhood Initiative.
6.3. An unfulfilled promise
Despite the hopeful beginnings discussed above, once the Partnership 
negotiations developed and efforts got underway to work out the practical 
implications of its new ‘paradigm,’ a series of practical and conceptual difficulties 
came to the fore. With these difficulties positive attitudes gradually gave way to 
scepticism, culminating in widespread doubts about the success and value of the 
new partnership. For many within the Safe Motherhood Initiative, these 
developments soon became emblematic of the unfulfilled promise of integration. 
A number of issues stand out, which I discuss in the subsections below.
6.3.1. Global governance for MNCH
A principal reason why many within the Safe Motherhood Initiative had 
welcomed the Partnership was, as mentioned above, that it would help overcome 
challenges relating to perceived weak global-level governance of safe 
motherhood issues. Around two years after discussions about a partnership had 
started, however, a general impression that circulated in the broader global health 
community was that institutional and managerial problems were diverting the 
Partnership from effectively fulfilling its remit, damaging rather than improving 
the safe motherhood field’s reputation. As one WHO official observed, “my 
concern about those things is that strategy is sacrificed for structural 
considerations, which relates to Svho’s going to host the secretariat’ and junk like 
that, which doesn’t really do a whole lot for mothers anywhere.” Others judged
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that the PMNCH had not adequately clarified its position relative to the WIIO. 
Another WHO representative even expressed unease that the PMNCII was 
overstepping its remit by offering technical advice and assistance to countries, 
even though, in her view, only the WHO has the credibility and mandate to gain 
direct access to governments at the country level. The WHO’s own creation of 
the Making Pregnancy Safer Department in 2005 can be seen as an effort to 
position itself as a technical leader in the fields of maternal and newborn health.
There was also evidence of widespread confusion in the wider global 
health community about the Partnership’s specific remit and position within 
global health governance. For instance, at an ‘evidence session* I attended in 
November 2007 held as part of a UK House of Commons International 
Development Committee inquiry into maternal health, members of the 
committee were evidently perplexed about the multiple actors involved in the 
field and confused about the difference between the Partnership’s mandate and 
that of its constituent members. Despite partners’ efforts to clarify their 
respective roles, the report from the session concluded that, “it is far from clear 
to us how the UN divides up responsibility for different aspects of maternal, 
newborn and child health” (House of Commons International Development 
Committee 2008). The committee members were particularly disquieted by the 
fact that the WHO had two separate departments working on women’s health, 
Making Pregnancy Safer and Reproductive I Iealth and Research, and bewildered 
about the role of these departments relative to that of the PMNCH {ibid). In 
conclusion, the report asserted that, “the overlapping remits between agencies 
has contributed to a lack of confidence in the UN as a global leader” {¿bid: 25).
Another area of contention concerned the Partnership’s performance on 
its promise to enhance participation by low-income country actors in global-level 
health policy debates. Despite good intentions, it was external donors, rather 
than countries, whose position had been the most clearly strengthened within the 
PMNCH. Bilateral donor agencies including USAID (who had been excluded 
from the original IAG) and private foundations, such as the Gates Foundation, 
had not only been granted full membership as constituents within the PMNCH, 
but also prominent positions within its governing body, the Board. It is telling 
that the number o f ‘partner countries’ listed on the Partnership’s member list in 
early 2009 was 13, while 12 separate bilateral and private donors featured on the
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list of ‘donors and foundations.’20 This prominent position of external donors 
signalled an important shift for the safe motherhood community, which had 
deliberately restricted donor membership of the IAG, in large part to protect its 
work from undue constraints imposed by donors hostile to women’s rights.
While the PMNCH enhanced direct contact with donor bodies and promised to 
improve donor contribution to maternal health, it also signalled a potential lack 
of autonomy, a theme I will develop below.
6.3.2. Continued elitism
The ability of the Partnership to address earlier concerns about elitism in policy 
decision-making also appears to have fallen short of expectations. While the 
Partnership underwent major expansion in membership -  from an initial 80 
member organisations in 2005 to 240 members by 200821 — simple enrolment 
concealed a widespread perception that the Partnership had done little to address 
the concentration of power within a small group. “From what I understand, all 
the meetings that have been held so far -  the high-level meetings -  are kind of 
elitist,” commented one international NGO representative. “Even though they 
want to have these working groups, I don’t think that there’s an attempt by the 
Partnership to open up the groups and invite people in from different 
organisations that were not part of this elitist group before. I don’t know what 
has happened with that.”
Academics I interviewed expressed a similar verdict. While on some 
levels welcoming the opportunity to participate in more policy-oriented work, 
many had very quickly become disillusioned with the Partnership’s institutional 
mechanisms, and especially with what they perceived to be constant in-fighting 
and posturing during committee meetings. One academic was especially critical, 
alleging that the Partnership, despite its formal consultative processes, was failing 
to foster a sense of common purpose: “I have not talked to anybody where he or 
she got shining eyes when they talked about the global Partnership and where I 
felt ‘oh yeah, that’s something new, something big, something strong where we 
really get together’.” Another even dismissed the Partnership as “completely
20 The partner countries were: Bangladesh; Bolivia; Chile; Cambodia; Ethiopia; India; Indonesia; 
Mozambique; Nepal; Nigeria; Pakistan; Tanzania; and Uganda.
(http://www.who.int/pmnch/about/members/devcountrvconstitucncy list/en/index.html. 
accessed 17.03.09).
21 http://www.who.int/pmnch/about/en/. accessed 27.05.08.
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ineffective,” and said that she no longer planned to attend its regular meetings in 
Geneva. For those who had been part of the LAG, including UN agency officials, 
the problem was slightly different, said one original member.
It was so much easier when it was 10 members.. .when you have 
a small, dedicated, determined group that is working toward a 
common goal, every person feels responsibility and when you 
get beyond whatever the number is, I know 10 is still inside that 
number, when you get 50, 60, 80, you say I’m too busy, she’ll do 
it, I’ll wait, something’ll happen. But when the group was that 
small, it was personal and everyone did their part. There was 
serious, absolute determination, personally and institutionally, 
among those 10.
Several other original IAG members made similar comments, suggesting that 
while the Partnership represented a necessary change, its much-expanded 
membership was actually translating into a loss of momentum.
6.3.3. The last o f  the trio
Underlying the expressions of disengagement or de-motivation reviewed above 
was a real sense of dissatisfaction that true ‘partnership’ — in the sense of mutual 
support and collaboration between different groups — remained a pipe dream 
despite the formal alliance that had been created. “Today people call these 
[things] partnerships, [but] it is the same thing that we had before but now we 
call it something different,” complained one academic. Other interviews and 
meetings I attended evoked a clear sense that the PMNCII was failing to resolve 
pre-existing turf battles over positions and influence between the maternal, child 
and neonatal health factions. As one NGO representative remarked on the basis 
of her experience of participating in one of the Partnership’s working groups:
It was sort of my hope that people would come in to these 
working groups with a new approach of integration and 
collaboration and, you know, together we can do more than 
each of us saying that, “we’re the child survival people’ or “we’re 
the neonatal people’ or “we’re the Safe Motherhood people.’ So, 
it’s very disheartening. I’m of the mind that we can all work 
together, we do want the same thing, but people’s egos are very 
wrapped up into it sadly.
Thus, as the twentieth anniversary of the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s creation 
approached, the sorts of insecurities that the movement had confronted on its 
own in the 1990s came to be projected onto the new partnership framework in 
which the movement now operated.
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Evidence of maternal health’s marginalisation in favour of child and, 
now, neonatal health was found in donors’ behaviour towards the Partnership 
too. Up to two years after the launch of the Partnership maternal health 
specialists still felt that donors were reluctant to fund the maternal health-related 
activities. “We are the last of the trio. We are the last for funding from Gates,” 
was one of my informants’ comments. Despite donors’ ostensible support for 
integration and for the continuum of care approach, informants directed me to 
evidence that many of the major donors indeed continued to favour child health 
and even neonatal health over maternal health or a combined approach. A 
UNFPA official offered two examples: first, a $25 million investment by the 
Gates Foundation for child health programmes in Africa, and, second, a ‘Global 
Business Plan’ devised by the Norwegian Prime Minister to accelerate progress 
towards MDG 4 on child survival. As my informant saw it, these initiatives 
exemplified a more general lack of donor interest in maternal health, despite 
stated commitment to integrated approaches:
We are fighting for it [to be integrated], but the Gates funding 
was for child survival in Africa, the Prime Minister of Norway 
was for child survival and nobody else has come to the 
Partnership and said, ‘we want to give you some funding,’ we 
would love to have a foundation or somebody say, ‘here is $300 
million for following maternal health,’ and then in this case we 
would say, ‘look, it cannot be only for maternal health, it has to 
cover the newborn and the child [too].’ But, we don’t have this.
Nobody says that they want to give us money.
Although safe motherhood advocates within the Partnership were 
eventually successful in persuading donors to direct their funding towards 
maternal as well as child health, their disappointment with donors’ behaviour was 
compounded by a perception that child health advocates within the initiative 
were doing little to dissuade from silo approaches to funding. Instead, a number 
of safe motherhood practitioners I interviewed accused their child health 
counterparts of using the Partnership to further their own position at the 
expense of the safe motherhood community.
Such perceptions suggest that for all the rhetoric on integration, 
partnership building was not resolving underlying and entrenched power 
differentials between the child and maternal health subfields. As one researcher 
put it, “when brought together with a child health group, [we] have always been 
poor relatives - that’s too negative a term -  always the less substantiated and less
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well supported group...and the same is true in the Partnership. In the 
Partnership.. .the child’s place is very strong and very powerful.” She even 
suggested that child health experts resented having to share their resources with 
their poorer “relatives”:
You know, I’ve even seen terminology, I’ve seen emails that 
probably shouldn’t come to me that talk about the ‘elephant in 
the room,’ which, you know, in some ways summarises some 
people’s perspectives of maternal [health]. I have certainly seen 
with some of the partners, not all, but some of the 
partners...that there is this attitude that ‘we don’t have the 
evidence for maternal interventions but we just have to do it.’
It’s recent and it’s strong, there’s no question and I’m not going 
to name names, but there are several key members — donors — 
within the Partnership who have, implicitly, if not explicitly, 
stated that point of view.
This quote highlights a pervasive view within the safe motherhood community 
that not only did the child survival field, being stronger, not need integration to 
survive (in the way the Safe Motherhood Initiative did), but, furthermore, that 
donors were only paying lip-service to maternal health, in part to demonstrate 
compliance with the Paris Declaration.
6.3.4. Bias against the complexity o f  maternal health 
Safe motherhood practitioners often cited the kind of skewed donor behaviour 
described above as evidence of what one informant labelled “the prejudice 
against the complexity of maternal health.” Despite the strong emphasis in 
Partnership advocacy materials on the continuum of care, many informants felts 
that in reality both donors and child and neonatal health specialists lacked 
genuine commitment towards the health systems recommendations they 
themselves considered essential for improving maternal survival, including skilled 
birth attendants and emergency obstetric care. Pointing to their experiences of 
the Partnership’s committees and meetings, informants reported that child health 
experts still focused primarily on low-tech, community-based services directed at 
saving children and newborns, rather than incorporating attention to the more 
sophisticated services needed to reduce maternal mortality. Maternal health 
specialists had welcomed the focus on integration between levels of care and 
different stages of the life cycle implied by the continuum of care paradigm. They 
were therefore particularly dismayed that many influential child health experts 
within the PMNCII spoke about the continuum in terms of ‘packages’ of
154
disease-specific interventions rather than a truly integrated approach. Child 
health experts, they claimed, interpret ‘integration’ to mean parallel 
implementation of discrete interventions to facilitate their implementation ‘at 
scale’ (i.e. achieving population level-coverage), so as rapidly to achieve 
measurable health targets. Moreover, they alleged that child health experts pay 
little attention to cross-cutting issues such as the need for a functioning referral 
system and an adequate and sustainable workforce. As such, there was a sense in 
which working out what was meant by a continuum of care exposed different 
‘philosophical’ approaches to health improvement. In other words, the tension 
between selective and comprehensive approaches that had divided the child and 
maternal health communities in the mid-1980s remained a main faultline within 
the Partnership too.
However, it was not only philosophical differences that were at stake, but 
also discomfort among certain safe motherhood specialists about the pressure 
they perceived from child and newborn health specialists to identify ‘magic 
bullet’ or ‘innovative’ solutions to maternal mortality and to reconsider low-tech, 
community-based public health public health solutions, including TBA-training, 
which research had indicated could be of benefit to child and newborn survival 
goals. Such pressure was seen as a clear indication of the child health’s 
community limited support for a true continuum of care. One academic was 
particularly disappointed with the response at a Partnership meeting to her 
suggestion that policy materials on the continuum of care should explicitly 
emphasise the importance of skilled birth attendants: “I immediately received 
quite negative feedback from the neonatal and child people, saying that, ‘yes of 
course you need a skilled attendant but it’s a long-term initiative. We need short­
term intermediate solutions.’ And that’s again another thing that came up in the 
meeting repeatedly. And I’m uneasy with that claim.” Others too lamented that 
child health specialists advocated for more attention and research into drug- 
based treatments for obstetric complications like haemorrhage and infection to 
be dispensed by TBAs, but did not back safe motherhood advocates’ calls for 
professional providers and facility-based services. Thus, while not disputing the 
theoretical effectiveness of certain community-based solutions, maternal health 
specialists expressed discontent that pressure to find simpler solutions diverted 
focus, yet again, from the need for long-term, sustained strengthening of health
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systems, including improved capacity to deliver life-saving, facility-based care by 
professional providers. An academic researcher explained this tension:
I mean, I think of myself as being pretty balanced on this issue 
and that I am interested in both outcomes [maternal and 
neonatal mortality], but I find myself reacting to the newborn 
people. I have heard [one advocate], who is like Mr. Neonate, 
say, 'you know, blah, blah, blah, skilled attendance in countries 
like Bangladesh where diere aren’t enough providers and this, 
that and the other, there are things that we could be doing right 
now in the home to save newborns.’ And you know, and this is 
the expression that sets me off: ‘yes, we need skilled attendance, 
but in the meantime. . . ’ And that sentence just sets me off, 
because what ‘in the meantime’ means to a policy-maker is ‘do 
nothing.’
As this quote shows, my informant felt that certain newborn health advocates 
were not adequately sensitive to the way in which the call for selective, interim 
maternal health solutions risks sidelining attention to long-term requirements.
The findings above highlight that it was not uncommon for my 
informants to claim that child health specialists lacked commitment to the 
integration project. However, others nuanced such views by suggesting that child 
health experts’ pressure on the maternal health field to define interim solutions 
to accelerate maternal mortality reduction resulted not from inherent lack of 
commitment, but rather from their lack of adequate historical familiarity with the 
Safe Motherhood Inidative’s enduring struggle to achieve support for health 
systems recommendations. One academic researcher had become convinced that 
better communication between maternal and child health partners is needed to 
dissipate the sort of tensions described above. She recalled an incident, an early 
Partnership meeting at which a child health specialist had made a “controversial” 
suggestion that antibiotics distributed by lay health workers may provide a 
solution to maternal mortality in countries without functioning health systems. 
My informant described how she successfully persuaded her colleague to be 
more sensitive about how he presents such alternative policy options to donors, 
so as not to weaken safe motherhood advocacy on the need for professional 
obstetric care and fu n ctio n in g  systems:
We had dinner with him then, that same night and I think he 
realised — he hadn’t ever been part of the discussion in safe 
motherhood — and all of a sudden he realised that by making 
these statements he was undermining a movement. I mean, he’s a 
clinician himself, he knows that some women need a caesarean
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section to save their lives. He knows that. And to him that’s 
such a given, that he is only thinking of other strategies. But the 
danger with donors.. .and the donors that were there.. . [An 
official] from USAID was again arguing her case very strongly 
that there are limited resources and they need to know where to 
put their money. So if TBAs can make a difference, they want to 
know that. So [the child health specialist] who had been very 
controversial the first day, the second day was all of a sudden 
much more nuanced. And said clearly that o f  course you need 
emergency obstetric care and you need midwives. And then in 
addition [you can have community-based solutions]. IIe was 
instrumental, if  you like, in all of a sudden removing some of the 
tension.. ..and I don’t quite know where all of a sudden.. .we 
spent an evening with him, I told him about an anecdote.. .1 
think in a way the anecdote did it. I told him about the caesarean 
section we had done in a town in the North of Chad where 
there is nothing, you know. You are not going to train community 
health workers there. Your first thing is to make sure there is a 
hospital that can do [c-sections].
While this particular example suggests that improved communication can resolve 
some of the tension between maternal and child health specialists, the most 
pervasive view among my informants was that the differences in the respective 
subfields’ philosophies and approaches were so profound as to be nearly 
intractable. On the whole, there was thus considerable unease within the safe 
motherhood community that the new Partnership, or even its ‘continuum of 
care’ approach, was not enough to enhance political support for the health 
system recommendations on EmOC and skilled birth attendants, and, in some 
cases, might even be undermining it -  even if unintentionally so.
6.3.5. Undermining the struggle for women’s rights 
Compounding the concerns discussed above was profound unease among a 
subset of maternal health specialists, primarily informants from NGOs, that 
integrating safe motherhood with child and neonatal survival was having the 
unfortunate effect of weakening support for reproductive and sexual health and 
rights.
Although, the Safe Motherhood Initiative had taken a strategic decision 
to distance itself from the controversy that had erupted around reproductive 
health activists’ demands for abortion in the 1990s (see Chapter 5), the majority 
of safe motherhood specialists supported the ideological basis of the 
reproductive health movement. It was therefore with dismay that they observed 
that certain members of the Partnership, especially newborn health advocates
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were contributing to the marginalisation of reproductive health. For instance, 
one advocacy specialist noted that newborn health advocates “consciously or 
unconsciously use some of the same language that anti-abortionists use” when 
promoting specific policy initiatives to save the lives of unborn children from 
stillbirths and neonatal complications. She saw this as potentially implying a pro­
life stance that is in conflict with most safe motherhood practitioners’ pro-choice 
position. Such perceptions led one informant to conclude our discussion on the 
Partnership as such: “I’m inclined to think that people have gone for this new 
approach because newborns are something that everyone coos over and it may 
be a way to kick-start new political will and get more money into the field. But I 
think there are risks that one ought to be aware of.”
The perceived danger of newborn health advocates’ language-use was 
particularly acute because conservative opposition to women’s reproductive 
rights, and especially access to abortion, had intensified with the appointment of 
US President George W. Bush in 2001 (Standing 2002; Crossette 2005). On his 
first day in office, Bush reinstated the 1984 Mexico City Policy prohibiting the 
allocation of federal funds to organisations doing abortion-related work, a policy 
that had been rescinded by President Clinton in 1993 (Office of the Press 
Secretary 2001). Under Bush the policy became known colloquially as the ‘global 
gag rule,’ indicative of the extent to which reproductive health activities 
perceived it as a constraint on their work. Within this climate of intensified 
political opposition to reproductive health, many perceived that the MDG on 
maternal health was not so much an expression of greater international 
commitment to maternal health as proof that the international community was 
reneging on previous commitments, such as those made at the ICPD in 1994, to 
secure reproductive and sexual health and rights. According to informants, 
maternal health replaced reproductive health as a less controversial choice, in 
part because UN agencies’ wanted to shy away from controversy to achieve 
global consensus around the MDG framework.
In addition to the above-noted concerns that newborn health advocates 
may be feeding into anti-abortion attitudes, the new prominence of donors 
within the Partnership raised the possibility that these donors might punitively 
withhold or withdraw funding from safe motherhood work that was even 
marginally associated with abortion, including work on post-abortion care to
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prevent deaths from unsafe abortions. USAID’s position on the Partnership’s 
Board clearly enhanced the perceived risk of funding restrictions on such work, 
compounded by the prospect that the Gates Foundation, as a prominent 
member of the board, may also push the Partnership towards a more socially 
conservative stance on women’s health. To illustrate the reality of such perceived 
threats, one UNFPA official explained that, despite being part of the 
Partnership, the agency had already lost its financial support from the US 
because of its work on unsafe abortion and now feared that other donors, 
especially the powerful Gates Foundation, would follow suit and withhold 
funding. “We haven’t received a single dollar since Bush,” my informant 
explained, “so, maternal health is linked to women’s health and to abortion and 
some donors are sensitive [to this], even... Gates — Melinda Gates is very 
religious, you know.”
6.4. The need to protect the M in MNCH
The sort of perceptions discussed above in many ways put safe motherhood 
specialists in a bind. On the one hand, they were committed -  institutionally, 
financially and conceptually — to the process of partnership building that they 
had initiated. On the other, there was a burgeoning perception that the new 
Partnership may be disadvantaging, rather than advancing, their position and 
interests. Fears were clearly rife that safe motherhood — both the advocacy 
coalition and the cause of women’s health and survival through pregnancy and 
childbirth — was being sidelined within the Partnership. “It’s a threat,” a UNFPA 
agent told me. “I would say that we have to fight, to constantly remind people 
that the Partnership is for MDG 4 and 5.”
At the time of my research, a range of different responses to this 
situation could be discerned within the safe motherhood policy community. 
Some urged vigilance, claiming that disengaging completely from the Partnership 
structure was unviable. “I don’t think there’s a choice. It’s not like it’s an open 
question, do we stay a part., .there’s clearly no choice in that sense,” said one 
informant. A minority withheld judgment, urging patience given that the long­
term impact of the Partnership had yet to be established. As one informant put 
it, “maybe we’re not going to see the real benefit of this combined partnership 
until 2012.1 don’t know. But things don’t change over night, so slowly it could
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affect programming, I would think.” But the more common response was a self­
defensive one, calling for action from safe motherhood advocates to prevent the 
safe motherhood issue being co-opted by the child and newborn health 
constituencies. An academic who had become deeply involved in the PMNCI I’s 
committee work was explicit on this point: “We still have a question o f ‘where is 
the M in MNCH’ within the context of the Partnership...So, I think there’s going 
to continue to need to be a constituency group for the maternal health issue, no 
question, within the Partnership and outside of it or else it’s just going to be 
sidelined potentially.”
An identified priority was not only to ensure focus on women relative to 
children, but also to actively promote policy attention to unpopular health 
system interventions. As the informant cited above added:
I think we need to make sure, all of us collectively, we need to 
make sure that the M in MNCII does not get lost. We have to 
be sure that, because maternal mortality is a longer term 
intervention and we have to look at issues of human resources 
and at strengthening health infrastructure, that donors and 
governments don’t just go for the quick-wins that are easier to 
do and have a quick impact, but [rather that they] have a 
commitment to the longer-term interventions.
This was at once a call to assert safe motherhood specialists’ position within the
Partnership and to collectively protect policy priorities for safe motherhood from
being sidelined.
While many of my informants perceived the need for at least some level 
of continued involvement with the Partnership, there was also an important 
subgroup within the safe motherhood field whose frustration with the 
Partnership was of the extent that they felt pushed to “do their own thing” 
rather than work within the partnership structure. This was especially the case 
among certain NGOs and UN agency representatives I interviewed and was a 
perspective that was discernable in the discussions at several international 
meetings I attended. Consequently, by 2007, barely two years after the 
Partnership’s launch at the UN General Assembly, frustration translated into a 
series of practices to protect the status of maternal health and mortality as a 
dedicated policy issue, over and above its association with newborn and child 
health. Such practices, which I describe in brief below, can be seen as a renewal
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of the Initiative’s self-management, aimed to stake out a specific space for safe 
motherhood on the international policy agenda.
6.4.1. A  Global Fund for safe motherhood?
One example of an effort to reposition safe motherhood as a global priority 
independent of the PMNCH can be seen in an initiative led by UNFPA — an 
important member of the original IAG and also of the PMNCH -  to form a 
dedicated ‘thematic trust fund’ for maternal health. Clearly modelled on the 
Global Fund and others like it, one of its architects described the fund as 
follows:
It is an appeal to donors on a certain topic and it says, ‘this is 
what we want to do, this is what countries need to do, this is the 
strategy that we plan to use, please give us the financial support, 
we have the roadmaps for the countries for maternal health, we 
have the strategy, we know and they know what to do they only 
lack the money’.
While evidently designed to challenge donor preference for child health, the 
creation of such a thematic fund for maternal health alone was plainly in tension 
with the Partnership’s pledge to align donor resources to maternal, newborn and 
child health. While a rational response to perceived funding shortfalls, the 
creation of the fund can be seen as a development that contributes to 
proliferating, rather than rationalising, donor initiatives, as such contradicting 
core elements of the Paris Declaration. It also marks a departure from past 
framings of safe motherhood. Whereas earlier advocates often insisted that 
funding was not the major impediment to achieving maternal health (rather it 
was organisational and managerial parameters in the health system), now 
advocacy specialists framed ‘funding gaps’ as the main constraint for achieving 
MDG 5.
In the same thrust as the creation of a maternal health fund, maternal 
health advocates from across UN agencies and prominent international NGOs in 
2007 initiated a major advocacy campaign to coincide with the establishment of 
the thematic fund. On many levels, this campaign was informed by Shiffman’s 
(2003; 2004; 2007) policy analysis of the factors that create political priority for 
different global health issues, an analysis that had been disseminated widely 
within the safe motherhood policy community. Shiffman’s emphasis on the 
importance of clear messages, consensus and focusing events as ingredients of
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successful public positioning was taken up by advocates trying to generate 
renewed support for safe motherhood as a priority issue. This campaign drew in 
expertise from UN agency representatives with experience from the Global 
Fund, as well as advocacy experts from other major global campaigns (including 
the Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt cancellation for poor countries). It aimed to 
emulate other successful global health campaigns, like the one that culminated in 
the creation of the Global Fund, in part by organising a series of ‘focusing 
events’ to promote a clear vision. As one member of the group who was 
involved in organising these events explained:
We are developing a very intense and very well crafted advocacy 
plan which starts around creating an advocacy platform to 
launch the Global Business Plan at the end of September, 
continues with the Women Deliver [Conference] where you 
incur it, and hopefully then use Davos and the G8 next June as 
the goalposts. And if it can be articulated and things go well, by 
the time Japan [the G8 summit] happens next year we’ll have 
recreated the process that led to the creation of the Global 
Fund.
In order to recreate, as my informant put it, for maternal health what the 
HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria fields had achieved with the Global Fund, the new 
campaign had to “position this product [safe motherhood] as an opportunity of 
desire so people will want to invest in it.” This statement — with its use of the 
words ‘position’ and ‘product,’ suggestive of the promotion of goods within a 
particular global health ‘market’ — is itself indicative of how well established the 
perceived necessity of appealing to the market-orientation of donors had 
become. But it also reveals that advocates sought to define safe motherhood as a 
product separate from what the Partnership was offering. As such, the principal 
aim of the main focusing events that were organised as part of this campaign was 
not to promote the PMNCH’s messages on integration and harmonisation, or to 
market its continuum of care approach as ‘global best practice.’ Instead, the aim 
was to position maternal health, rather than ‘MNCII,’ as a global priority.
The Women Deliver Conference (referred to in the quote above) was the 
main focusing event associated with this new campaign. The event, which I 
attended as both a participant and observer, drew almost 2000 delegates to 
London in October 2007. Although the conference was timed to coincide with 
the twentieth anniversary of the first Safe Motherhood Conference, ‘Women 
Deliver,’ rather than ‘Safe Motherhood’ was chosen as the title. This choice was
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an intentional attempt to get away from the term safe motherhood, which 
advocacy specialists felt had been tainted by the field’s difficult history and by its 
negative connotations with women’s death. Instead, as one of the organisers 
explained during an interview, the term ‘women deliver’ was intended to draw 
attention to the fact that “women deliver so much more than babies.” In part, 
such a refocusing intended to reassert women’s health as a policy objective 
distinct from children’s survival. But this was not a case of returning to the 
feminist and social justice premise that had formed the ideological foundations 
of the Safe Motherhood Initiative in the late 1980s. Subgroups within the safe 
motherhood and reproductive health policy communities used the conference to 
advocate for action on maternal mortality as a matter of human rights, but the 
predominant message that was promoted was that investing in women’s health 
and survival makes economic sense. As the conference slogan had it — “invest in 
women — it pays.”
To this end, the word ‘deliver’ was chosen for its double meaning, 
invoking at once women’s role in delivering babies and their contribution to 
economic productivity. As such, it was an effort to appeal not only to public 
health rationales, but also to economic and poverty-reduction justifications for 
investment in health that in the past ten to fifteen years have emerged as an 
important part of the global health discourse (Standing 2002; McIntyre et al. 
2006). Indeed, at Women Deliver, technical public health justifications were 
downscaled in favour of economic arguments. As such, earlier advocacy for the 
1997 Action Points and for EmOC (see Chapter 5) were simply replaced with yet 
another branding of the recommended policy solutions: the “three pillars to save 
women’s lives” (family planning, skilled birth attendance and emergency 
obstetric care). These pillars were presented as a global consensus, but 
surprisingly little mention was made of how they related to the continuum of 
care approach (Women Deliver 2007). The priority was clearly on forging 
economic rationales for donors and governments to invest in maternal health.
To this end, advocates adopted and adapted claims that had been 
successful in framing HIV/AIDS as a poverty-related issue, notably arguments 
about the impoverishing catastrophic expenditure of treatment and of the 
productivity costs of deaths and morbidity (see Gill et al. 2007). At the 
conference, safe motherhood advocates now argued that the international
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community should prioritise women’s health (as distinct from MNCII) in order 
to achieve all the MDGs, including the primary goal of ending poverty. Maternal 
health should be a priority not only for the sake of women, but also for the sake 
of the survival of their children, communities and the economic productivity of 
countries. In Chapter 8 I discuss how advocacy groups used scientific and 
economic data to bring about such shifts in emphasis. What is most important 
here is to highlight that the organisers of Women Deliver did not as much 
advocate for maternal, newborn and child health as an integrated set of 
objectives as seek to position maternal health as the fulcrum of efforts to achieve 
not only MDG 5 on maternal health, but also all the other MDGs.
6.5. Conclusion
In 2005, the Safe Motherhood Inter-Agency Group initiated the process of 
partnership formation to save itself, given a growing perception that as a single­
issue movement it could not survive within the highly competitive global health 
field. Once again, however, the principal effect was that this new operational 
context provided the means for it to also reinvent itself in ways that safe 
motherhood practitioners might not have been able to predict. In part, the safe 
motherhood community embraced its partnership with old and new competitors 
out of necessity. However, as the PMNCH became established, unequal power 
relationships, donors’ limited commitment to integration and different 
interpretations of what a ‘continuum of care’ entails impeded effective 
collaboration, as well as the development of an integrated policy agenda. The 
culmination of these factors resulted in a shift in maternal health experts’ 
responses from embracing the Partnership’s promise to resolve core anxieties 
within the field, to deep ambivalence and reservations, followed by efforts to 
protect the institutional and intellectual interests of the safe motherhood policy 
and research network. By 2007, what had started barely two years earlier as an 
effort to rationalise donor spending and integrate public health approaches had 
thus given rise to an intensified effort to single out maternal health as a priority 
for investment over and above joint advocacy for maternal, newborn and child 
health. It even culminated in the creation of a dedicated funding mechanism 
modelled on the Global Fund. And in order to achieve this, the importance of 
neonatal and child health were not rejected so much as assimilated into the core
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justification for why maternal health strategies should be at the heart of global 
health priorities.
In conjunction with the previous chapter, the dynamics explored here 
thus give us a better sense of the nature of global health movements, and in 
particular, the complexities involved in developing and maintaining advocacy 
coalitions between actors with different belief systems and histories. As others 
have shown in studies of the policy process, the extent and structure of 
interdependency between actors are important determinants of their behaviour 
within all such inter-organisational relationships (Fenger and Klok 2001; Walt et 
al. 2004). Fenger and Klok (2001) differentiate between symbiotic and 
competitive interdependency, which variably incline actors towards cooperation 
and drive them apart, leading to conflict. Both of these tendencies were apparent 
at different times in the relationship between the coalitions that came together in 
the Partnership. However, competitive tensions elicited protective responses 
from the safe motherhood contingent, the speed and intensity of which were no 
doubt informed by the movement’s enduring struggle to assert itself, including 
its previous experience of seeing maternal health subordinated to child health. 
Ironically, however, safe motherhood practitioners’ self-defensive practices may 
accentuate the kind of fragmentation to global health governance, financing and 
policy solutions that the Partnership was intended to reverse.
The findings discussed in this chapter highlight the urgency of a critical 
debate about what is actually meant by terms such as ‘integration’ and 
‘partnership’ within global health discourse. ‘Partnership’ is currently a buzzword 
in the global health field that has even been enshrined within the MDGs, with 
MDG 8 being to develop a global partnership for development, consisting not 
only of greater collaboration across the global North and South, but also 
partnerships with private companies to ensure access to drugs, for instance 
(United Nations 2009). The rise of public-private partnerships, another term for 
global health initiatives, has been depicted as “a trend with no alternative” 
(Richter 2004:43). Nevertheless, there has as yet been little conceptual or 
empirical discussion about what is meant by ‘partnership,’ how such partnerships 
are best configured or who stands to benefit from new institutional 
arrangements, and under what conditions. Similarly the meaning of ‘integration’ 
in the context of global health policy debates is not straightforward. Integration
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can refer to policy, governance, financing strategies, research, advocacy and 
actual implementation of health services. Each level clearly poses a series of 
distinct, but inter-related challenges (Lush et al. 1999; Mayhew et al. 2000; 
Sundewall et al. 2009). Further critical debate of these issues is essential to avoid 
that the processes and benefits of partnership and integration are taken as 
axiomatic. As one informant put it, “who can be against integration?”
There is another connection worth drawing with the previous chapter. 
Like the effort to define EmOC as the strategic focus for safe motherhood 
policy and advocacy (discussed in Chapter 5), the process of partnership 
formation and the resultant practices described above can be thought of more 
profoundly as part of the safe motherhood field’s continuous work of self­
management. Safe motherhood practitioners first loosened the boundaries 
around their policy community and then attempted to redraw them. Through 
such ‘boundary work’ they sought to demarcate maternal health as a distinct 
priority, and thereby prevent their policy objectives from being subsumed by the 
child and newborn health goals. Safe motherhood practitioners sought to 
position themselves in a more favourable position within the broader 
competition for global health resources in ways that sought to adhere to its 
original ideological foundations, but which inevitably entailed a not always 
entirely conscious reformulation of those. In the next two empirical chapters 
(which comprise Part II of the thesis) I take this analysis to a different level, by 
demonstrating how within these broader social and political developments, key 
actors (focusing on academics and advocacy specialists) have relied on the 
authority of scientific evidence, including statistics, to assist in this process of 
self-management.
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Par t  II
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C h a p t e r  7
7. ACADEMIC RESEARCH PRACTICES AND THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF EVIDENCE
Public health researchers, especially those based in universities in high-income 
countries, have come to play a crucial role within global health initiatives. Today, 
such academics lead scientific research on global health issues, collaborate with 
research groups in low-income countries and are, increasingly, consulted for 
technical advice by international agencies, donors and policy-makers (e.g. 
Macfarlane et al. 2008; McCoy et al. 2008). Meanwhile, their involvement in 
global health initiatives exposes them to a new set of social and political 
pressures, as they are also held accountable not only to the institutional and 
scientific demands of academia, but also to the exigencies of global health 
initiatives, as well as those who fund them. The prominence of academics’ 
participation within global health initiatives in part reflects the expansion of the 
evidence-based movement from its origins in clinical medicine into public health 
research and policy, where it has introduced normative ideas about what 
constitutes rigorous scientific evidence (Dobrow et al. 2004; Lambert et al. 2006). 
Donor agendas mirror the evidence-based paradigm, such that today, evidence- 
based claims derived from systematic research play an important role in global 
health initiatives’ competition for global resources and policy attention.
There has been growing concern, however, that the current global health 
research agenda is driven by a research culture and incentive system that does 
not value the kind of research that is needed to improve policy and practice in 
low-income countries, namely operationally-oriented health systems and policy 
research (Lavis et al. 2004; Travis et al. 2004; Sanders and Haines 2006). For 
instance, academics in high-income countries — who dominate global health 
research -  have been said to lack the inclination, incentives and skills to conduct 
the sort of research that developing countries need (McCoy et al. 2008:1056). 
Despite such concerns, there has been relatively little attention paid to how 
academics themselves are experiencing and negotiating their position within 
global health policy and politics, or the consequences for research itself. With the
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rise of the evidence-based medicine paradigm and its expansion into the policy 
sphere, academics are not only expected to produce a certain kind of research, 
but also to interpret their findings, discern the policy relevance of scientific 
evidence, issue recommendations and publicly endorse and advocate global ‘best 
practice’ recommendations issued by international agencies (Walt 1994; Davis 
and Howden-Chapman 1996; Lavis et al. 2002). Such potentially competing 
demands often place academics in a difficult position.
The academic subspecialty that has, since the late 1980s, emerged around 
an interest in maternal health in developing countries provides an interesting case 
of a field that has had to adapt to the changing ideas within global health about 
the nature and role of evidence and, notably, the expectation that a particular and 
narrowly defined type of evidence is needed to justify policy. The maternal health 
subfield is interesting because it has been particularly difficult to produce the sort 
of evidence that is highly valued within the hierarchy of evidence about maternal 
health in developing countries, and there is a widespread perception among 
actors within the field that such difficulties have translated into neglect of 
maternal health in the global health arena (Behague and Storeng 2008).
As academics’ roles have changed, old questions about the nature of their 
responsibility have re-emerged and taken on new forms. Are they are equally 
committed to public health action as they are to public health science, for 
example (Weed and McKeown 2003)? Is their responsibility constrained to their 
professional practice within the academic domain, or do they bear responsibility 
to respond to the growing demand for their participation in the advocacy of 
specific policy options (Krieger 1999)? In this chapter I argue that, for academics 
navigating through the complex and inter-locking pressures and accountabilities 
of global health research, answers to these questions are in no way 
straightforward. By examining both the accounts and research practices of a 
group of academics -  primarily epidemiologists specialising in maternal health 
and working in international research institutes - 1 argue that these actors in 
many ways find themselves at an impasse. They are aware of the discrepancy 
between their research practices -  which are driven in part by their aspiration 
towards a particular standard of evidence and demand for ‘evidence-based’ and 
ostensibly globally relevant knowledge — and the actual research needs of 
countries grappling with high maternal mortality, but they also find that they lack
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the independence, and perhaps confidence, needed to resolve this discrepancy. 
This, in turn, is shaping the way in which they respond to the challenges of 
improving maternal health through research.
7.1. Trends in international maternal health research
In the late 1980s an academic subfield of maternal health was established in 
direct response to the then newly formed Safe Motherhood Initiative. As one 
UN agency advisor I interviewed recalled, the first Safe Motherhood Conference 
in 1987, “was a meeting of real country people, of researchers and donors — 
because we wanted to know, is it a problem, what’s the dimension of the 
problem and how are we going to pay to do something about it? That’s who we 
wanted in the room and that’s who came.” As it drew together researchers 
primarily with training in epidemiology and often with clinical experience, this 
subfield gradually established itself in reputable international schools of public 
health, including the LSHTM in the UK, and the public health schools of Johns 
Hopkins University in Baltimore and Columbia University in New York, USA.
In the early years of the subfield, newly formed academic units worked in 
collaboration with technical advisors from multilateral agencies and existing 
research-based NGOs in the population and family planning field (such as 
Population Council). Over time, this network expanded considerably, 
incorporating research institutions from across the globe, including from 
developing countries who became essential partners in international institutions’ 
research, though not always on equal terms (McCoy et al. 2008).
The research practices of international academics have undergone 
important shifts during the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s twenty year-long 
history. Though always tied in with the demands of the broader Safe 
Motherhood Initiative of which they are part, academics specialising in maternal 
health have, as mentioned in the introduction, become increasingly implicated in 
global health politics and competition for resources and dependent on external 
financing to sustain their livelihoods. As part of the process to secure financing 
and priority for the Safe Motherhood Initiative of which they are part, they are 
inclined to contribute to endorsing and promoting international policy messages. 
These developments have impacted on their research practices, as the following 
three subsections serve to illustrate. These provide a brief overview of trends in
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international maternal health research, starting with a discussion of maternal 
mortality measurement and health systems research and tracing the influence of 
the evidence-based medicine movement on public health research practices.
7.1.1. Maternal mortality measurement
From the start, a main priority for the new maternal health subfield was to build 
up a global picture of the state of maternal health and maternity services in low- 
income countries, since little was known about the epidemiology of pregnancy- 
related ill health and death outside of the industrialised west. A handful of small 
studies conducted in hospitals and clinics in sub-Saharan Africa from the late 
1970s onwards revealed high case-fatality rates in clinical settings (e.g. Bullough 
1981), but the extent of maternal mortality in the general population remained 
undocumented in many countries, especially in the world’s poorest countries. 
This was a reflection of the fact that most low- and middle-income countries 
lacked adequate hospital information systems and systems for registering vital 
events and that the majority of deliveries, at least in the poorest countries, 
occurred outside of the formal health system (AbouZahr 2003; AbouZahr and 
Boerma 2005).
Owing to poor data sources from which to derive mortality statistics, the 
first global maternal mortality estimates published by the WHO in 1986 were 
produced in large part on the basis of mathematical modelling (Lopez et al. 
2007). An early priority for academics was therefore to refine measurement 
techniques by improving the classification of maternal mortality and by 
developing indirect methods for estimating population-level maternal mortality 
through surveys, thereby bypassing the lack of population-level vital registration 
data (Campbell and Graham 1990).22 This early interest in improving 
measurement techniques was politically, as well as scientifically, motivated. 
Academics I interviewed recalled their assumption that more accurate and valid
22 The best known of these methodological developments was the ‘sisterhood method,’ an 
indirect technique for deriving population-based estimates of maternal mortality that asks adults 
during a census or survey about deaths during pregnancy and childbirth among their adult sisters 
(Graham et al. 1989). Because maternal mortality is a relatively rare outcome on a population 
level, such indirect methods require huge sample sizes to capture maternal deaths, making them 
both expensive and labour intensive. The intention was therefore that, with time, such surveys 
would be replaced with routine health surveillance systems that would enable countries to collect 
data on maternal mortality for use in planning and evaluation of safe motherhood programmes 
(Graham 2002).
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measures were necessary for raising international awareness of and commitment 
to safe motherhood. As one prominent epidemiologist recalled:
At the time we started to move., .it was always measurement, 
that was always the focus. It was always the belief that part of 
the problem was in measurement bottlenecks and generally 
feeling that by improving indicators and measurement 
techniques that we would help to address part of the problem.
So the problem was neglected because there wasn’t enough 
information, there wasn’t enough information, so it was all a 
vicious circle. So it started with a very measurement focus.
Such ideas about the importance of measurement have also been elaborated in a
1992 article in Social Science & Medicine, in which the authors posit that women’s
health had been largely ignored in international health because of a
“measurement trap,” in which lack of data and lack of attention to the issue were
“trapped” in a negative feedback loop (Graham and Campbell 1992).
Although maternal mortality measurement was considered important for 
global-level advocacy, my informants recalled that maternal health academics 
quite quickly came to a consensus that the expense and logistical challenges of 
measuring maternal deaths through large surveys were not justified and that the 
resources could better be spent on other research or on public health 
programmes. Indeed, by the early 1990s, many research groups thought that 
measuring maternal mortality “was pretty much impossible and definitely not an 
efficient use of resources” (Graham 2002:701). Research attention subsequently 
shifted towards the development and refinement of other sorts of 
epidemiological indicators for assessing the extent of pregnancy-related ill health 
and death and to evaluate clinical and public health interventions. First, 
indicators of severe or ‘near-miss’ morbidity were proposed as proxies for 
maternal death (Filippi et al. 1998). Researchers considered such indicators useful 
for drawing attention to the fact that maternal mortality only captured a small 
proportion of pregnancy-related suffering (Fortney and Smith 1996), but also for 
exploring risk factors for maternal mortality (given that severe morbidity from 
complications are on the ‘causal path’ of maternal death). At the time, many 
considered severe obstetric morbidity a more feasible outcome measure than 
maternal mortality because morbidity occurs more frequently than maternal 
death and can therefore more easily be measured in clinical settings. Since severe 
morbidity is closely related to maternal mortality it was assumed that being able
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to detect a change in morbidity in response to an intervention signalled also a 
reduction in maternal mortality (see Goodburn 2002).
Second, some researchers proposed that ‘process indicators’ -  
quantitative indicators of the availability, access to and quality of different 
healthcare services -  could be an alternative to health outcome indicators in the 
evaluation of healthcare services. This proposal was justified by the close link 
that was assumed to exist between the ‘process’ of providing certain services — 
notably the different elements of emergency obstetric care — and maternal 
mortality indicators. The advantage of such process indicators was that they were 
either available from existing recording systems at health facilities or 
incorporated into routine health information systems, and were thus cheaper and 
simpler to collect than maternal mortality data (Goodburn 2002). As such, 
although researchers recognised the political value of mortality data, their work 
was pragmatically oriented towards developing feasible measurement techniques 
that could help inform and evaluate programmatic practice.
7.1.2. Health systems research
Although measurement and refinement of indicators was clearly an early research 
priority for the safe motherhood field, it is important to note that ro«/ev/-specific 
research to understand the circumstances around implementation of clinical 
interventions in diverse healthcare settings was initially considered of equal 
importance. Indeed, in his 1987 Call to Action on Safe Motherhood, Halfdan 
Mahler (then Director-General of the WHO), was explicit that “health systems 
research” was needed in order to put existing clinical knowledge about pregnancy 
and delivery -  derived mostly from Western countries -  into practice within 
actual health systems in low- and middle-income countries:
If we are effectively to apply existing knowledge in a wide range 
of different conditions, much further research is essential. In 
each country’s circumstances the particular pattern of 
preventable causes of maternal deaths must be clarified, and the 
potentials for improvement in that country’s own context must 
be identified. Health systems research (operational research, as it 
is sometimes termed) is essential to the evaluation of feasibility 
and effectiveness of many recent ideas and technologies 
(1987b:669).
In the early 1990s, academics responded to Mahler’s call for health 
systems research by conducting comparative analyses of programmatic
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experiences in different countries and by developing methodological tools to 
help countries design and evaluate their specific healthcare delivery systems (e.g. 
Maine 1991). Campbell and Koblinsky (1995), for instance, proposed an 
assessment tool for defining the data sources that countries would need to design 
and evaluate programmes. This entailed a number of steps in any given country: 
first, gaining an overview of health policy relevant to maternal health; second, 
assessing the magnitude and causes of maternal mortality and morbidity, and the 
characteristics of groups at particular risk; and third, assessing the available 
inputs, both in terms of services (access, quality, providers, what is provided at 
various tiers, etc.) and in terms of the culture and existing resources and groups 
(ibid). The same authors later elaborated an approach to research that aimed to 
define different models of organising delivery care for countries with different 
epidemiological profiles and health system capabilities (Koblinsky et al. 1999). In 
other words, the focus was on identifying solutions adapted to each country’s 
health system and political-economic context.23
A cross-cutting feature of this early research was its methodological diversity. 
Research drew on epidemiological and clinical approaches, but also on qualitative 
investigations, sociology, history, and case study approaches, despite the fact that 
maternal health academics were predominantly trained in statistical and clinical 
disciplines, including epidemiology. On one level, these researchers’ use of 
different methods was a practical response to the dearth of data about maternal 
mortality and morbidity in low-income countries. For instance, due to lack of 
epidemiological trend data in low-income countries, researchers trying to better 
understand the mechanisms of population-level mortality decline in such 
countries turned to historical epidemiological data from Western countries, 
where maternal mortality statistics had been routinely collected for at least the 
past hundred years. This included data from countries like Sweden, the US, 
England and Wales, countries that had achieved very low levels of maternal
23 Other influential research during this period investigated the various obstacles that households 
and individuals experience in their quest for life-saving treatment, as captured most explicitly in 
an article published in 1994, entitled Too far to walk’ (Thaddeus and Maine 1994). Focusing on 
the interval between the onset of obstetric complications and the outcomes of such 
complications, this article sought to show that delayed treatment is a major explanatory variable 
in many maternal deaths, regardless of underlying risk factors. It put forth the ‘three delays’ 
framework to analyse the factors that first, delay the decision to seek care; second, delay arrival at 
a health facility; and third, delay the provision of adequate care (ibid). Such research helped to 
direct focus on to the importance on professionalised obstetric care to reduce maternal mortality 
(see Chapter 5).
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mortality by the late 1930s, albeit at different rates. Researchers without specialist 
training in history innovatively combined such data with social history to try to 
build up an understanding of the most important medical, professional, social 
and political factors that could explain the different patterns and rates of 
mortality decline in these countries (Storeng et al. 2006). On this basis they drew 
lessons for the contemporary situation in developing countries (De Brouwere et 
al. 1998; Van Lerberghe and De Brouwere 2001). Similarly, case studies from a 
number of countries that had achieved substantial maternal mortality reduction 
more recently, including Malaysia and Sri Lanka, combined a range of 
methodological approaches to examine the mechanisms of mortality decline at 
the population level (Koblinsky 2003). As Chapter 5 discussed, in 1997 the LAG 
mobilised such analyses to justify international policy recommendations on the 
importance of professionalised obstetric care.
On another level, the methodological diversity of maternal health 
research reflected that specialists recognised that a range of methods was needed 
to understand the complex processes involved in maternal mortality decline. 
Throughout the 1990s experimental research methods became highly valued as 
the best way of establishing the effectiveness of not only clinical, but also public 
health interventions. However, maternal health researchers argued that safe 
motherhood strategies could not easily be evaluated using such methods. Instead, 
they argued, evaluating such strategies would require a range of methodological 
inputs, because safe motherhood programmes, including those targeting 
mortality from direct obstetric complications, necessarily involve all levels of the 
health care system rather than a single drug or procedure that can more easily be 
subjected to experimental study. Moreover, since the intended beneficiaries of 
such complex interventions are communities or populations rather than 
individuals, researchers argued that it was not only extremely difficult but also 
unjustifiably expensive to conduct large-scale, experimental evaluation research 
(see McPake and Koblinsky 2009).
Taking what has been discussed thus far on maternal mortality 
measurement and health systems research serves to highlight that, by the late 
1990s, maternal health research as a definable sub-discipline had come to be 
characterised by substantial flexibility in its methodological approach. This, I 
have tried to show, was a response to the recognised complexities and
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differences of implementing public health strategies in different contexts and 
researchers’ clear desire to provide knowledge that could be usefully applied in 
practice. Though motivated by the analytical quest to understand how to reduce 
maternal mortality and improve maternal health, this research agenda was also 
responding to the need to make maternal health and mortality more visible 
within the global health field, and to enhance the position of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative. As I now turn to examine, however, as standards have 
changed in what counts for good and credible knowledge, safe motherhood 
researchers have become anxious, and have had to respond to the concern that 
the research they produce is not sufficiently ‘evidence-based.’
7.1.3. “Not enough” evidence
With the rise of the evidence-based medicine paradigm as a framework for public 
health research over the past decade or so, the methodological diversity outlined 
above has subsided, replaced in large part by an aspiration within the maternal 
health research community to conduct research using methods that are deemed 
more ‘rigorous’ or ‘robust’. Such an aspiration reflects that within the evidence- 
based medicine paradigm, the credibility of research findings has come to be 
defined principally in terms of the methods used to produce them, rather the 
findings themselves (Lambert 2006). A ‘hierarchy of evidence’ places systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses of experimental or quasi-experimental study designs at 
its apex. The randomised controlled trial (RCT) is considered the most rigorous 
study design for evaluating the effectiveness of a single intervention (Sackett et 
al. 1996; Rychetnik et al. 2004). As the name suggests, the main principle behind 
the RCT is the random allocation of alternative interventions (usually clinical 
interventions) to different individual subjects or groups in order to control for 
confounding factors between treatment groups when establishing the efficacy or 
effectiveness of healthcare services (Rychetnik et al. 2002). Within the hierarchy 
of evidence, the RCT is considered to be the ‘gold standard’ methodology, 
producing the highest level of evidence (Timmersmans and Berg 2003). In the 
hierarchy, it is followed by observational study designs such as cohort studies 
and case control studies, and, at the bottom, by other observational methods 
such as case studies. Observational epidemiology and qualitative evidence, of the 
kind that played an important role in the first decade of international maternal
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health research, are thus not highly valued within this paradigm (Petticrew and 
Roberts 2003).
The authority of objective, quantitative, systematic, and transparent 
knowledge is reinforced by the cultural value and presuge associated with 
methodological rigour (Inhom 1995; Lambert and McKevitt 2002). Moreover, 
the principles of the evidence-based paradigm have become institutionalised 
within the academic global health field, with both funding and the most 
prestigious scientific journals biased towards biomedical research and research 
that uses experimental study designs, even for questions dealing with public 
health or policy interventions (Wolff 2001). Such institutional factors are also 
reinforced by the fact that donors’ agendas mirror the evidence-based paradigm, 
as I show in more detail below. Together, these changing circumstances have 
created strong institutionalised incentives for researchers to orient their research 
towards such ‘gold standards’.
Within the maternal health academic environment, a principal effect of 
the gradual entrenchment of the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ as the guiding 
framework for assessing the quality of research has been to create anxiety about 
the field’s suboptimal performance relative to other global health subfields. A 
common narrative has emerged, positing that a poor record of evidence-based 
policy-making has damaged the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s credibility within 
global health debates as well as prioritisation of maternal health (Behague and 
Storeng 2008). Indeed, informants commonly implied that the ‘evidence base’ on 
maternal mortality and maternal health intervention strategies is insufficiently 
well developed to ensure prioritisation of the issue, especially when compared 
with other global health initiatives. As one informant claimed, “things not getting 
priority because there’s not enough evidence, that’s definitely the case in 
maternal health.”
Such anxiety had several dimensions. First, a major issue was the 
persistent difficulties researchers have encountered in improving measurement of 
maternal mortality. Informants widely interpreted that lack of valid data on 
maternal mortality in low-income countries has been a core determinant of the 
lack of prioritisation of maternal health relative to other health issues. This is a 
perception that has existed in the field since the 1990s, but that has intensified 
with the growing reliance on burden of disease data as a shorthand for the
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importance of global health problems. It has been further reinforced by the 
analysis of political scientist Jeremy Shiffman (2003), who has argued that a 
credible indicator of the magnitude and severity of a problem is a key factor in 
generating political priority for a specific health issue. More generally, a common 
perception among my informants was that problems relating to the validity of 
maternal mortality data and to the sheer difficulty of collecting such data carried 
through and compromised the validity and credibility of research to evaluate 
public health strategies, in turn feeding into the neglect of those strategies. As 
one informant explained:
One of the problems that has plagued the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative has been the lack of both an easy way to estimate 
maternal mortality...at the national scale and also the difficulty 
with evaluation of the programmes, given the difficulty of the 
maternal mortality indicator. So...I think that [measurement 
difficulty] really has been a major factor in terms of the 
difficulties with achieving progress, has been the difficulty 
measuring it . . .‘if  you can’t measure it, you don’t do it.’ That has 
been an enormous challenge.
Many felt that such a challenge was particularly acute because of the field’s 
history of policy shifts, which some informants and researchers in the broader 
global health community had come to see as epitomising the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative’s failure to adopt an ‘evidence-based’ approach (Miller et al. 2003). 
While few informants doubted the value of professional obstetric care as an 
important aspect of maternal mortality reduction -  having been convinced of its 
value on the basis of clinical, historical and experiential knowledge — many did 
worry that the quality of existing evidence was of too poor to convince decision­
makers. As one UNFPA advisor put it:
We keep repeating the same thing over and over. For example, I 
keep saying in my advocacy papers that no country has 
significandy reduced maternal mortality through keeping home 
deliveries and that all countries that have reduced maternal 
mortality have done so through institutional deliveries. That’s all 
we know. We have evidence of that in historical evidence, such 
as trends, but we don’t have case-control [or randomised 
studies].. .It’s not enough.
Thus, by claiming that the existing evidence on the value of professionalised 
obstetric care (which is clinical, historical and observational rather than 
experimental) is “not enough,” my informant was implying that it was not 
sufficiendy rigorous to convince the broader global health field to act. Others
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implied that the absence of ‘gold standard’ evidence on public health 
interventions to reduce maternal mortality has been used as an excuse by donors 
to withhold investment from maternal health in favour of other global health 
interventions with more incontrovertible evidence of benefit, such as vaccines 
for children. The production of evidence in maternal health is thus clearly related 
to the kind of competitive pressures outlined in previous chapters.
7.1.4. In pursuit o f  the gold standard
Over the past five to ten years, researchers have tried to respond to the kind of 
anxieties outlined above by orienting their research practices towards the 
production of more robust evidence. This has entailed a number of things, first 
of which has been renewed attention to improving maternal mortality 
measurement so as to better document its magnitude using Valid’ and ‘credible’ 
indicators. To this end, in the early 2000s a prominent maternal health 
epidemiologist, Wendy Graham, led a morally imbued supplication for 
investment in measurement research, despite having earlier argued against 
maternal mortality measurement and in favour of the adoption of broader 
indicators and outcome measures. In an influential Lancet commentary, she 
argued that improved measurement is essential for meeting the MDGs and for 
overcoming the “scandal of invisibility” of women dying from pregnancy-related 
causes without their deaths even being recorded:
We must stop saying this [maternal mortality measurement] 
cannot be tackled and acknowledge the damage caused so far.
We must recognise the risks of continuing to neglect the data 
needed by poor countries to inform their allocation of scarce 
resources, and find the funds, the tools, and the opportunities to 
meet these needs. We must build a sustainable evaluation 
capacity at the country level and a greater demand for reliable 
measurement of maternal mortality and severe morbidity 
(Graham 2002:703).
Graham’s plea, articulated within the discourse of the normative priority-setting 
approach incorporating burden of disease and cost-effectiveness, clearly appealed 
to donors: it was rewarded with unprecedented research funding to improve 
maternal mortality measurement through the Immpact project, which was 
supported by major donors such as the Gates Foundation, with DfID, WIIO, 
UNFPA and the World Bank among 12 international contributing agencies 
(Christie 2002).
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Graham (2002) argued that investment in maternal mortality 
measurement is necessary to enable rigorous, evidence-based evaluation of global 
safe motherhood recommendations. Similarly, a number of my informants 
claimed that more robust evaluations would be needed to ensure that 
international agencies’ recommendations are in fact ‘evidence-based’ and thereby 
help to ensure the credibility of these agencies. Such attitudes underpinned a 
growing aspiration evident within the safe motherhood academic community to 
improve the rigour of maternal health evaluation research by adopting the 
highest possible grade of study design, preferably the RCT, preferably with 
maternal mortality as the outcome measure. Despite earlier concerns (noted 
above) that experimental study designs may be inappropriate for studying the 
kind of public health interventions believed to be necessary to reduce maternal 
mortality, by the early 2000s there was growing consensus within the field about 
the need to overcome the constraints relating to costs and methodology of 
conducting RCTs. This was seen as necessary to improve the evidence on safe 
motherhood recommendations and thereby encourage donors’ and governments’ 
uptake of these recommendations. To this end, key actors within the maternal 
health academic field framed experimental research into recommended strategies 
as an ethical imperative, necessary to ensure that recommended strategies are 
indeed effective at reducing maternal mortality and to avoid squandering limited 
resources (Miller et al. 2003). But an underlying motivation for such arguments 
was that the production of more robust evidence was also seen as an essential 
step in strengthening the field’s competitive position relative to other emerging 
global health initiatives. As one epidemiologist put it:
I think the maternal health field really competes against other 
fields for money, no? And I think other fields like the big 
spenders — malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, even child health 
- 1 think they have a better record of promoting evidence-based 
interventions. And the maternal health field might be at risk of 
being left behind and eventually left out, because that can create 
donor fatigue, you know, if you miss the target too often with 
TBA training first, risk screening....
This informant was echoing the written argument of certain maternal health 
specialists that programme planning in safe motherhood in the past had been 
“based on theory rather than proved effectiveness” (Miller et al. 2003:10). These 
authors made a case for the use of rigorous criteria for the selection and
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evaluation of interventions under real-life conditions in developing countries as 
“an efficient way to identify interventions for large-scale program replication” 
that could “speed progress in reducing maternal deaths” {ibid.).
Such strong calls to strengthen the evidentiary basis of core safe 
motherhood recommendations have been made routinely over the past five to 
ten years, and have been influential in fostering an aspiration within the field to 
conduct such research. However, efforts to realise this agenda have come up 
against financial, logistical, methodological and epistemological challenges. For 
instance, experimental evaluations of complex maternal health interventions have 
remained hampered by difficulties in measuring maternal mortality because of 
insufficient sample sizes or poor recording methods, as well as by lack of suitable 
comparison groups and difficulties in assessing the effects of confounding 
factors (Ross et al. 2005). While cluster randomised trials have been conducted 
on interventions including vitamin A supplementation and reduced number of 
prenatal visits (Benoit et al. 2005), no experimental research has been conducted 
into skilled birth attendants and emergency obstetric care. Consequently there 
have been few systematic reviews of the evidence on strategies for improving 
maternal healthcare (Althabe et al. 2008). On some level, then, ‘gold standard’ 
evidence on maternal mortality reduction remains an aspiration.
Such impediments have not, however, weakened the field’s resolve to 
strengthen its evidence-based credentials. But because of the challenges 
mentioned above, many researchers wishing to produce ‘gold standard’ evidence 
have shifted their focus from methodologically complex studies of context- 
specific health system strategies, and focused instead on targeted clinical 
interventions or one subcomponent of larger health system packages that can be 
more easily studied with experimental methods (Behague and Storeng 2008).
This includes specific obstetric care, quality assurance mechanisms, and clinical 
interventions to address single causes of maternal mortality, such as the use of 
magnesium sulphate for eclampsia or misoprostol (a drug that stimulates uterine 
contractions) for post-partum haemorrhage in home birth settings {ibid).
In addition to their pursuit of experimental research, researchers have 
participated in various other research practices to help secure scientific credibility 
for interventions as globally valid recommendations. Such work has included 
various efforts to review and synthesise existing evaluations of skilled birth
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attendance and emergency obstetric care in order to distil ‘best bet’ evidence- 
based messages about these strategies’ effectiveness. Perhaps the best example of 
this is the Lancet series on maternal survival that was published in 2006, which 
reviewed existing research before concluding that midwifery-based care in health 
facilities — or skilled birth attendance -  is the best public health strategy for 
bringing about maternal mortality decline (see Campbell and Graham 2006; 
Ronsmans and Graham 2006). The publication of this series can be seen as part 
of an effort to reassert safe motherhood as a specific priority of the kind 
discussed in Chapter 6, a competitive response to the fact that the Lancet had 
published special series on child health and neonatal health, which helped raised 
the profile of these health issues. At the same time, informants were quite open 
that the publication of the series was also an effort to draw on the scientific 
legitimacy afforded by the prestige of the Lancet in order to convince the 
international community of the scientific validity of investing in improved 
maternal health services as a strategy for achieving maternal mortality reduction, 
in part to overcome the absence of clear-cut scientific evidence. Academics’ 
participation in such ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1983) served not only to 
demarcate their own work as scientific, but also to strengthen the credibility of 
the broader policy community of which they form part. They considered a 
unified, coherent and scientifically endorsed set of messages essential to convince 
donors to prioritise safe motherhood over other issues. As one informant said, “I 
certainly have heard donors say that we will not do anything where there doesn’t 
seem to be agreement.”
In sum, then, maternal health researchers’ efforts to respond to the 
exigencies of the evidence-based paradigm -  driven by academia and donors and 
by the need to improve the field’s position — have impacted on their research 
practices in important ways. First, there has been a gradual narrowing of the 
methodological scope of research on maternal health. Second, the practical 
challenges of studying complex interventions using such narrower methods have 
contributed to shifting research focus away from the dynamics of complex health 
system interventions and towards components of larger strategies. Third, and at 
the same time, other research practices, such as reviews of the evidence, have 
sought to ascertain the evidence-based credentials of global safe motherhood 
recommendations.
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7.2. Self-critical academics
Academics’ efforts to build up a particular and narrowly defined evidence base 
on maternal health, described above, were driven by a confluence of academic 
and donor-driven pressures, and by academics’ own efforts to contribute to 
advancing the broader Safe Motherhood Initiative. These were developments 
many academics were both aware and critical of. Indeed, their growing pursuit of 
methodological rigour seems to have raised important and unresolved questions 
for them as to their own role in endorsing the scientific legitimacy of global 
policy recommendations. A core concern for many of my informants, for 
example, was that their efforts to strengthen the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s 
credentials for evidence-based research and policy occurred at the expense of 
meeting national or even sub-national level research needs in countries grappling 
with maternal mortality. As one epidemiologist put it, “I think that the academic 
environment does push us, does value certain kinds of research over other kinds 
of research, and I’m not sure that is always the right kind of research although it 
is highly skilled and highly technical.” In interviews, informants often expressed 
just this sort of self-critical attitude as to the nature of their research practices 
and the broader implications of their work. In the subsections below I review 
some of these doubts and tensions in more detail in order to demonstrate the 
extent of their self-awareness of the limitations of their research to address issues 
that are truly ‘policy-relevant’ for countries struggling with high maternal 
mortality.
7.2.1. The right kind o f  research?
It was striking that a considerable proportion of the academics I interviewed 
were rather critical of their field’s renewed priority on maternal mortality 
measurement, in several cases despite their own deep involvement in research 
into maternal mortality. Echoing the earlier arguments of maternal health 
researchers reviewed above, they often reported that the cost and complexity of 
maternal mortality measurement outweighs its benefits. Such measurement 
responds first and foremost to global demand for monitoring and evaluation, 
without necessarily being very useful for countries trying to plan and evaluate 
their health services, several explained. One epidemiologist argued that even if  
the methodological challenges could be overcome, and funding acquired, a major
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problem would persist, namely that “mortality data don’t tell you what to do.” As 
she saw it, “if you come out of this study and you have a maternal mortality ratio 
of 750 or of 600, what are the differences in implications? None. Doesn’t tell you 
a thing. It’s high. We know it’s high.” While mortality data can be important for 
advocacy purposes, informants expressed the opinion that it is primarily other 
kinds of data, including process indicators relating to the specific distribution and 
quality of health services at national and sub-national levels, that are the most 
urgently needed to improve the delivery of healthcare.
Second, many were critical that their emphasis on experimental research 
was pushing them towards studying interventions that lack relevance for low- 
income countries. Specifically, there was concern about the trend towards 
research into component or single-intervention strategies that can be studied 
using an RCT, such as vitamin A supplementation to reduce maternal mortality 
or the use of particular drugs to address single causes of maternal mortality, such 
as haemorrhage. Referring to the trial of the effect of vitamin A supplementation 
on maternal mortality, one of my informants explained how such trial research 
does not necessarily address questions that are relevant for poor countries:
We are working in the poorest areas of the world where their 
problem is poverty. That is the tension I have. I think these 
smaller epidemiological questions are not the answer. I mean, 
take the vitamin A trial. It’s wonderful if it works and if it’s 
repeated ten times say, that confirms that vitamin A is the big 
technical solution [to maternal mortality]. These poor countries 
will still not have the system in place to deliver it so for me that 
is the tension.
Similarly to this informant, others voiced concern that research into 
technical solutions is feeding into an unwelcome myth that population-level 
improvements in maternal health can occur without investment in infrastructure, 
equipment and personnel. One epidemiologist, for instance, felt that the vitamin 
A trial had been “very destructive because it opened up the possibility of a 
simple solution.” She elaborated this comment by explaining that even if vitamin 
supplementation is “proven” to work in the context of an RCT, it will never 
provide a panacea for maternal mortality: “I think even if it works [to reduce 
maternal mortality] I don’t think it’s going to change any of the core messages” -  
the need for skilled birth attendants and a functioning health system capable of 
delivering emergency obstetric care. As such, she was echoing the broader
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concern discussed in the previous chapter that promoting interim solutions can 
divert attention from long-term health system development. More generally, 
some saw the focus on establishing the effectiveness of different clinical 
interventions within the context of an experimental trial as a distraction from the 
real need for greater understanding of policy transfer and “operational” 
knowledge on how to implement existing clinical and public health interventions 
with proven effectiveness in wealthy countries within the weak health systems of 
poor countries. As one informant put it:
In the core things we know what works. We know exactly how 
we reduced eclampsia deaths in the west [with functioning 
health systems]. From the technical point of view.. .medically 
speaking. [But] it’s how to deliver these services to women in 
poor countries where you have no doctor in the hospital, you 
know, you go to rural Mali, you have no hospitals, that’s the 
difficulty but from a technical point of view we know [what is 
needed].
Echoing this informant’s distinction between medical and public health 
knowledge, I regularly heard academics express reservations about the call from a 
sub-group of maternal health academics for the field to pursue experimental 
research into the effectiveness of complex public health strategies. An example 
of such a study might be an RCT to compare the effectiveness of programmes 
deploying skilled birth attendants versus traditional birth attendants. The 
comments of these critical academics often resonated with an emerging critique 
within the public health and social science literatures of the limitations of the 
RCT design for examining the complex causal mechanisms involved in 
interventions whose effectiveness may be context-specific and the result of 
social, as well as biomedical, mechanisms (Wolff 2001; Lavis et al. 2002; Victora 
et al. 2004; Behague and Storeng 2008). My informants frequently pointed to the 
difficulty of generalising about the results of RCTs of complex interventions 
beyond the context in which the trial is conducted because of the complex 
nature of the interventions. Thus, some have argued that although it is possible 
in theory to conduct community (rather than individual) randomised trials that 
offer a “high standard of proof’ about the effectiveness of an intervention (albeit 
within an experimental context), the costs of such trials would be prohibitive in 
relation to the benefits (Koblinsky et al. 1999:399).
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Some maternal health experts also had ethical objections towards 
experimental research into skilled birth attendance and emergency obstetric care. 
Indeed, these informants insisted that there already exists clear evidence of the 
benefits of skilled providers and emergency obstetric care for maternal mortality 
reduction, even if  this evidence is not highly valued within the hierarchy of 
evidence. This is a view that was also expressed in a letter to the editor of the 
Journal ofMidwifery and Women’s health, in which Paxton and colleagues (2003) 
insisted that the combined weight of numerous observational and quasi- 
experimental studies, historical research and clinical experience provides 
sufficient evidence to justify global recommendations on emergency obstetric 
care and skilled birth attendants. Given such lack of real scientific ‘equipoise’ 
about the benefits of these interventions, some informants deemed that it would 
be unethical to conduct experimental research in which some women would be 
randomly assigned to receive an alternative, and likely inferior, intervention.
Such reservations about the call for experimental research into complex 
interventions were buttressed by maternal health academics’ growing 
appreciation that policy-makers in low-income countries may not, in fact, 
uncritically value research findings simply because they are deemed to be a high 
grade of evidence. Unlike the donors who often demand ‘gold standard’ evidence 
before committing to any given course of action, informants felt that at the 
national and sub-national levels policy-makers appear to be more interested in 
the relevance of research findings for their particular context than in the rigour of 
the methods used to produce them. As another informant explained:
When I go and talk to ministers and parliamentary secretaries, 
they say, ‘I listen to you.. .and I hear what you are saying about 
skilled birth attendants and skilled care and everything, but my 
coverage is only 20 percent. Can you tell me how I go there? I 
agree with you.. .but can you tell me how I am going to get from 
20 percent to 30 percent to 80 percent. Give me some evidence, 
some lessons learned, so that I can go there’.
Another informant concurred, remarking that policy-makers at national level are
required to make quick judgments and filter information that responds to their
“intuitive sense of what reality is.” He claimed that policy-makers at the country-
level largely accept as given that skilled attendants and emergency obstetric care
are needed, but require context-specific guidance, rather than experimental
evidence, on how to scale-up health interventions to their populations. Similarly,
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based on experience interacting with policy-makers in one South American 
country, another informant argued that country-level policy-makers are “much 
more impressed” by a non-experimental study showing that a neighbouring 
country achieved health improvement following a real-life policy intervention 
than by the results of an RCT from a far-away country with a totally different 
context.
These findings suggest a view among some maternal health academics 
that experimental research is not always able to address relevant questions and, 
furthermore, that such research is not always justifiable from an ethical or 
financial perspective. As these findings show, academics were often self-critical 
that their pursuit of the kind o f ‘robust’ research valued within the evidence- 
based paradigm — and by international donors and many international policy­
makers — was occurring at the expense of research that would be more useful at 
addressing questions relevant for specific countries. This highlights that the 
universalising epistemology of the RCT is not able to capture the different needs 
of the multiple users of the information that it produces.
7.2.2. Oversimplifying complex realities
Compounding worries that their research practices were not addressing questions 
of relevance to country-level policy-makers was academics’ concern that they 
were being complicit in disseminating an oversimplified set of messages about 
safe motherhood policy, and thereby contradicting country-level policy-makers’ 
apparent need for context-specific guidance on implementation of health policy 
change. This was a tendency that academics themselves attributed to the growing 
pressure they faced to contribute to establishing the credibility of global-level 
policy recommendations. As one epidemiologist said, the “quick-winnism of the 
taskmasters” — development agencies and donors from high-income countries — 
who are “dealing with a mountain of things” and therefore need messages that 
speak to them directly, “has pushed a lot of people to simplify their message.” 
Indeed, some academics admitted that they had, on occasion, succumbed to 
pressure from the broader safe motherhood community, including advocacy 
specialists, to oversimplify the complexity of their findings when communicating 
these to outside audiences, including to donors. For instance, speaking about the 
Lancet series mentioned above, those participating in its production recalled with 
discomfort that they had been actively challenged by the editorial staff (which
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included representatives from a major NGO) to present a unified and 
unambiguous voice on policy priorities, if necessary by overstating the certainty 
of the scientific evidence in the interest of creating a coherent policy message. As 
one epidemiologist recalled:
They wanted us to say ‘look how big the problem is. Countries 
make no progress, yet we know what works and what needs to 
be done’. That’s what people wanted to hear. They called it 
‘evidence-based advocacy’. . .My feeling is that it’s slightly more 
advocacy than evidence because they want us to say ‘there are so 
many deaths in the world, it’s the indicator with the biggest 
inequality’ etc., etc., yet the evidence base isn’t there.
Such unease about overstating the certainty of scientific evidence and the 
validity of numbers was for many academics exacerbated by a feeling that it was 
disingenuous towards country-level stakeholders to gloss over the evident 
complexities of maternal health epidemiology and maternal mortality reduction 
for the sake of presenting a message with global appeal. Such tensions are 
illustrated by looking at academics’ handling of the results of a longitudinal 
epidemiological study into maternal mortality trends in the demographic 
surveillance site of Matlab, Bangladesh, which recorded a substantial decline in 
maternal mortality over a thirty-year period (see Chowdhury et al. 2007). While a 
success story, mortality decline was documented despite low coverage of skilled 
birth attendants (at around 20% of all births) and the findings challenged the 
global validity of the recommendation that population-level access to skilled 
birth attendants is the most important factor in population-level mortality 
decline. Subsequent in-depth analysis of the Bangladeshi data attributed the 
documented maternal mortality decline to a range of factors, including a fall in 
abortion-related deaths, better access to emergency obstetric care and 
community-based delivery care systems, as well as other policies that expand 
access to education and more affordable health services, improving access for 
the poor (Koblinsky et al. 2008).
For academics, the Bangladesh findings in no way invalidated the general 
importance of skilled birth attendants, but the research did reinforce their views 
that searching for an elixir to the problem of maternal mortality is inherendy 
futile given the complexity of maternal mortality decline. Yet, while the range of 
context-specific factors that help to explain maternal mortality reduction in 
Bangladesh were acknowledged in scientific articles, in international forums such
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complexity was often downplayed so as not to compromise the clarity of the 
message that deploying skilled birth attendants is the best ‘evidence-based’ 
recommendation for countries to adopt. One academic who had been intimately 
involved in the Bangladesh research admitted that it was for this reason that the 
study team had been particularly “cautious” about the way they presented the 
findings in international forums and that she herself felt compelled to back the 
message on skilled attendants to contribute to a coherent global 
recommendation. This was despite the fact that she personally believed -  and the 
data clearly suggested — that maternal mortality reduction is “much more 
complex than skilled birth attendants.” The presentation of the research results 
was thus clearly socially enacted. More generally, others worried that the 
credibility and authority of the Safe Motherhood Initiative as a whole, including 
of key agencies like the WHO, would be seriously undermined if the movement 
continued to insist on the ‘evidence-based’ nature of global recommendations 
without acknowledging and documenting context-specific variation. As one 
researcher put it:
If you look and see, I mean, WHO and the international 
community are coming out and saying ‘skilled attendance for all’, 
and refusing, I mean refusing to ever talk about context. So you 
go to Nepal where you get eight percent skilled attendance and 
you say ‘skilled attendance for all* and you go to, you know,
Egypt and say ‘skilled attendance for all’. It’s a ridiculous, 
poindess, stupid thing to say in a country that absolutely has no 
ability to achieve that goal, and if you are going to say this is our 
goal in every country, but recognising this is where we are, and 
in five to ten years we should shoot for it, then [that would be 
ok]. But they will never take that step, or they haven’t yet.. .1 
think the WHO has a pretty weak leg to stand on because this 
far down the road we still don’t have the evidence that we need 
to have a convincing story. I mean, you see the stuff coming out 
of Bangladesh. We do not understand why maternal mortality 
decreased.
As this comment suggests, academics were clearly frustrated by the way in which 
they saw themselves being complicit in international agencies’ oversimplified 
representation of scientific evidence.
These findings suggest that many academics experienced a tension 
between their perceived responsibility to draw out the implications of their 
research for national- and sub-national level practice and the pressure exerted on 
them by the broader safe motherhood community to give scientific legitimacy
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and credibility to global safe motherhood policy recommendations. It was clear 
that many felt deeply uneasy that issuing policy advice was fundamentally at odds 
with their idealised view of the academic’s role, especially when such advice was 
issued on the back of uncertain evidence.“We should be impartial and we should 
take all the evidence and say somehow what that evidence tells us, but we 
shouldn’t come with a particular mandate or a particular role to play,” said one 
epidemiologist, while also acknowledging the pressure that constrains the 
realisation of such an idealised position: “It is difficult because people say ‘make 
a recommendation’ and tell us what to do, [but] as soon as you start giving 
recommendations, people think you’ve got an axe to grind.”
7.3. Playing the game
Above I have argued that academics clearly identified a discrepancy between 
their research agenda and the evidence needs in countries struggling with 
maternal mortality, and on this basis questioned their own role in backing global- 
level recommendations that simplify the reality of maternal mortality reduction. 
Yet, on the whole they did not address such discrepancies in their work. Indeed, 
the two have come very much to co-exist within the academic subfield of safe 
motherhood. I would argue that a main reason for this is that academics in 
international institutions, despite their elite status, found themselves without 
much independence or power to address the sort of discrepancies identified 
above. Such lack of independence can be seen to have several different 
dimensions.
First of all it is important to take into account that these academics were 
working within a research culture that on different levels favours ‘gold standard’ 
research and, conversely, discourages the sort of operational, health system 
research that many of my informants said was needed to inform the actual 
implementation of safe motherhood policy. For one, as academics frequently 
explained, implementation research is not considered “cutting edge” within 
universities, where publication practices, promotions and status are aligned with 
the dominant hierarchy of evidence. Academics were also constrained by a new 
set of expectations relating to academics’ accountability through the production 
of a certain kind of highly-valued research that is seen to promote not only 
academic credibility but also economic efficiency in public health practice,
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similarly to the audit culture described by Strathern (2000) with reference to UK 
university life more generally. Thus their obligations to their profession and to 
their topic came into conflict, with the result that their own intellectual freedom 
of movement was undermined.
Academics’ growing dependency on external donors, including private 
donors, to fund their research reinforced their lack of independence to pursue 
research practices that were more directly aimed at the needs of specific 
countries and set other constraints too. Such donor dependency operated in 
direct ways, for instance through dependency on donors to sustain academic 
livelihoods through grants, but also indirectly, through academics’ dependency 
on the survival of the Safe Motherhood Initiative as a whole to sustain their 
specialist field of research. Particularly academics in ‘soft funded’ positions, 
required to raise their own salaries and research costs through external grants, 
had few incentives to challenge the bias of the external donors whose funding 
patterns favour clinical research and gold standard methods. Of all donors, the 
Gates Foundation was said to be the most notorious for its explicit preference 
for ‘innovative’ technological solutions to health issues and a marked reluctance 
to fund much needed research into the implementation of existing interventions.
In addition to a bias in favour of research into technological solutions, 
there was a clear perception that it was only through producing ‘gold standard’ 
research that academics could help to persuade donors and international policy­
makers to support the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s recommended strategies. In 
part, this was perceived to be a self-inflicted situation. As one informant said, 
“we’ve sort of killed ourselves by always arguing that you needed trial evidence, 
you needed rigorous evidence. Now the policy-makers need that same language, 
of rigorous evidence.” It was clear that many now found it difficult to resist this 
pressure. Despite claiming that process indicators are both more feasible and 
more informative outcome measures, one academic even claimed that only 
studies using “hard outcomes” -  in other words mortality outcomes -  have the 
power to influence the high-level donors who set the terms of policy debates. 
“That’s the only way you get the attention of the [World] Bank and the big 
people,” he insisted “If you just go and say ‘well, we changed a bit of behaviour’ 
they say ‘oh thank you’. But if you can actually say Sve’re hitting the Millennium 
Development Goal,’ then it hugely raises you up the agenda.”
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The perceived pressure to produce a particular kind of evidence was so 
strong that some academics admitted that they would participate in conducting 
an RCT into skilled birth attendance despite their own strong reservations about 
the value of such work if that is what it would take to convince donors of the 
value of investing in such care. An epidemiologist I interviewed explained:
That’s the struggle that I’m having because I am so convinced of 
the argument [about the value of skilled birth attendants]... but 
we need to think, what makes policy-makers shift? Do we need 
another beautiful trial showing that TBAs [traditional birth 
attendants] make no difference [to maternal mortality decline]? I 
would say I hope not, but unfortunately quite a few people [are 
calling] for trials of community health workers, you know to see 
what they can contribute. And the donors [are] taking note. And 
if we’ve gone that far then I would say.. .God, what a waste of 
money. But maybe we have to play the game, I don’t [know]...I 
feel uncomfortable about it.
Such comments highlight an interesting development, whereby academics who 
are critical of a system nonetheless may feel obliged to mould their research into 
the terms of the system in order to get by and contribute to the broader goal of 
the global health movement in which they are, in effect, active participants. Such 
‘blending in’ may be an effective strategy for survival, but it comes at a clear cost 
to the perceived usefulness of the knowledge that is produced as a result.
It was also clear that many academics felt too intimidated to challenge 
decision-makers in the high-level global health policy sphere, including certain 
prominent donor agencies, because they felt that these were working from within 
a frame of reference entirely different to their own. Some bemoaned that the 
Gates Foundation’s business-oriented approach to global health in particular 
made it almost impossible to challenge its relative neglect of health systems. One 
epidemiologist, for instance, complained that the Gates Foundation’s 
representatives tend to talk of public health interventions as “products,” while 
reducing health systems to “pipelines” for getting products to consumers. She 
suggested that this business-oriented view of global health is so entrenched 
within the Foundation as to make it virtually impossible to partake in 
constructive discussions about maternal health with Gates’ representatives, 
despite the Foundation’s efforts to consult academics about future priorities for 
maternal health research. Recalling with exacerbation one meeting at which a 
Gates’ representative had enthusiastically called on the maternal health research
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community to identify “a bed-net for maternal health,” she dismissed this explicit 
demand for a technical fix to maternal mortality, modelled on the insecticide- 
treated bed-nets used to combat malaria, as evidence of profound lack of 
appreciation of the challenges of reducing maternal mortality. Yet, my informant 
admitted that she had not publicly challenged this view or insisted on the 
importance of implementation or health system research. When I asked her why 
not, she replied, “oh I can try to argue that, but they are not going to 
listen.. .they are looking for cheap solutions, they are looking for the vitamin A 
pill.”
7.3.1. Lack o f  expertise and authority
While various academic and donor-driven pressures constrained academics’ 
ability to address the identified discrepancy between current and ideal research 
practices, other factors also played a role. For one, given their clinical or 
epidemiological training, many academics lacked the confidence that — even if 
the professional impediments were removed -  they would be able to take 
forward a research agenda that would be more appropriately directed at 
countries’ policy and programmatic needs. One informant, for example, 
distinguished between “technical knowledge in health,” which can be fairly 
specific, and “development-related knowledge,” which is “more about how to 
spend money to achieve things in a system that isn’t your own.” She admitted 
that she was unsure, for example, that epidemiologists can actually help to answer 
these development-related questions. Part of the allure of epidemiology was 
plainly technical. One epidemiologist described the pleasure of her work in terms 
of finding patterns in data and rather mundane tasks such as cleaning a data set 
to eliminate error. To some extent, the research question was irrelevant — “it 
could be about anything — the colour of socks in the underwear drawer” — and, 
although she claimed to be interested also in the “big questions” to do with how 
systems function she questioned whether her technical skills were up to die job 
of addressing such questions. “Sometimes I even think, is this what I should be 
doing at all? This field? If the big questions are about [health system] issues, 
maybe I should be working much more on something where the questions are 
much more [narrowly about descriptive] epidemiology,” she admitted. It was 
clear, then, that at least for certain academics, some elements of the broader 
problem were felt to be outside their own epistemological remit.
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For many academics based in Western research institutions, such 
insecurities were compounded by a concern that they lacked the credibility and 
legitimacy to offer advice to policy-makers or programme managers working “on 
the ground” in low-income countries. This was in part because of the physical 
and social distance separating them from these actors and in part because they 
felt they lack the context-specific knowledge needed to interpret the practical 
significance of findings for a given health system and political context. These 
were concerns shared by others (non-academics) within the safe motherhood 
community. But, interestingly, for one policy-advisor from a middle-income 
country, this was not just a question of a lack of knowledge about any one 
particular country or region, in other words a case of the academics having 
insufficient geographical understanding. It was also a more deeply rooted issue 
about the specific forms that the professionalisation of academics in the global 
North in particular has taken. During a recent period as a guest fellow at an 
American university, for example, the informant cited above had observed that, 
unlike academics in many Southern settings who interact socially with policy­
makers, academics in high-income countries tend to be separated from the 
policy-making domain, both in their own countries and in the low-income 
countries where their research is based. She felt that this is because these 
academics’ work tends to be concentrated very explicitly on achieving academic 
advancement. Referring to the US university she was visiting, she remarked that, 
“there I have found that most of the academics haven’t seen a policy-maker in 
their life or had any exchange at all, and they don’t even talk across 
disciplines.. .People are in their own worlds, chasing money for their own 
projects and then working very hard to get the deliverables.” While this policy 
advisor perhaps underestimated Western academics’ sensitivity to the knowledge 
needs of policy-makers in low-income countries, she rightly observed the 
formative role that institutional and professional pressures can play in impeding 
the relevance of international research for national and sub-national practice.
7.3.2. Carving out a new niche for research
A number of informants rationalised their own, recognised inability to bring 
forward a research agenda that is truly relevant to countries’ needs by designating 
the kind of work that would be required as being outside the academic role. For 
instance, one academic queried how researchers could contribute to the
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“mission” of reducing maternal mortality without actually going to countries, 
living there and working alongside ministries of health, but quickly dismissed this 
option by saying, “that wouldn’t be a researcher role, that would be a 
development role.” By contrast, some academics seemed to be able to address 
the sorts of tensions discussed above precisely by effectively dissolving the 
demarcation between ‘development work’ and ‘research’ and explicitly orienting 
their work towards country-level, rather than global, evidence needs. But it was 
also clear that those who felt more confident that they were addressing country- 
level research needs had achieved this position in part by redefining the 
“researcher” identity. “We are not really researchers here,” said one of these 
academics. “We are more committed and involved in the development of the 
health system, and we use science to help develop, say in a more rational or 
efficient way, the health systems.” This kind of perspective was expressed by 
academics based at European research institutions with relatively secure 
livelihoods, who were not as dependent on external funding as the majority of 
my academic informants. They described their model of research as one that, 
when compared with mainstream international research, is more responsive to 
countries’ own priorities and that fosters a truly collaborative and equitable 
approach with national-level research partners “in the driving seat.” This entailed 
a deliberate policy of prioritising the links between research and national-level 
policy over the production of formally recognised scientific research, even if 
doing so meant forfeiting international prestige and major grants, as well as 
access to global-level policy spheres. The emphasis was on working directly with 
Ministries of Health to study and evaluate government-run programmes from an 
operational perspective. Rather than the research question being driven by the 
choice of a particular method, such as an RCT, this was a model of research that 
started from the research question and then identified appropriate methods to 
answer it, I was told.
In order to advance this vision of collaborative research, such health 
systems-oriented researchers defined “capacity building” of partners in 
developing countries as a priority, and were quick to add that they rejected the 
typical model of academic collaboration: research designed and led by Northern 
institutions and executed by partners in the South. Instead, they emphasised the 
importance of investing sufficient time in building up social relationships across
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the North-South divide to ensure that research questions are truly relevant to 
those they are intended to benefit (see also McCoy et al. 2008) .Moreover, 
country-based knowledge and programmatic experience were considered to be of 
equal, if  not higher, importance to formal academic credentials, such that one 
research institute even had an explicit policy to recruit only researchers with at 
least five years of field-based experience from low-income countries. This was in 
part to ensure a level of ‘operational’ expertise that would ensure the researchers’ 
credibility in interactions with policy-makers.
While this sort of collaborative research model may be highly valued by 
the vast majority of the academic maternal health specialists I interviewed, the 
majority of academics in fact lacked the financial and institutional support to 
pursue such a model of research, and may also have been discouraged from 
doing so by their own professional interest in developing an internationally 
recognised research career. Disengaging from global health politics was thus not 
a realistic option, and they had to find other ways to realise their objectives while 
working within the domain of global policy and advocacy. Some academics, for 
instance, were in the process of revising previous attitudes about a strict 
demarcation between academic objectivity and social engagement. Others were 
considering whether they should educate themselves about the processes of 
policy-making and how decisions are made or even take on a more active role in 
campaigning for policy change. One informant spoke of the need to harness 
academics’ technically-based authority in order to exert greater influence over 
global-level research agendas. Others were also revising their previous attitudes 
about the separation between academic work and policy-oriented advocacy, 
suggesting, for instance, that there is a need for academics to become more 
active participants in defining the global health research agenda, and to challenge 
the normative attitude that experimental evidence is always best. As with the 
work of international policy formulation and advocacy explored in the previous 
chapters, the sustained pressure of practical and political objectives is thus 
beginning to bring about a series of changes in the very nature of work 
undertaken by safe motherhood academics.
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7.4. Conclusion
By paying attention to academics’ own perspectives and practices, I have aimed 
to demonstrate that academic researchers working in international institutions 
and affiliated with global health initiatives today find themselves in an ambivalent 
position. Academics associated with the Safe Motherhood Initiative, for example, 
find themselves caught between sometimes competing demands from the 
academic sphere, from global-level donors and from international, national and 
even sub-national level decision-makers.
Over the past decade, the confluence of the evidence-based medicine 
movement and the growing prominence of donors in setting the global health 
research and policy agenda has contributed to an international research culture 
that has pushed academic research towards pursuing a narrower definition of 
evidence and that does not provide the incentives to pursue more operational 
health system and implementation research, despite the fact that academics 
recognise that such research is needed to improve actual policy implementation 
at the country level (Behague and Storeng 2008; Behague et al. 2009). Indeed, 
this research culture has developed despite burgeoning debates within the 
academic community about the need for health policy and systems research that 
can generate knowledge on improving the delivery of existing interventions and 
about the need for better alignment of international evidence needs and country- 
level research priorities (Haines et al. 2004; Freedman et al. 2006; Costello et al. 
2007; Kapiriri et al. 2007). It is this contradiction, or paradox, that in fact best 
captures the nature of academic work within safe motherhood today.
Of course, the role of academic incentive structures and the biomedical 
bias in research systems has been previously recognised. But the findings here 
draw particular attention to the way in which such questions are impacted by 
academics’ own positioning within disease-specific global health initiatives that 
compete for funding and political attention, and the potential impact of such 
relationships on academics’ independence to pursue the research that they think 
is needed to improve health. Academics’ involvement in global-level politics and 
growing reliance on donor (including private donor) funding exposes them to the 
‘high policy’ domain, but also appears to curtail their academic independence in a 
variety of ways. As others have commented, it is problematic that the immense 
influence of donors such as the Gates Foundation, with its very particular
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approach to health, tempers the open and critical attitude of academics who 
hope to receive funds from the Foundation (Strouse 2000; Walt and Buse 2000; 
People's Health Movement et al. 2008).
But then again, at the same time as my informants recognise the 
limitations of the current international research culture, they are also complicit in 
the establishment and normalisation of these attitudes within the broader global 
health field; as I have tried to show, they have little choice but to be. It is for this 
reason that many of them evince the sorts of tensions, or ambivalence, towards 
not only evidence itself, but towards their own engagement with evidence. While 
academics, like other safe motherhood practitioners, continue to seek ways of 
resisting the trend towards interim, ‘magic bullet’ approaches to the problem of 
maternal health, in responding to the pressures they confront within their own 
professional sphere — the need to work on ‘cutting edge’ research, or the need to 
be seen as ‘policy relevant’ -  they thus also come gradually to produce 
knowledge that is itself more readily applicable to such vertical, rather than 
horizontal, approaches.
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C h a p t e r  8
8. EVIDENCE-BASED ADVOCACY
In the previous chapter I examined some of the ways that academics have been 
co-opted into the global health policy and advocacy domain. I tried to show that 
they in fact felt deeply ambivalent about gearing their research practices towards 
global policy and advocacy demands, sometimes at the expense of country-level 
relevance. But though they found the emergence of ‘evidence-based advocacy,’ 
for example, to be inherently problematic, they nonetheless ultimately embraced 
it as a way of responding to some of the broader pressures confronting the field. 
My aim in this chapter is to examine how a contrasting group of actors, safe 
motherhood advocates working within international NGOs, actively draw on 
and embrace the authority associated with evidence to variously generate support 
for issues, change the way that issues are framed, identify policy agendas and 
solutions, and hold policy-makers accountable to their promises (see Sanders et 
al. 2004; Pollard and Court 2005). Moreover, I seek to examine how ‘evidence- 
based advocacy’ has come to replace the sort of explicitly value-based and 
feminist claims that formed the basis of advocacy at the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative’s beginning.
By ‘evidence-based advocacy’ I mean the deliberate and strategic use of 
scientific evidence — such as health statistics, evaluation of public health 
programmes and descriptive analyses of health services — to influence global, 
national and sub-national policy processes. This includes both efforts to raise 
safe motherhood as a priority issue and to influence the formulation and 
implementation of specific policies. Recourse to the authority of science now 
routinely underpins the full range of international advocacy groups’ activities, 
including knowledge ‘translation’ and diffusion, evidence production or research, 
direct lobbying of decision-makers and capacity-building in the use of evidence 
among national and local counterparts. As such, safe motherhood advocacy 
groups embody a trend towards reliance on different forms of evidence in the 
work of NGOs more generally (Epstein 1996; George 2000; Pollard and Court 
2005).
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In order to critically examine this development and its implications for 
the Safe Motherhood Initiative, I analyse the accounts and practices of a 
subgroup within the broader safe motherhood field that I term advocacy 
specialists. These are actors who, based primarily in NGOs in settings such as 
London, New York and Washington, D.C., direct their work towards improving 
maternal health (and sometimes reproductive health more broadly) in developing 
countries. I start by briefly examining some of the reasons why ‘evidence-based 
advocacy5 has come to play an important role in their work, before examining 
some of the specific ways in which they mobilise scientific evidence in their 
work. This entails examining first advocacy specialists’ efforts to influence 
‘agenda-setting’ for safe motherhood and, second, the multiple ways in which 
they use scientific data and authority to influence the formulation and 
implementation of specific policies aimed at improving maternal health. By 
examining these various uses of evidence, I aim to demonstrate that advocacy 
specialists are not constrained by the dictates of the evidence-based medicine 
paradigm — and its associated professional pressures — in the manner of academic 
researchers (discussed in the previous chapter). Instead, they mould their use of 
evidence in creative ways, adapting it to the stage of the policy-making process 
they are trying to influence and to the target audiences they seek to persuade. As 
such, they deliberately rely on the political and social meaning, as much as the 
scientific credibility, of scientific evidence. While on many levels clearly enabling 
for advocacy groups, the final section reflects on whether embracing evidence- 
based advocacy risks unduly depoliticising calls for priority to safe motherhood.
8.1. Why evidence-based advocacy for safe motherhood?
Which factors help to explain why there has been a trend towards an explicit, 
evidence-based foundation for the advocacy conducted by international NGOs 
specialising in safe motherhood? A first important answer to this question relates 
to the general rise in the authority of objective, and especially quantitative, 
knowledge in all areas of global health. Like academics, many advocates 
identified a recent surge in global health debates for evidence of effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness, explaining that they were today faced with the challenge 
of having to provide quantitative or other incontrovertible evidence of the likely 
benefit of any given policy change they were advocating. As one informant
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explained, in the past “donors never wanted indicators and then they wanted 
results and everybody started asking ‘what are you using your money for.” Many 
felt that the demand for evidence was higher in the maternal health field than in 
other sub-fields, with evidence needed to compensate for a lack of inherent 
political appeal of the safe motherhood issue relative to other global health issues 
that “have a totally different appeal than maternal mortality for the big donors” 
(such as family planning in the past, with its ties to population control and the 
more recent interest in threatening infectious diseases). Illustrating this view, one 
informant gave the example of funding discrepancies between programmes 
promoting abstinence as a strategy to combat the IIIV/AIDS epidemic, for 
which there is little evidence of effectiveness, and safe motherhood programmes: 
“How many billions of dollars have gone to abstinence in the last six years? 
What’s the evidence there? You can’t take a fraction of that money to save a 
woman’s life unless you have the evidence.”
The notion that evidence is needed to compensate for low political 
appeal is not unrelated to informants’ perception that the original feminist 
ideological basis of the movement has been discredited. “I think everybody’s 
afraid of getting the feminist label because it turns so many people off,” 
explained one informant from a New York-based women’s health NGO.
Another similarly complained that the fact that safe motherhood advocates have 
tended to be women has put the movement at a disadvantage relative to other 
health movements:
I think HIV really captured the attention because of the push 
that there was behind it. Both donors and money-wise.. .1 mean 
the first people who got behind it were males in the US! I mean, 
what stronger voices.. .can there be? And this [safe motherhood] 
is a story about mothers and children. I mean, if we women talk 
about it, we’re whining, about a topic that is, you know, not 
interesting. ..you know, it’s part of life.
Advocacy specialists, tired of being dismissed by high-level, often male,
policy-makers as “a bunch of feminists,” have understandably turned to more
‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ claims to strengthen their own credibility in a policy
sphere dominated by male doctors and economists, who, as they perceive it, have
little tolerance for a female-dominated advocacy community. Being able to
authoritatively talk about the evidence on maternal health epidemiology and
intervention strategies was essential for these groups to get a seat at the table at
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high-level policy forums, as the female director of one prominent women’s 
health NGO explained:
Women’s lives are dispensable in one way or another. The only 
way we are going to have safe motherhood is in fact if a political 
movement can have enough influence to get the resources 
allocated, but not just the money. It’s to be at the table to say 
‘this is what women’s lives are like, these are our suggestions 
about how you can best go about, in very specific country 
settings, how you can go about saving women’s lives.’
As this comment highlights, being able to present descriptive evidence and
evidence relating to context-specific policy options was seen as an essential
component of any political movement to achieve support for the issue, as well as
to enable advocates’ own access to the forums in which decisions are made.
Advocacy specialists also found scientific evidence an expedient tool 
because of the transnational nature of the safe motherhood field. Theirs was 
work that was often directed not only at international agencies, bilateral and 
private donors, but also at national-level decision-makers. Capturing some of this 
broad scope, one NGO, for instance, divided its activities into those “in the 
States,” “in the courts,” “worldwide” and “on the I Iill’ (a reference to Capitol 
Hill in Washington D.C.). Working in such varied domains often involved 
communicating across not only linguistic, but also ideological and religious 
divides, a process that informants felt can be greatly facilitated through use of 
“neutral” evidence. Statistics in particular, they suggested, are less prone to get 
lost in translation than are arguments that are more explicitly rooted in a 
particular ideological or political framework. “You don’t know who you’re going 
to alienate with these words and how they are translated into local language,” 
explained one informant. “There are many languages that don’t even have a 
word for feminism and so it’s perceived as imposing Western values on 
something and stirring things up socially that should be a more generic, internal 
process.” For many advocacy specialists, the impetus to back up ideological 
claims with statistics is thus demonstrative of Porter’s (1995:ix) notion that 
quantitative evidence has become favoured among the ways of establishing 
authority because of its characteristics as “a technology of distance.” As in 
Porter’s historical analysis of the relationship between quantification and 
authority, for safe motherhood advocacy specialists numbers provide summaries 
of complex events and transactions, conveying results in a familiar, standardised
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form that can be understood far away and, crucially, across linguistic and 
ideological divides.
Reinforcing the factors discussed above was an ingrained conviction 
among many of my informants that they have a social responsibility to use 
knowledge to bring about social change. Whereas academics expressed 
ambivalent attitudes about the use of research in policy, most advocacy 
specialists were adamant that knowledge of all sorts, including scientific evidence, 
is a tool for bringing about social change and that those harbouring such 
knowledge, including academics, have an obligation to ensure it is put to uses 
that are in the public interest. This was a view that one informant traced to the 
specific experience of the late 1960s when scientific knowledge was “abused” in 
the interest of developing advanced warfare:
I came up in the late 60s, I was in graduate school doing my 
dissertation in the late 60s and because that was the era of the 
Vietnam war and there was a lot of debate about how science, 
scientists, academics in their work had been exploited by the 
CIA and the Defence Department in order to conduct what 
most people felt was an immoral war. So there was a lot of 
debate around the issue of what responsibility does an academic 
have for the way his or her work is used by people in 
government. I came away from that era convinced that 
academics had to accept responsibility for what happened with 
the work they generated and how it was used. And so I think 
academics have a responsibility not to be neutral in the policy 
world but to provide an interpretation to the best of their ability, 
as otherwise someone else will use their...and if that happens 
and they have not themselves said what they think their data 
means for public policy then I think they have shirked their 
responsibility. I don’t think academics can get off the hook 
because they’re being objective.
What this informant was suggesting was that is not sufficient to leave scientific 
evidence un-interpreted because there is always the danger in such an event that 
users of the information without the requisite understanding become misusers of 
that information. As such, many informants saw conducting evidence-based 
advocacy as part of a broader process of exercising a social responsibility to 
prevent misuse of evidence.
Having briefly reflected on some of the main reasons why evidence- 
based advocacy has become a prominent part of safe motherhood advocacy 
groups’ activities, the next two main sections examine in more detail different 
ways in which advocacy specialists deploy scientific evidence to influence the
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policy process. The first of these sections demonstrates their use of scientific 
evidence, particularly statistics, in ‘agenda-setting’ for safe motherhood, while the 
second section examines how they use evidence to influence the formulation and 
implementation of specific policies aimed to improve maternal health. These are, 
of course, inter-linked activities, yet looking at them in terms of ‘agenda setting’ 
and ‘policy formulation’ conforms with my informants’ own demarcation 
between the different stages of the policy process they sought to influence. By 
presenting the data in this way, my aim is to draw attention to advocacy 
specialists’ acute awareness that, as one informant put it, “research plays a 
different role at different stages of the public policy process.”
8.2. Agenda-setting
Generating priority for safe motherhood on the policy agendas of the broader 
global health field (comprising international organisations and donors, but also 
national governments) was the primary remit for many of the advocacy groups 
that I visited and consulted during my research. Informants from these NGOs 
identified ‘agenda-setting,’ including documenting and bringing attention to a 
specific problem, as one of the most important ways in which they could 
influence the policy process. In doing so, they drew explicitly on frameworks 
used in policy studies, including Kingdon’s (1984) agenda-setting framework and 
Shiffman’s (2003; 2007) work on agenda-setting within safe motherhood, in 
particular. There were a number of ways in which advocacy groups mobilised 
scientific evidence in order to ensure priority for safe motherhood on different 
policy agendas and they often scaled and adapted the evidence they used to fit 
different target audiences.
8.2.1. The use o f  mortality data in agenda-setting 
As mentioned in previous chapters, vital statistics and ‘burden of disease’ data 
have played important roles in advocacy for maternal health (recall, for instance, 
the ‘measurement trap’ and academics’ emphasis on improving measurement of 
maternal mortality). Indeed, in his call to action on safe motherhood in 1987, 
Mahler (1987b:66S), then Director-General of the WHO, said that, “sound 
estimates based on new data.. .are at the foundation of our current 
understanding and concern” about safe motherhood in low-income countries. 
The tendency to equate the magnitude of mortality, and to a lesser extent,
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morbidity, with the importance of a health issue has a long history, reflecting that 
high mortality problems were considered important because the potential to save 
lives was correspondingly high (Armstrong 1996). This tendency has, of course, 
been reinforced with the rise of selective primary healthcare and the proposal 
that high mortality health problems should be targeted for intervention, and 
further by the growing dominance of the ‘burden of disease’ framework for 
priority-setting propagated by the World Bank since the early 1990s. In recent 
years, Shiftman’s (2003; 2007) assertion that having a credible indicator of the 
severity of the problem is a key condition for ensuring political priority for a 
given health issue has further reinforced many safe motherhood practitioners’ 
conviction of the importance of statistics in advocacy.
Advocacy specialists relied heavily on the use of mortality statistics in 
their various agenda-setting efforts, perhaps particularly in their attempts to raise 
awareness and commitment to improving maternal health and survival in 
countries with high maternal mortality. While this entailed a range of different 
strategies, their use of health statistics is particularly illustrative of the role of 
evidence in advocacy work. For advocacy specialists, the value of mortality 
statistics as an advocacy tool was not simply its role in raising awareness about a 
previously unrecognised problem — indeed, they countered, maternal mortality is 
now well-recognised across the globe — but rather to galvanise action by relying 
on the highly emotive and polemical nature of such numbers. The contested 
nature of numbers has been evident throughout the history of the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative, with the publication of statistics on maternal mortality 
almost inevitably raising a furore, especially at the national level.
On a basic level, advocacy specialists explained that because government 
officials often respond to the publication of international statistics by claiming 
that they are “too high,” such estimates have the power to create a reaction, as 
governments wish to dissociate from the implied suggestion that a high maternal 
mortality estimate means that their country is ‘underdeveloped’ and their 
government unable to provide its citizenry with adequate healthcare. According 
to my informants, simply publishing a league table over national MMR (maternal 
mortality ratio) estimates has, in the past, played an important role in creating an 
impetus for action, as national governments have sought to avoid comparing 
unfavourably with other countries that they considered to be less socially or
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economically advanced. For instance, informants recalled that the publication in 
the late 1990s of an MMR estimate for Morocco that appeared significantly 
higher than previous estimates caused political outcry not because of the 
absolute magnitude of the estimate, but because it made Morocco’s MMR appear 
similar to that of a sub-Saharan African country. As my informant explained, 
“Morocco certainly doesn’t consider itself African...So giving them an MMR of 
600 that looks like Burkina Faso will not go down well.” As such, ‘high’ maternal 
mortality was a relative, rather than an absolute value, determined according to 
how national statistics compared to those of other countries. “They don't 
pretend that it [the MMR] is zero or ten,” said one informant, suggesting that 
health authorities in low- and middle-income countries do not tend to deny that 
maternal mortality is a public health problem in their particular countries. “What 
is important is that if  you are in Burkina Faso, the rate is much lower than in 
Niger and in Mali and less than in Senegal and less than in Benin,” he said, 
underlining the way in which MMR has come to be seen as a marker of national- 
level performance and inter-state competition.
On another level, maternal mortality statistics invoked contests over the 
authority to define the validity of numbers between international organisations 
and actors — who often produce the statistics — and national health authorities 
and politicians. For instance, in several countries the publication of UN MMR 
estimates that were higher than the nationally-produced estimates was used to 
variably challenge the credibility of the government and of the UN agencies who 
produced it, in one country even sparking a key parliamentary debate about 
maternal health. As one informant recalled:
I worked on the first WHO estimates of maternal mortality, 
which were highly controversial and led to a UN embargo 
against the document and 11 - 1 can’t even remember how 
many — UN ambassadors came and formally launched 
complaints against UNICEF and three or four ministers of 
health almost lost their jobs. It was completely ridiculous.
Anyway, in Morocco, this number came out, and it was higher 
than the number they were working with, and it made it into the 
newspapers. The opposition took this up and said, ‘thank God 
there are international agencies who will tell us the truth about 
our women who are dying, the government is clearly lying to us’.
And this issue was debated in parliament. I don’t know that it 
has affected policy at all but it certainly caused a big political 
brouhaha.
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From advocacy specialists’ perspectives, statistics’ ability to create such 
“broohaha” was exactly where the power of the numbers lay, because it showed 
that the numbers had the power to arouse a sense of political accountability for 
safe motherhood. Contrary to Shiffman’s assertion, however, it was not the 
scientific validity or credibility of the indicators p erse  that sparked a reaction, but 
rather the symbolic and political connotations of the numbers, which, in turn, 
rest on a shared understanding of the meaning of maternal mortality as an 
indicator of the social development of a particular country. “For the politician, it 
is how he is judged. Because unconsciously people concentrate on the numbers,” 
said one informant. This stems, he suggested, from the fact that maternal 
mortality has become “sufficiently part of the collective conscience to appear as 
part of the Millennium [Development] Goals,” with widespread recognition that 
maternal mortality is an important indicator of the performance of the health 
system, with the health system, in turn, being an indicator of the social 
performance of a country.
The argument that it was the wider symbolic value, rather than scientific 
credibility, of the numbers that galvanised a response is illustrated by the fact 
that the political reactions to discrepancies between international and national 
data occurred despite generalised knowledge of the fact that the WHO estimates 
were produced using a different statistical method. Though, according to 
informants, most people knew that the difference between the international and 
national estimates was in fact a statistical artefact rather than a “real difference,” 
the new estimates still served as a “shock to the system” of national health 
authorities. According to one informant, maternal mortality statistics have a 
specific power to raise such a reaction, even more so than other mortality 
indicators, suggesting that despite the perceived neglect of maternal mortality, 
there is “something special” about this kind of death such that being confronted 
with the numbers creates a visceral reaction. “It’s not the numbers., .clearly, 
some deaths are more important than others. It’s a different kind of death that 
people react to differendy.”
On the basis of such an understanding of the power of numbers, 
advocacy groups relied heavily on maternal mortality statistics in their advocacy 
materials, including policy briefs, websites and other published material, as well 
as in their various media communication activities. Their use of statistics was
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moulded to fit different audiences. While MMR league tables were considered 
important in high-level political forums, improving public support for the issue 
of safe motherhood often entailed other, more creadve uses of epidemiological 
data. Judging that the level of MMR has little intuitive meaning to non-experts, 
advocacy specialists explained that using different kinds of numerical expressions 
to describe the risk of pregnancy-related death can help people interpret and 
draw meaning from the numbers. For instance, referring to individual-level life­
time risk rather than the ratio of deaths within a population is a way to engage 
individual perceptions of risk and thereby overcome the difficulties of getting 
individuals to identify with and react to population-level mortality estimates. As 
one informant described:
It’s interesting because when you talk with people one to one 
and you say, for example, that one out of every six women in 
Afghanistan die in pregnancy and childbirth compared to one in 
every 30,000 in Sweden or Norway, people are absolutely 
horrified, shocked and, I also think that they’re — particularly 
women in the developed world who’ve been pregnant, who’ve 
had a baby -  can really identify if  you say to them, ‘think about 
what it would have been like for you to give birth in rural Africa,
15-20 km from the nearest health facility, with no doctor, no 
nurse, no midwife, no clean water, what would have happened 
to you and to your baby? Think about that, as that’s how the 
majority of births take place in the world, at least in the 
developing world.
As this quote suggests, creative use of epidemiology (of the kind that 
anthropologists have noted in other domains (e.g. Gifford 1986; Kaufert and 
O’Neil 1993)) offered a way to communicate complex ideas about risk in a way 
that could enhance popular interest in and support for safe motherhood. 
Informants considered such public support important not just to create a sense 
o f ‘global’ solidarity and awareness of health inequalities, but also to ensure 
public pressure on politicians in low-income countries and to ensure public 
support for donor-driven initiatives among the public in donor countries.
8.2.2. “The numbers alone don’t make the case”
Although, as the last sub-section demonstrated, advocacy specialists recognised 
and drew on the power of maternal mortality ratios to create political reactions, 
they were also clearly aware that such numbers alone are not sufficient to secure 
safe motherhood’s place on the global health agenda. In high-level global health
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debates in which burden of disease frameworks dominate priority-setting 
discussions, for example, advocacy specialists recognised that maternal mortality 
alone could never compete with health issues accounting for a larger proportion 
of the global ‘burden of disease.’ Although national-level agenda-setting often 
relied on communicating the idea that the number of maternal deaths is too high, 
advocacy specialists clearly felt that their international advocacy was hampered 
by the fact that the numbers were too low to prompt decision-makers to prioritise 
the issue (despite their stated commitment to do so) (cf. Adams 2005). As one 
informant said,
The fact is you really have a struggle because if you compare the 
number of deaths there are half a million maternal deaths 
compared to 10 million infant and child deaths per year. You 
know, people say it’s nothing compared to some of the other 
issues so you really do have to frame it in a different way as the 
numbers [of maternal deaths] alone don’t make the case.
The growing currency of economic justifications for public health
priorities reinforced this perception that burden of disease data and numbers
alone do not make the case for safe motherhood, not least because it is often
ministers of finance and private donors rather than ministers of health that set
overarching global health priorities. Such actors, informants claimed, are not so
much swayed by burden of disease data as by economic justifications. Thus,
while appealing to underlying interpretations of the social meaning of numbers
can be effective at certain levels of the policy process (as discussed above), and
social justice arguments can mobilise popular support, different justifications
were required once advocates found themselves needing to appeal to these
particular decision-makers. As one informant observed, “you can mobilise a
certain constituency group just by talking about the ethical and injustice issues,
but for these hardcore decision-makers who look at economic factors, that kind
of appeal doesn’t necessarily carry the day.”
The pervasiveness of such perceptions helps to explain why so many
advocacy groups were increasingly mobilising economic justifications, of the kind
I discussed briefly in Chapter 6, to bolster their calls for priority to maternal
health. For instance, they sought to appeal to the idea that investing in women’s
health has benefits for productivity and macro-economic well-being. This
objective in fact underpinned the shift in emphasis from ‘mothers’ and safe
motherhood to ‘women’ that took place at Women Deliver in 2007. According
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to one informant, it was in part because it was not possible, due to 
methodological limitations, to ‘prove' the impact of maternal health on macro- 
economic well-being that advocacy specialists shifted their arguments to be 
about women in general instead of mothers. As one informant explained:
Maternal health is not enough in terms of numbers to destroy an 
economy. I mean, 1,000, 2,000 maternal deaths in a country will 
not change much in the economy of Ethiopia or Nigeria. So, it’s 
not a very strong argument. Women’s health in general, the 
female workforce needs to be strong and well fed and 
productive and so on. Women are the nurses, the teachers, the 
workers in factories, the farmers and so on. So, women’s health 
can have an [impact on] the economy, but not maternal health 
alone. The numbers are too small.
Many advocacy specialists were also driven by the pressure they 
perceived to demonstrate the ‘cost effectiveness’ of investments in safe 
motherhood, in part so they could combat the observed trend of donors using 
cost-effectiveness arguments as an “excuse” to invest in other health issues 
rather than maternal health. One informant, for example, was dismayed that the 
reporting requirements of the donors reflected an expectation that safe 
motherhood practitioners should be able to account precisely for the number of 
lives saved from any donations, which is difficult to do when it comes to 
maternal mortality. The effect, my informant suggested, is that donor resources 
are displaced from maternal health:
They want to see exactly where their $500,000,000 went. I low 
many maternal lives were saved? How many children were 
saved? Depending on what indicators you use — but it’s all 
quantitative now -  so they’re going say, ‘oh, well for every 
million dollars we reach 30 million children -  but we only affect 
the lives of maybe 50,000 mothers, well that’s not very cost- 
effective so lets go for the children,’ and that’s what’s 
happening.
My informants’ fears that donors were swayed by the greater immediate 
return they could expect from child survival efforts were compounded by their 
perception that even proving that maternal health interventions could save 
women’s lives in a cost-effective manner would not be sufficient to convince 
donors to shift their priorities. As one informant put it, “saving women’s lives is 
not enough.” It was on the basis of such perceptions that some advocacy 
specialists sought to redefine the “benefit” of maternal health interventions as 
being broader than simply reducing maternal mortality. For instance, advocacy
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specialists sought to demonstrate that maternal health interventions are 
particularly cost-effective because they also improve child survival and health, 
and even economic productivity (as discussed briefly in Chapter 6). In making 
such arguments, informants inevitably came up against the fact that little relevant 
quantitative evidence exists to demonstrate such benefits. As a substitute, they 
turned to qualitative data to demonstrate not only the benefits of investing in 
maternal health, but also the costs of failure to do so. A specific example of such 
an effort is the use of case studies, as described by one informant in the run-up 
to the global Women Deliver Conference in 2007:
.. .there’s a case study that we’re going to be using for some of 
the background documentation for Women Deliver, of a family 
in Afghanistan, where a husband and wife, they had at least two 
kids already, wife gets pregnant, gives birth to twins and then 
dies. The eleven-year-old girl gets pulled out of school to 
basically play mum. The thirteen-year-old son also then gets 
pulled out of school because the family is really struggling and 
can’t support themselves. The twins, which she had given birth 
to, are both sick and are fed on goat’s milk etc. and one of them 
dies after a series of illnesses. The eleven-year-old daughter gets 
married off, gets pregnant, has obstructive labour, baby is bom, 
has brain damage and she develops an obstetric fistula so 
husband rejects her and sends her back to her father. This is 
what happens when a mother dies - you can trace the 
consequences so it’s so much more than just the death.
The use of such non-quantitative data to appeal to decision-makers who 
are often said to favour ‘hard outcomes’ and unambiguous evidence in itself 
marks an interesting development in light of the quantification of evidence. But 
despite recognising the higher value that is often afforded to quantitative data, 
informants also insisted that such case studies nevertheless have the potential to 
have an important political impact. Some even claimed that it was when 
combined with qualitative data that could “put a face to the numbers” that 
experimental and other quantitative evidence was the most powerful. 
Furthermore, qualitative data could help to explain complex relationships that 
could not easily be delineated through quantitative analyses alone. As such, this 
use of data suggests that advocacy specialists felt that pure numbers themselves 
are not, after all, wholly sufficient for communicating the meaning of these 
numbers in a way that could persuade international decision-makers dealing with 
many competing issues.
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8.3. Policy formulation
The sort of flexible attitude to the use of evidence displayed in the agenda-setting 
activities discussed above was apparent also in advocacy specialists’ efforts to 
influence the formulation and content of specific policies and plans aimed at 
maternal health, as well as to influence the actual implementation of such plans. 
As I show in the sub-sections below, they aimed to influence policy formulation 
by strategically communicating evidence, using evidence in direct lobbying, 
influencing the definition of targets and indicators used by international agencies 
and donors to measure progress, and by participating in monitoring and 
evaluation activities.
8.3.1. Translation and communication
Many advocacy groups specialised in the communication of scientific evidence to 
decision-makers and the wider public, reflecting the growth within the evidence- 
based movement of a veritable industry specialising in the transfer and 
translation of evidence between research and policy. Such communication 
involves synthesising, ‘translating’ and disseminating scientific evidence to key 
decision-makers in international agencies, donor bodies and stakeholders at the 
national level who are involved in drafting policy and programme standards and 
procedures.
A key aspect of this process is “translation” of otherwise inaccessible 
scientific evidence into terms and language that different target audiences would 
be able to understand. Translation is often needed, informants explained, to 
overcome academics’ poor presentation skills and their reluctance to simplify or 
even interpret what their findings mean for policy and programmatic practice. 
Several of the “translators” I spoke with described collaborating with academics 
in producing policy briefs summarising scientific articles, but they also often 
criticised academics for being reluctant to simplify their findings for ease of 
presentation. For instance, one advocacy specialist derided academic colleagues 
within the Safe Motherhood Initiative for always insisting that policy briefs 
include the uncertainty bounds around statistical findings, claiming that 
academics fail to realise that policy-makers do not understand, and indeed are 
not concerned with, confidence intervals. As she saw it, “if  you give them 
confidence intervals then the number you’ve given them is meaningless.”
212
Another informant similarly suggested that academics within the field have in 
effect impeded the effectiveness of advocacy by being excessively open about the 
scientific uncertainty of their data. She even admitted -  after I reassured her of 
the anonymity of my interviews — to feeling that the safe motherhood research 
community “has been plagued by an excess of honesty and ethical rigour” when 
it comes to evidence. Academics in other global health subfields, she said, have 
been much more appreciative of the politics of evidence. Referring to researchers 
from the child health field, she observed:
If you get them away from the conference over a couple of 
glasses of wine they’ll say, ‘oh yeah, our numbers are not any 
more valid than yours, it’s just that we [don’t] publicise the 
differences and we come out with the numbers and we assert 
them strongly and.. .people accept them.’ The Safe Motherhood 
community never did that. We were never assertive enough, 
whether it was because we were women, I don’t know but we 
were never, kind of, out there.
For such reasons, advocacy specialists felt that it was especially important to 
enhance the communication of evidence about maternal mortality to ensure that 
decision-makers were aware of it. While sometimes faulting academics for their 
“fanaticism” when it came to the way they were communicating evidence, many 
of them were nevertheless sensitive to academics’ fears about potential 
oversimplification of evidence-based claims. Advocacy specialists explained that 
they strive hard to achieve a balance between accurately presenting scientific 
findings and “getting it down to a sound-bite” to enable effective 
communication. On the whole, they judged that they managed to achieve this by 
drawing on their combined scientific and communication expertise. As the 
president of one of the NGOs I visited in Washington, D.C. told me, flipping 
through one of her organisation’s most recently published reports on maternal 
health:
When we do a press release for a publication like this, we will go 
back and forth and back and forth until we get just the right 
balance between the need to communicate and the need to be 
true to the science. It’s not easy and we struggle with it every 
time we put something out. But I think the fact that [because] 
we have people with a passion to communicate and people with 
a passion to the science, committed to the same goal, which is to 
have an impact, we end up with a very strong product. There is 
no statement in this, which would make any of our research staff 
uncomfortable. This is one powerful communications piece.
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As such, effective communication was in no way seen to be irreconcilable with 
maintaining scientific integrity.
The research evidence that was disseminated to influence policy 
formulation often derived from the academic domain, but it is important to note 
that advocacy groups also drew on research findings that they had themselves 
produced. In fact, most of the advocacy groups I visited conducted some 
research, whether secondary analysis of existing data or primary qualitative and 
quantitative research. Often this research aimed to produce knowledge not 
available within the scientific literature, such as research on unsafe abortion, 
which few academics had the independence to conduct. Although seeking 
academic validation for this work -  for instance through publishing it in 
academic journals -  was an important component of securing its credibility, an 
informant from one US research NGO insisted that publication in scientific 
journals “is something we do to validate the other publications that are for more 
of a lay audience.” Communication to non-experts was the ultimate aim, she 
added, showing me a report her NGO had recently produced, and pointing out 
the white space surrounding the text, the charts and graphs and pullouts that 
make the document readable before explaining that, “behind it and giving it 
legitimacy with policy makers and the press who are often arbiters of science, are 
these peer reviewed journal articles.”
For advocacy specialists, such validation was important, but an 
underlying premise in conducting research was that the findings could be applied 
to policy and practice in a direct and immediate way. This, as one informant’s 
comment shows, was seen to set NGO research apart from academic research: 
“unlike a fair amount of academic research, this is research that is always linked 
to a policy objective.” While they were critical of what they saw as academics’ 
tendency to pursue research without any real appreciation for how the findings 
would be used, a number of my informants from NGOs did recognise that they 
were in many ways freer than academics to pursue a policy-relevant advocacy 
agenda. “This is not a publish or perish kind of atmosphere,” said one informant, 
explaining that this leaves research NGOs in a better position to determine 
questions on the basis of political relevance rather than methodological design. 
Furthermore, a number of NGOs had their own endowments that enabled them 
to pursue research topics that are sometimes not an option for academics, such
214
as abortion-related research. At the same time, they were adamant that they were 
in no way seeking to supplant academic work and tried to keep to what they saw 
as their own comparative advantage. For instance, while they might conduct 
secondary analysis of statistical data or research to map ‘unmet need’ for 
different health services, they left complex evaluation research to academics.
8.3.2. Lobbying
While much of advocacy groups’ communication work involves ‘translation’ and 
dissemination through written outputs, their effective use of evidence as an 
advocacy tool can also depend on their inserting themselves very directly into the 
high-level arenas in which the content of policy is negotiated. For instance, one 
American advocacy group prided itself on having developed strong personal 
links with key politicians that enabled its members to directly influence the 
uptake of maternal health concerns within key political debates about US 
international development policy. As the director of this NGO described to me:
We meet on a regular basis with Hilary Clinton’s staff, with 
Harry Reid’s staff, with Nancy Pelosi’s staff and sometimes with 
the Speaker herself and we feed them this kind of information.
We help them draft legislation and report language, we help 
them structure hearings, we act as expert witnesses at those 
hearings, we identify other people who can speak, so we have a 
very direct input. But we are bringing something unique to that 
process because we are bringing scientific evidence.24
As this quote suggests, my informant attributed the success of such lobbying to
skilful networking with prominent US politicians and others within elite policy
networks, but also to the effective combination of scientific and political
expertise.
While it had been possible for several of the international NGOs I visited 
to develop strong links with prominent policy-makers in their own countries 
(primarily the UK and the US) and with international organisations and donor 
bodies, they were not always in a position to directly influence national-level 
policy debates in countries grappling with high maternal mortality. They 
therefore often relied on what one informant labelled “local policy champions.” 
These were individuals, sometimes from regional or national subsidiaries of the
24 At the time of this interview, in June 2007, Hilary Clinton was Senator for New York, Harry 
Reid was leader of the Senate Democrats and Nancy Pelosi had recently been elected Speaker of 
the United States House of Representatives.
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NGO, who had more direct access to national-level policy spheres and who were 
therefore seen to be in a good position to carry out evidence-based advocacy at 
this level. Speaking about such local ‘champions/ an informant from a New 
York-based NGO explained how important it is to “flood them with evidence” 
from the international domain and explain how they can use this evidence to 
achieve legitimacy and exert influence on those in the Ministries of I Iealth and 
donor institutions in their own settings. As she explained, “I say, ‘these are the 
talking points if you’re going to go to USAID or if you’re going to a reproductive 
health meeting or Safe Motherhood meeting.. .this is why it’s relevant to your 
country.’” To a similar end, another NGO organised training workshops to instil 
the tenets of evidence-based advocacy in the practices of their local partners in 
sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries. As a representative from this 
organisation told me, “What we try and do in that setting is to help our research 
partners to use science, or translate their findings into policy-friendly or media- 
friendly language and then help the partner understand how to better review 
scientific evidence in advocacy.” The goal, she explained, is “to help scientists to 
become better advocates and make advocates more evidence-based,” both with 
the underlying aim of advancing maternal health-specific policy. Through such 
workshop the US-based advocacy group hoped to give their local partners 
enough training to put them in a position of being able to leverage resources, and 
“keep on hounding the new Minister of Health or the new regional, local people 
that can influence policies and be part of the policy-making process.”
8.3.3. “What you measure is what you do”
In addition to such efforts to directly influence policy-makers, it is interesting to 
note that certain Western-based NGOs also intervened in the overtly technical 
debates over the use of evidence within the policy formuladon process itself.
One example of this is the way in which they participated in technical meetings 
and sought to influence the definition of the indicators used to measure progress 
towards various international agreements and goals, including the MDGs. Driven 
by the maxim that in public health practice “what you measure is what you do,” 
shaping the choice of indicators was considered a good way to indirectly 
influence the formulation of policy and its subsequent implementation.
Advocacy specialists had observed that performance indicators can in themselves 
create powerful incentives at both national and sub-national levels, because they
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are often embodied in the reporting requirement and implicit and explicit 
conditions that donors impose on countries in exchange for financial and 
technical assistance. The objective of advocacy groups was to ensure that stated 
commitment to maternal health would actually be translated into concrete policy 
plans and action for achieving maternal health improvement.
Perhaps the best example of such technical intervention is the way in 
which international advocacy groups in 2005 succeeded in adding a specific 
target on reproductive health under MDG 5 on maternal mortality. This can be 
seen as an indirect way of re-orienting policy towards the broader reproductive 
health agenda that advocates felt had been further marginalised over the past five 
to ten years. While the inclusion of maternal health among the MDGs in 2000 
suggested high-level commitment to women’s health, many advocacy specialists 
interpreted it as a sign that the international community, under the influence of 
the US Bush administration and other conservative forces, had reneged on the 
previous commitment made at ICPD in Cairo in 1994 to ensure women’s sexual 
and reproductive rights in a broader sense. The previous commitments were 
scaled back, they explained, to the less controversial goal of improving maternal 
health and reducing maternal mortality (as mentioned in Chapter 6).
In contrast to the ICPD, where NGOs had been very active in setting the 
agenda, civil society had been largely excluded from the process leading up to the 
definition of the specific Millennium Development Goals. In one informant’s 
estimation, they were excluded in large part because the Secretary-General of the 
UN at the time, Kofi Annan, was very intent on producing a consensus 
document that all UN member countries would endorse. When they found that 
international goals and targets on reproductive health had been excluded from 
the MDGs in favour of a narrower goal on maternal health, many within the 
women’s health advocacy community initially wanted to lobby for the inclusion 
of an additional goal on reproductive health. However, driven by a belief that it 
is performance indicators -  rather than the goal itself — that are the most 
influential in driving the formulation of actual policy and programmes, key 
advocacy specialists convinced the wider NGO community to focus their efforts 
instead on lobbying for the inclusion of an additional target relating to 
reproductive health under MDG 5. This new target was to be included alongside
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the original target (to reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three quarters 
between 1990 and 2015) (United Nations 2009).
The decision to focus on defining the targets rather than lobbying for a 
new goal was thus deeply pragmatic. Advocates compromised, scaling down their 
original objective and replacing it with a more politically feasible option. In order 
to do so, they infiltrated the technical working groups that had been convened to 
define the targets for measuring progress towards the MDGs. In this forum, they 
argued that the maternal mortality target for MDG 5 could not, in fact, 
accurately assess progress towards the goal, since MDG 5 calls for improved 
maternal health, rather than simply reduced maternal mortality. Indeed, advocates 
claimed, it would in fact be possible for countries to meet the target, but miss the 
goal of improving health (see also Crossette 2005). On this basis, they thus 
successfully called for an additional target for mapping progress towards 
improved maternal health: “universal access to reproductive health care” (to be 
measured through an indicator on contraception). Being able to partake in 
technical discussions about performance indicators thus proved a particularly 
successful strategy for achieving influence in a high-level policy domain from 
which advocacy groups had initially been excluded.
8.3.4. Monitoring and evaluation
Such technical competency not only enabled advocacy groups to influence the 
definition of targets -  with targets recognised as important drivers of policy 
change — but also to participate in the further work of monitoring and evaluation 
to ensure compliance with such internationally recognised targets in actual policy 
formulation and practice.
Perhaps the most prominent example of such an effort is a global project 
known as the ‘Countdown to 2015’ that was formed as a ‘supra-institutional 
initiative’ in 2005.25 The overarching aim of the Countdown is to use statistics 
on the “coverage of health interventions proven to reduce maternal, newborn 
and child mortality” to monitor and hold countries accountable for their 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on child and 
maternal health. According to the Countdown’s website, the expectation behind 
this effort is that simply drawing attention to such data will stimulate “better and
25 http: / /www.countdown2015rnnch.org. accessed 23.07.09.
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stronger efforts at the country level.” This is similar to the way in which 
mortality statistics have been used to raise safe motherhood on the global health 
agenda, but focusing more explicitly on statistics pertaining to the provision of 
health services rather than maternal mortality per se.
The same principle underpinned one advocacy group’s use of health 
statistics and UN-endorsed global guidelines on the provision of maternal 
healthcare to hold governments and international organisations and donors to 
account for their obligations to secure the human rights to health and life 
enshrined in various human rights treaties, implying also an obligation to ensure 
access to essential life-saving care. To this end, certain advocacy groups gathered 
and analysed health statistics that they used to reveal discrimination in the 
distribution of health outcomes or access to life-saving healthcare within a 
population. These statistics would then be presented to governments or 
international actors in order to demonstrate the shortfall in their commitments to 
ensure access to healthcare, for instance. According to informants, the 
effectiveness of such work relies fundamentally on the pre-existing political 
currency of the data that is used. As one representative of one NGO told me, an 
NGO can gain credibility by using statistical data and technical recommendations 
that have been validated by an external authority such as the WHO. Using 
evidence that has already “gone from science to policy,” such as WHO-endorsed 
recommendations on emergency obstetric care, confers authority to NGOs, 
since it offers “a norm that you can present to governments and say why are you 
not complying to this basic norm, it’s not exactly a norm, it’s not a binding norm 
but a neutrally accepted standard by a reputable body.” For advocacy groups, a 
benefit of relying on such accepted standards and externally-validated evidence is 
that they can avoid resorting to confrontational human rights. Instead, using 
more neutral statistics can engage governments in more productive discussion 
about how to identify priority interventions to ensure the progressive realisation 
of rights to healthcare.
A possible criticism of such use of indicators is that the indicators, being 
externally set, may encourage policy responses that do not align with country- 
level priorities. The indicators may also correspond to targets that are in reality 
unattainable. Moreover, as one informant acknowledged, not all countries have 
an “information-oriented” culture in which good governance is equated with
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transparency and the use of statistics — as it often is in donor nations and within 
international organisations -  meaning that performance indicators may lack 
credibility at the national level. Indeed, several of my informants acknowledged 
that uncritically exporting ‘target culture’ to low-income countries may simply 
push health authorities to pay lip service to international reporting requirements 
in order to appease the donors and NGOs who demand data to monitor 
compliance with set targets. On the other hand, some felt that the potential 
positive benefits outweighed such risks. As one informant saw it, “you could take 
a cynical view which is that these are imposed and therefore they take the path of 
least resistance to get some consultant from the outside to get the numbers and 
they submit them. On the other hand, on a more positive, optimistic note, one 
could actually say that it is encouraging a culture of understanding of what’s 
going on.”
Indeed, echoing the Countdown initiative’s rhetoric, members of the 
rights-based NGO referred to above insisted that their use of statistics to enforce 
accountability was not intended to be punitive, but was rather a way of 
stimulating reflection and debate on how governments can actually go about 
addressing the violation of rights identified through the use of statistics. “It is not 
about banging on the table and fighting for your rights,” said one informant.
“It’s not just a question of the numbers. It’s about how public health systems are 
designed to address maternal health, and whether women’s rights are front and 
centre in those systems.” In such ways, statistical indicators came to be seen as a 
tool for offering practical guidance to policy-makers, because the indicators 
could be used to identify where policy efforts should be directed to redress rights 
violations.
In sum, it seems that it was to a large extent through their ability to 
manipulate scientific evidence and data, and to deploy this strategically within 
various policy domains, that advocacy specialists felt that they were able to exert 
an influence. As one informant herself concluded our discussion, “our 
experience, we think, demonstrates that if you have solid scientific evidence and 
you communicate it very strategically to ‘change agencies,’ that you can over time 
have an impact on policies and programmes.”
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8.4. Depoliticised advocacy
Although informants clearly found that they were better able to influence policy 
through the use of science, there are also potentially adverse consequences 
associated with the growing reliance on purportedly objective burden of disease 
data and economic arguments in global health advocacy. While informants 
celebrated the effectiveness of their own evidence-based advocacy and the 
political advantages this had conferred, they also recognised, and to some extent 
lamented, that evidence has to a large extent become the only, or at the least the 
most legitimate, way to present an argument and achieve credibility in global- 
level spheres. Furthermore, some regretted that this heavy reliance on evidence 
prevented them from mounting principled or moral arguments against policies 
and positions they disagreed with (or, vice versa, to counter arguments against 
those policies they themselves supported). As one advocacy specialist reflected,
“I think it suggests the importance which policy-makers and the public attach to 
evidence-based policy, that people on the left no longer feel that their moral 
position or an emotional position is sufficient to justify a particular policy.” By 
people on the left, this informant was referring in fact to most safe motherhood 
advocates. At the same time, my informant claimed that “people on the other 
side” -  which for her means the conservative right — have started producing and 
using scientific claims of questionable scientific standard (sometimes termed 
“junk science”) to back up their moral and religiously-based opposition to 
women’s health issues. Safe Motherhood advocates, she felt, were being careful 
with the way they pitch evidence, claiming to do so in a responsible way, but 
others were doing so in an irresponsible way, one that was, in fact, entirely 
morally-enframed.
Nowhere has the contested use of evidence in advocacy been more 
clearly demonstrated than within the controversial abortion debate, and the 
emerging tendency among pro-life activist organisation to document through 
purportedly systematic research the allegedly adverse mental and physical health 
consequences of abortion. Such research forms part of their effort to legitimise 
on scientific grounds their religious or moral opposition to abortion. Several 
informants dismissed these studies as being of poor quality, but despaired that 
pro-life politicians are perfectly prepared to use such ‘junk science’ to justify their 
policy stand. To counter this, one safe motherhood group I visited had even
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gone so far as to set up a “rapid response system” to challenge, on scientific 
rather than moral or political grounds, the arguments of those with politically 
opposed perspectives. The system is designed to identify studies into spurious 
links between abortion and adverse outcomes, such as women’s mental illness. 
Once identified such studies are subjected to a systematic methodological 
critique to debunk the credibility of their purported evidence-based claims. This 
critique is then written up and circulated in summarised form to policy-makers, 
the press and other advocacy groups, or even to “key people up at Capitol Hill” 
if it seems likely that the study in question might be used in a floor debate 
around a piece of legislation. The speed of response is crucial, explained an 
informant who had helped develop the rapid response system, “because if a 
study like that gets legs and it starts disseminating itself then it’s very hard to 
correct that misinformation so we want to be able jump on it right away and we 
want to smash it before it gets any traction.”
Such responses may work, but by engaging — on an evidence-based level 
-  with political opponents such as pro-lifers, they also unintentionally endow 
their opponents’ arguments with a legitimacy that my informants believe they 
simply ought not have. In this they recognise that far from ridding policy of 
ideologically-motivated advocacy the growing use of evidence has contributed 
instead to obfuscating the political and ideological basis of some policy advice 
(e.g. anti-abortion) and simultaneously made it more difficult for others to make 
their evidence count when the users of those policies (such as certain policy­
makers) are themselves ideologically motivated and choose between competing 
evidence claims, not on scientific but on ideological grounds.
But while evidence-based advocacy surely has the potential to depoliticise 
advocacy, a subset of actors used objective evidence precisely to re-politicise the 
debate about maternal health. Notably, statistics played an important role in the 
dissemination of the idea that surviving pregnancy and childbirth is a 
fundamental human right, since effective medical interventions exist to prevent 
such deaths. Specifically, some advocacy specialists used descriptive 
epidemiological indicators of health outcomes and service provision to challenge 
the public, as well as expert communities, to reconceptualise the issue of 
maternal mortality not simply as a public health problem or as a even women’s 
rights issue, but as a fundamental human rights issue (see e.g. Freedman 2001;
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Cook and Dickens 2002; Freedman 2002; Yamin and Maine 2005; Gruskin et al. 
2008).
According to a representative of one such group, maternal mortality 
illustrates well how public health problems can be thought of as human rights 
issues: “an individual avoidable death becomes a human rights issue when that 
death is evidence of a wider, more systemic failure of the government to 
adequately address structural problems that result in a pattern of [maternal 
mortality]”(Freedman 2002:156). Informants were upfront about the challenges 
of using rights-based language in certain countries, with one claiming that in a 
country where women until very recently delivered in the secrecy of their own 
homes, “you take a rights-based approach and you speak into a desert.” By 
contrast, insisted other informants, statistics can greatly facilitate the process of 
communicating the idea that maternal mortality results from discrimination 
against certain groups, a fundamental principle within the rights-based 
conceptualisation of maternal health. As one informant explained, “if you look at 
a country where you have a middle class that’s able to give birth safely but then 
you see very high rates of maternal mortality among minority groups, immigrant 
groups, then it is clear you have a discrimination issue and that’s not a difficult 
rights argument to make.” Advocates wanting to make these arguments were 
often impeded by data shortages, however, and therefore appealed to 
epidemiologists to design data collection tools that can allow for analyses of 
inequities. As such, some safe motherhood advocates have begun to adopt the 
political strategies of their opponents whilst being careful not to abuse the 
evidence they present. In this, it seems to me that they are in fact finding ways to 
adhere to the moral imperatives they believe in, whilst on the surface continuing 
to formulate their arguments in a technical way.
8.5. Conclusion
Safe motherhood advocates today embrace and seek to capitalise on the 
authority, legitimacy and influence that science and statistics give them in high- 
level policy spheres, and the way in which the language of evidence and numbers 
enables them to exert influence on actors across social, geographical and 
ideological divides. Whereas the evidence-based medicine paradigm assumes a 
universally valid hierarchy of evidence, here I have argued that, in practice,
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advocacy specialists operate with a more nuanced hierarchy of their own, in 
which the level and type of scientific evidence are not considered universally 
valid, but rather scaled and adapted to fit different audiences and stages of the 
policy process. While my informants emphasised that evidence must be -  as far 
as possible -  reliable and convincing, they also recognised that in certain contexts 
evidence-based knowledge claims, and especially statistical forms of knowledge, 
carry great weight in global health policy, even when nobody defends their 
validity with real conviction (Nichter and Kendall 1991; Porter 1995; Hacking
2007). As Kielmann (2002:118) has remarked, “despite widespread recognition 
that collecting data on illness and death in low-resource settings is fraught with 
technical and logistic difficulties, these numbers have tended to acquire a public 
life of their own and have come to constitute authoritative knowledge in health 
policy and planning decisions.” Similarly, in the case of advocacy for safe 
motherhood, it has often been the broader social and political meanings of 
objective claims as much as their inherent scientific credibility that have imbued 
‘evidence-based’ advocacy claims with the power to create a political response.
The growing prominence of international advocacy NGOs within global 
health governance suggests a need to develop greater understanding of how such 
groups influence policy and the sources of legitimacy upon which they draw 
(Doyle and Patel 2008). Previous work from other subfields has demonstrated 
how instrumental various civil society groups can be in using evidence to 
influence policy change. For instance, Epstein’s (1996) study of the AIDS 
movement in the US shows how AIDS activists, through acquiring scientific 
literacy, were not only able to create political commitment to HIV/AIDS, but 
also to alter the regulatory frameworks around the approval of HIV/AIDS drugs 
so as to expedite their own access to treatment. Similarly, George (2000) has 
described how the advocacy coalition working against sterilisations in India 
gained legitimacy through becoming conversant in technical language and by 
participating in international forums and exploiting their social links with 
research organisations. When set against these cases, safe motherhood advocacy 
appears peculiar in that it has relied so heavily on Western women advocating on 
behalf of women in poor countries who are assumed, often rightly so, to lack the 
voice to do so themselves. Advocacy specialists, through inserting themselves in 
global-level elite policy networks, have become able not just to subvert dominant
224
agendas through obtaining their own scientific literacy, but also to structure and 
manage their own practices partially within these agendas. While other 
commentators have been sceptical of the ability of advocacy groups to influence 
‘high’ policy agendas that are dominated by the ideology of donors (Brock and 
McGee 2004, cited in Pollard & Court 2005), safe motherhood advocacy 
specialists’ use of evidence and their waging of ‘advocacy’ at the level of technical 
debates does seem to have facilitated their access to and influence in high-level 
spheres and secured their own reproduction.
However, while advocacy groups can infiltrate and shape technical 
debates, on the whole this rarely involves any explicit challenge to dominant 
ideology or frameworks that had set the terms of these debates in the first place, 
including the heavy reliance on burden of disease and cost-effectiveness as 
proxies for determining the relative priority of different health issues. Although 
embracing evidence-based advocacy is clearly a pragmatic response to altered 
political realities, fostering the heavy reliance on purportedly objective claims -  
rather than challenging the basis upon which global-level decision-making often 
takes place — may have negative consequences. Indeed, safe motherhood 
advocates may be perpetuating or extending the dominance of a technocratic 
approach to priority-setting focused on burden of disease and cost-effectiveness 
evidence that on many levels disfavours maternal health and safe motherhood 
interventions. Interestingly, some advocacy specialists appear to be critical of this 
tendency and are using statistical evidence in creative ways as part of their efforts 
to bring about a re-framing of maternal mortality as a human rights issue that 
governments and the international community have a responsibility to address.
The findings presented in this chapter also underline the extent to which 
technical expertise has come to be seen as a prerequisite for political influence. 
This has implications for how we evaluate the key justifications behind the 
growing reliance on NGOs within global health policy debates, namely that they 
give a voice to marginalised people in the policy process and enhance democracy 
through their membership of consultative or decision-making bodies of 
international health-related organisations (Seckinelgin 2005; Doyle and Patel
2008). Has the trend towards evidence-based advocacy enhanced participation, 
or is it instead perpetuating an elitist and technocratic approach to global health 
policy-making? It is clear that international advocacy groups are acutely aware of
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the way in which authority has become increasingly inseparable from scientific 
expertise -  and the ability to communicate such expertise effectively. Indeed, an 
important part of their work involves diffusing ideas about evidence-based 
practice to low-income countries, as a way of influencing the policy process at 
national and local levels. Yet, whether this has the desired effect of ‘empowering’ 
local stakeholders remains to be established, as does the extent to which the 
internationally-produced evidence-base that is disseminated through advocacy 
work actually accords with national and local needs, priorities and political 
realities.
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C h a p t e r  9
9. CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have sought to understand the making of the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative as an example of one of many so-called global health initiatives to have 
emerged over the past ten to twenty years. My main overarching aim has been to 
explore how safe motherhood practitioners have come to understand the 
problems that are credited for the field’s stymied status, and how their 
‘diagnoses’ and situational analyses have informed their subsequent practices. 
Drawing on in-depth interviews with over seventy actors within the field, 
participant observation and document review, I have provided an historical and 
ethnographic account of the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s struggle for identity, 
authority and priority within the increasingly fragmented and competitive field of 
global health. I have tried to examine just how — and with what consequences -  
the Safe Motherhood Initiative as a ‘policy community’ has sought to influence 
the global health policy process, so as to raise awareness about women’s health 
and maternal mortality, secure global health resources, and further ensure the 
actual uptake of the Initiative’s own policy recommendations.
9.1. Summary and discussion of main findings
The findings were presented in two main parts, which acknowledged the 
historical arc of the safe motherhood movement’s development, while allowing 
me to focus thematically upon some of the key dynamics at work. In Part I 
(Chapters 3-6) I thus examined the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s own particular 
policy vision in relation to the broader debate about comprehensive versus 
selective approaches to public health, and the different ways that debate has been 
expressed over time. In Part II (Chapters 7 and 8) I paid in-depth attention to 
how research practices and advocacy for safe motherhood have responded to the 
debates discussed in Part I  and, in particular, to the normative priority-setting 
frameworks and definitions of evidence that have emerged during the past few 
decades. By structuring the thesis in this way, I have sought to give an account of 
safe motherhood that is historically dynamic, sensitive to the differing
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perspectives of some of its key protagonists (be these academics, advocacy 
specialists, or policy advisors) and capable of providing a nuanced 
conceptualisation of a global health movement ‘in the making.’
9.1.1. The tension between comprehensive and selective approaches
The first specific objective of my research was to analyse how the tension 
between comprehensive and selective approaches to public health has impacted 
on safe motherhood policy debates and policy shifts since the Initiative’s launch 
in 1987. This entailed situating the emergence of the Initiative and its particular 
policy vision within the broader context of global health.
The common narrative of the history of safe motherhood policy told by 
the Initiative’s own practitioners in the scientific literature and in various policy 
domains holds that the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s progress has been hampered 
by the strategic missteps the Initiative made in its early years, including the 
promotion of a broad agenda encompassing social, economic and health policy 
change (e.g. Starrs 2006). Today, we are most commonly told, strategies are more 
appropriately targeted at emergency obstetric care and skilled birth attendants. 
This narrative implies a gradual retrenchment of an idealistic, comprehensive 
vision, in favour of a more rational, selective approach.
Interpreting such accounts, however, can be complex. While they 
provide a useful, shorthand history of a professional community and its key 
events and debates, they also, inevitably, reveal a particular way of telling that 
history. It can be seen as a version of history constructed by long-standing 
participants in the debate that serves to validate their current policy positions, as 
part of their broader struggle for legitimacy and policy support (cf. Fujimura and 
Chou 1994). As such, rejecting past policy recommendations as mistaken on the 
one hand oversimplifies the past, but on the other hand serves to legitimate the 
strategic policy focus of the present. In conducting an historical ethnography, I 
have sought to draw attention to some of the contradictions that emerge in the 
common narrative, as well as to the factors that it obscures. For instance, 
ethnographic research reveals that the process of international policy 
development for safe motherhood has been neither linear nor particularly 
rational, but can be better understood as a process that is fundamentally social 
and political and, at times, highly contested. For the international-level actors
228
involved — whether as researchers, policy advisors or advocacy specialists — the 
process has in fact entailed considerable negotiation, and, for many, compromise.
The Safe Motherhood Initiative was created in the midst of a polemical 
debate about competing concepts and approaches to public health. In Chapter 3,
I described how the Safe Motherhood Initiative emerged out of practitioners’ 
underlying conviction that a comprehensive primary healthcare approach — 
incorporating social and medical, preventive and therapeutic approaches — would 
be the best strategy for low- and middle-income countries to adopt in order to 
improve women’s health and survival through pregnancy and childbirth. As I 
elaborated on in Chapter 4, such a comprehensive approach is a vision that the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative has, ever since, struggled to realise, as it has come up 
against political-economic impediments, as well as ideological resistance from 
powerful actors preferring a selective approach to global health.
One important response to the lack of uptake of the original 
comprehensive strategy has been the Initiative’s recommendation that safe 
motherhood programmes should be targeted at averting deaths from obstetric 
complications through professional, obstetric care, including emergency care. In 
Chapter 5 ,1 showed that this dramatic shift away from the combined social and 
biomedical focus of the original safe motherhood agenda did not result from 
genuinely new technical insights about maternal mortality reduction, as has often 
been claimed. Instead, I argued, it resulted from a repackaging and ‘branding’ of 
core health system recommendations to enhance their appeal to market-oriented 
decision-makers favouring disease-based approaches to public health, one that 
was emulated on the successes of the Child Survival Revolution in promoting 
GOBI.
While the past five to ten years have seen debate about the need for 
‘integration’ and ‘alignment’ of selective programmes, this period has also seen 
the proliferation of disease-specific global health initiatives and the rise of private 
philanthropy. This proliferation has altered global health financing, governance 
and policy-making in important ways, in part by atomising it. As a result, as I 
discussed in Chapter 6, the safe motherhood policy community has not only 
continued to be tom between a desire to integrate with other disease-specific 
coalitions and a need for self-preservation, it has also come to internalise some 
of these basic contradictions in global health.
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The way in which the chapters in Part I together challenge the notion of 
policy development as a rational process has implications for how we think 
about the role of international actors and specifically communities like the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative in the ‘policy process.’ If the policy process is thought of 
as long-lasting and emergent, it becomes possible to see the work of safe 
motherhood actors as being to connect and modify what Walt, Lush and Ogden 
(2004) have referred to as the different “iterative loops” involved in the transfer 
of policy from international organisations to national jurisdictions. The main role 
of international organisations is in international agenda-setting for specific issues, 
followed by policy formulation in the form of global guidelines. In what Lush 
and her co-authors describe as a first, “bottom-up” loop, international actors 
take up, adopt and adapt lessons from research and clinical practices developed 
in one or more countries, or indeed from other sub-fields of public health. In a 
second, “top-down,” marketing-oriented loop they then mobilise support for 
particular policies by marketing and promoting them {ibid.).
Walt and her co-authors developed this notion of interacting, iterative 
‘loops’ to account for international policy on infectious diseases, but it can help 
to make sense of the work of the Safe Motherhood Initiative too. As we have 
seen, in the run-up to and early years of the Initiative, international-level actors 
formulated a broad set of recommendations on the basis of clinical and public 
health lessons. These were derived in large part from the experience of Western 
countries in reducing maternal mortality, as well as from new epidemiological 
and clinical research from low- and middle-income countries. The 
recommendations were also underwritten by an ideological commitment to 
improving women’s status and ensuring ‘health for all.’ The formulation of these 
original comprehensive recommendations can be thought of as the ‘bottom-up’ 
loop in the development of international safe motherhood policy that has taken 
place over the past two decades. The gradual work that then went into 
promoting these recommendations to the international health and development 
community, as well as to national stakeholders, can be seen as the ‘top-down,’ 
marketing-oriented loop. Here, the original complex and comprehensive safe 
motherhood proposals were simplified and branded so as to achieve more 
broad-based appeal and uptake, first as ten Action Points at the 1997 Safe 
Motherhood Technical Consultation, then as EmOC and more recently as the ‘3
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pillars of saving women’s lives’ at the Women Deliver Conference of 2007. The 
role of research-based knowledge in this stage has been not so much to guide 
policy solutions as to legitimate simplified and ‘branded’ international policy 
guidelines.
However, we also need to take stock of the fact that while the 
‘marketing’ of policy has changed in response to broader dynamics in the global 
health field -  and may indeed improve global-level support for safe motherhood 
— the practical and applied implications of changes in the branding of safe 
motherhood policy may be underappreciated. When rebranded messages — for 
instance on EmOC or the continuum of care -  are conveyed from international 
organisations to those implementing programmes in low-income countries, they 
can appear unclear, ambiguous and open to misinterpretation (I lussein and 
Clapham 2005). For programme managers, the frequent change in branding 
strategy and messages can feel like “sinking in a sea of safe motherhood 
concepts” (ibid.:294).
The changes in concepts and terminology belie that the core, underlying 
principle that most safe motherhood actors have sought to convey — that 
maternal mortality reduction depends on ensuring women’s access to life-saving 
obstetric care delivered within a functioning health system -  remains much the 
same as it was twenty years ago. Nevertheless, in the process of the gradual 
simplification inherent in policy marketing or branding, the very meaning and 
significance of the term ‘safe motherhood’ has been modified and to some extent 
redefined. Safe motherhood, originally devised as a catch-all term for an initiative 
that aimed to improve women’s status and health through comprehensive policy 
change, has, in effect, become gradually redefined as a more technical effort to 
avert deaths from obstetric complications. This has occurred despite the fact that 
the Initiative’s practitioners, on the whole, have retained an ideological 
commitment to advancing women’s rights and to developing comprehensive, 
accessible and affordable health systems. This redefinition of safe motherhood 
has been contested by some subgroups within the Initiative, at times creating 
factions, even as the Initiative’s constituent groups constantly struggle to come 
together as a coherent whole. Ultimately then, the Safe Motherhood Initiative 
not only represents a single instance of the broader fragmentation or 
‘atomisation’ of public health into disease-specific initiatives, but an example of
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what we might call the ‘vascularisation’ between different sub-groups that takes 
place within individual global health movements as a response to that wider 
fragmentation of the international health field.
9.1.2. Appeals to scientific authority
The second specific objective of my research was to examine how, and on what 
terms, research practices and advocacy have responded, and are in part 
constrained by, the sort of tensions and debates I identified in Part I. This 
included attention to how research and advocacy have adapted to the gradual rise 
of more normative approaches to establishing global health priorities and for 
defining what counts as ‘evidence.’ In Chapter 7 I therefore traced a shift in 
academic research practices away from methodologically diverse health systems 
research and towards the pursuit of a more narrowly defined concept of 
evidence, focusing heavily on maternal mortality measurement and experimental 
evaluations of healthcare interventions. Such a gradual narrowing responded, on 
the one hand, to the adoption of the evidence-based medicine paradigm as the 
main framework for judging academic performance, but was reinforced by the 
way in which this paradigm has come to be mirrored in donor agendas. This, in 
turn, reflects a preoccupation with monitoring and evaluation of global health 
investments to ensure value for money.
The findings presented in this part of the thesis served to demonstrate 
that academics struggle to reconcile the contradictory pressures emanating from 
academia, donor agencies, advocacy specialists and country-level policy-makers. 
This has left them feeling deeply ambivalent about their identity and querying 
what their contribution to global health should be. Advocacy specialists in 
international NGOs, by contrast, embraced the authority and political power of 
scientific evidence and statistics in their efforts to encourage political priority for 
safe motherhood and in their lobbying for specific policy change. In Chapter 8 I 
showed how they often tailored their use of evidence in creative ways according 
to the stage of the policy process and the target group they were seeking to 
influence, something they saw as critical to convincing policy-makers and donors 
to support the Initiative and its goals.
These chapters show different forms o f ‘boundary work’ at play, through 
which academic and advocacy actors sought to demarcate their practices and 
positions as scientific rather than ideologically driven (Gieryn 1983). Of course,
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there is nothing inherently new about such appeals to scientific authority. The 
historical work of both Daston (1992) and Porter (1995) reminds us of the social 
origins of often taken-for-granted notions such as objectivity. Both these authors 
show how systematic and transparent knowledge and quantitative knowledge in 
particular became equated with objectivity and, in turn, with authority first and 
foremost because it served social ends. The rising authority associated with 
quantitative knowledge relates to the fact that it enabled the need for 
communication that arose as a result of greater interdependence between 
different, and sometimes distant, communities {ibid.). Porter (1995) further 
argues that quantification in particular came to be associated with social authority 
in response to eroding levels of trust in individual expert knowledge. As such, 
the emergence of quantification in the domains of bureaucracy and science did 
not derive so much from the wish to make better decisions but rather from the 
need for a response to institutional disunity and external pressures {ibid.). For 
Porter, the key to understanding the continued widespread “trust in numbers” is 
thus that it minimises the need for intimate knowledge and personal trust. Much 
the same can be seen within the Safe Motherhood Initiative. While the tendency 
to invoke scientific expertise to achieve social authority may not be new, it has 
doubtless taken on new ferocity within the current context of global health. As I 
have shown, appeals to scientific authority and legitimacy are at the heart of the 
strategies through which the Safe Motherhood Initiative has sought to position 
itself as a viable competitor for global health resources.
It is sometimes claimed that the growing reliance on evidence that 
characterises global health policy is enabling to scientific experts, in part because 
the status associated with scholarly expertise and professional training is 
empowering for those individual experts who are consulted or co-opted into 
policy-making (Stone 1999). While this may be the case for the advocacy advisors 
I interviewed, who used scientific knowledge to achieve direct political influence, 
some academics clearly did not feel enabled and in fact struggled to reconcile 
their role as academics with that of advocate or policy advisor. Instead, the 
blurring of roles experienced by many academics raised a series of unresolved 
questions about how they should act. It is not clear, for example, how academics 
are to balance the global demand for coherent, simplified messages with their 
desire to accurately communicate evidence that is highly complex, nuanced and
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context-specific. How should they balance their conviction that the major 
research challenge for improved maternal health is operational health system 
research, with the intense professional pressure to produce ‘cutting edge’ 
experimental research into single interventions?
While proponents of evidence-based policy might argue that basing 
policy on evidence reduces undue ideological interference and hence ensures 
more objective, and even fairer, allocation of resources (Klein 2000), my findings 
suggests the need to nuance such claims. Rather than ridding advocacy and 
research of ideological influence, the turn to more ‘objective’ justifications for 
public health action does not as much eliminate as obfuscate the ideological and 
deeply political basis of decision-making. This may mean that these ideological 
and political foundations are suspended from open and critical scrutiny. The 
reliance on objective or evidence-based arguments may also have entrenched a 
deeply technocratic and elitist approach to inherently political policy debates, as 
scientific expertise — which is in no way equally distributed globally — has come 
to be equated with political influence. The picture that results is complex. 
Boundary work may benefit individual actors and groups who can derive 
legitimacy and authority from appearing ‘scientific.’ However, we have also seen 
that such boundary work can encourage research and advocacy practices that 
may be counter-productive to the Initiative’s enduring struggle to mobilise 
political support for the notion that health system development is essential to 
realising women’s right to avoid preventable death during pregnancy and 
childbirth.
9.1.3. Self-management
It is in order to explain why safe motherhood actors engage in these sorts of 
potentially counter-productive practices that I have, throughout the chapters, 
tried to conceptualise the movement’s history as one characterised by continual 
self-management. As I have shown, individual actors contribute to the safe 
motherhood policy community’s self-management through strategies that aim to 
pursue their common policy objectives and to secure the survival of safe 
motherhood as a successful global health alliance. Indeed, the very inception of 
the movement can be seen as a competitive response that grew out of a 
perceived need to protect women’s health and maternal healthcare from
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becoming subservient to child survival objectives and the dominance of selective 
primary healthcare (see Chapter 3).
As I have demonstrated across the chapters, over the past two decades, 
the safe motherhood policy community has sought to position itself within the 
rapidly changing institutional and ideological landscape of global health, in order 
to ensure its own reproduction and to secure a place for safe motherhood on 
global and national policy agendas. As global health has changed, with a shifting 
balance of power that has seen UN actors gradually crowded out in favour of 
individual donors, NGOs and global health initiatives, the safe motherhood 
movement has also had to adapt itself. It has done so principally by seeking to 
strengthen the credibility of its own policy proposals (e.g. Chapters 5 and 7), 
establishing new institutional structures and funding mechanisms, seeking to 
identify new champions (Chapter 6) and by elaborating more sophisticated 
research (Chapter 7) and evidence-based advocacy (Chapter 8). The safe 
motherhood policy community has thus in many ways come to model itself on 
the global health initiatives that have, since the turn of the millennium, been 
increasingly successful in attracting both public and private financing and in 
influencing health policy agendas, and it has done this even as it purports to be 
fundamentally quite distinct from them.
In modelling itself on other apparently more successful global health 
initiatives, notably the Global Fund, the Safe Motherhood Initiative has, 
understandably, sought to generate political priority for its own objectives. 
According to Shiffman and Smith (2007), political priority is present when public 
statements of support for a particular health issue are made and when the level 
of resources that political leaders and donors allocate to a particular area is 
considered commensurate with the severity of the problem. By this measure of 
success, the safe motherhood community appears to be moving in the right 
direction. For instance, in recent years the field’s reinvigorated advocacy 
campaign has indeed fed into the creation of a number of dedicated, global 
initiatives to enhance progress towards maternal health-specific goals. These 
include the ‘Global Business Plan’ that was initiated by the Prime Minister of 
Norway in 2007 (pledging one billion dollars over 10 years to achieve MDGs 4 
and 5), and a Gates-supported Maternal Health Task Force formed in 2008. 
Maternal health most certainly has a higher public profile now than it did at the
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Initiative’s start and even than it did a few years ago, at least at the global level 
and in important donor nations. In the UK, for instance, Sarah Brown, the wife 
of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, is now an ambassador for the advocacy NGO 
the White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood, and an outspoken champion of 
safe motherhood issues in the media. The Initiative has thus on some level 
clearly succeeded in strengthening its position as a global health initiative 
approaching that of the public-private initiatives that have been catapulted to 
global prominence over the past ten years (even if  the volume of funding pales in 
comparison to some of the other, major global health initiatives, such as the 
Global Fund).
Such successes are today widely celebrated as evidence of greater political 
priority for safe motherhood, not least because of the implicit assumption that 
they will translate into health improvement in low-income countries. But a causal 
link between political priority for specific health issues and improved health 
indicators assumes that the policy responses or services enabled by prioritised 
global health initiatives are in fact appropriate to the challenge. As I discuss 
below, there are growing concerns within the public health community that this 
may not always be the case. Instead of translating into stronger health systems 
and better health outcomes, ostensibly successful global campaigns such as those 
highlighting HIV/AIDS and child survival may in fact come to illustrate the 
limits of disease-specific global campaigns within the poorly functioning health 
systems of low-income countries. Given the current concerted efforts to achieve 
political priority for ‘safe motherhood’ as a global health issue, it seems crucial 
therefore to critically assess the extent to which political priority for disease- 
specific global health initiatives is likely to translate into health improvement.
It is too soon to judge the effects of new donor-driven global initiatives 
dedicated to maternal health, which have only recently come under way or are 
still in the planning stages. Much will depend on how activities are implemented 
and funds disbursed. Nevertheless, in reflecting on these questions, it is 
instructive to look briefly at what can be learned from the experiences of other 
global health initiatives that are widely deemed to be more successful at 
generating political priority. Is the emergence of strong global health initiatives 
such as the Global Fund, GAVI and Pepfar -  and the 100 or so other global 
health initiatives that have also been established around diverse global health
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issues — really such a desirable trend? How are we even to know whether such 
initiatives contribute to their stated goals to improve health? And what lessons 
might they provide for the Safe Motherhood Initiative?
9.2. The effects of global health initiatives on health and 
health systems
Perhaps the most commonly cited benefit of strong global health initiatives is 
that they are very good at attracting money and attention, even for neglected 
global health issues. A clear indication of this financial prowess is that 
development assistance to health has increased four-fold since 1990, a rise that is 
almost exclusively attributed to the emergence of public-private partnerships and 
global health initiatives, including the Global Fund, GAVI, Pepfar, and the 
World Bank's Multicountry AIDS Programme (Ravishankar et al. 2009). But how 
do such initiatives impact on health outcomes and health systems?
While the Global Fund’s website claims that 4,000,000 lives have been 
saved through Global Fund-supported programmes,26 most commentators have 
been more cautious in attributing mortality decline direcdy to the activities of 
global health initiatives. They have focused instead on documenting their 
benefits for access to health services. One recent review of the existing literature 
on the effects of global health initiatives for HIV/AIDS lists rapid scale-up in 
HIV/AIDS service delivery, greater stakeholder participation, and channelling of 
funds to non-governmental stakeholders (mainly NGOs and faith-based bodies) 
as among the benefits of such initiatives (Biesma et al. 2009). Another review 
similarly notes the expansion in HIV/AIDS services in many countries, along 
with improvement in infrastructure and laboratories and, in some cases, primary 
healthcare services (Yu et al. 2008). Others further claim that strong global health 
initiatives contribute to reducing out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare in 
developing countries by subsidising access to essential medicines (Banati and 
Moatti 2008). Banati (a representative of the Global Fund) and Moatti even claim 
that disease-targeted programmes allow for better use of scarce resources in 
health systems by reducing mortality among healthcare personnel and the 
incidence of infectious diseases through prevention interventions, as well as by 
limiting hospitalisation rates for treated individuals {ibid.).
26 frttp:/Ayww.theplobalfund.org/en/. accessed 10.11.09.
237
Despite such reported benefits, a number of negative effects have also 
been indicated. The first large-scale assessment of the effect of global health 
initiatives on country health systems (conducted by the WHO’s Maximising 
positive synergies group — incorporating scientists from 30 nations and 
representatives of the WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, GAVI, the Global Fund and 
the World Bank) was published in the Lancet in June 2009. An editorial in the 
same journal itemised some of the “troubling harms” documented by this review:
.. .deepening inequalities in health services, reduced quality of 
services because of pressures to meet targets, decreases in 
domestic spending on health, misalignment between GUIs 
[global health initiatives] and country health needs, distraction of 
government officials from their overall responsibilities for 
health, the creation of expensive parallel bureaucracies to 
manage GHIs in countries, the weak accountability of a rapidly 
expanding GHI-funded non-governmental sector, and increased 
burdens on already fragile health workforces (Lancet 
2009a:2083).
Others note similar concerns, including that global health initiatives’ 
emphasis on improving access to treatment sometimes implies inadequate 
attention to whether expanded services are accessed in an equitable manner 
(Hanefeld 2008). More generally, Walt and Buse (2000) have warned that global 
health initiatives may exacerbate inequalities or disadvantage the poor, both 
globally and within countries, in part because they focus their activities on 
countries that offer a reasonable chance of success. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that resources are diverted from routine health services to support 
donation programmes and that scarce personnel are “siphoned o ff’ from other 
healthcare services to better jobs in vertical HIV/AIDS programmes (Yu et al. 
2008). Such effects on personnel no doubt have adverse consequences for 
general health services, including for maternal healthcare, which depends so 
heavily on professional and ‘skilled’ providers. Some authors have even gone so 
far as to argue that decline in African health standards in the maternal and child 
sector, as an index of the general functioning of a health system, is a “direct 
result” of Global Fund policies, such as “the competitive recruitment of its own 
staff and consequent neglect of other services” (Italian Global Health Watch 
(OISG) 2008:44).
Reaching clear-cut conclusions about the effects of global health 
initiatives on health systems is complicated by the relative dearth of systematic
238
empirical research into their effects and the polemical nature of the debate. For 
example, despite presenting mixed evidence, the WHO-led review that claims to 
be the most authoritative assessment of the issue to date concludes on a positive 
note. Its authors argue that with a few adjustments to the way in which global 
health initiatives are run, such initiatives may offer critical opportunities to 
improve “efficiency, equity, value for money, and outcomes in global public 
health” (World Health Organization Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative 
Group 2009:2137). However, critics question the credibility of the review, 
alleging that it is potentially biased because it relies on global health initiatives’ 
own analyses (McCoy 2009). Moreover, it is debatable whether all the effects 
identified as positive in current assessments of the evidence are in fact so. For 
instance, that global health initiatives channel funds to non-govemmental 
stakeholders is not an unequivocal benefit. As anthropologists have documented, 
the “velvet glove” of privatisation associated with the expansion of private and 
NGO healthcare provision in developing countries can indeed improve access to 
care, but can also have other harmful effects, including undermining local control 
of programmes and contributing to growing local social inequality (Pfeiffer 
2004). The widespread assumption that NGOs funded by global health initiatives 
have the legitimacy to represent the interests and priorities of people in the 
countries in which the initiatives work is also contentious (Doyle and Patel 
2008).
Fears about the negative effect of global health initiatives relate not only 
to their impact on health systems and outcomes, but also to the fact that a global 
health ‘architecture’ comprised of many, parallel initiatives means that governance 
for health has become very fragmented. More than a decade ago, health policy 
analysts Buse and Walt (1997) drew attention to the “unruly melange” of 
numerous disease-specific initiatives operating within a competitive global health 
sphere. They also queried the weak representation of recipient countries on the 
governing boards, technical, advisory or grant-giving committees of global health 
initiatives (Walt and Buse 2000). Since then, the influence of state and UN actors 
has gradually ceded to the World Bank, private donors and NGOs (Lancet 
2009a). A main concern for some critics has been that global health initiatives 
undermine the WHO’s role as an inter-governmental, representative organisation 
able to act as an accountable leader for international health action. This concern
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stems from the fact that global health initiatives are largely unaccountable to 
governments or inter-governmental agencies and the fact that they are strongly 
influenced by corporate ‘partnerships’ (Gostin and Mok 2009). According to one 
critique, the consequence of the resulting lack of leadership is that Ministries of 
Health (especially in donor-dependent countries) are forced to operate in a 
“circus of multiple and uncoordinated demands from global institutions, donor 
agencies and international NGOs” (People's Health Movement 2005:20). Others 
worry about the potential of high volume global funds to disrupt the policy and 
planning processes of recipient countries, for instance by distracting 
governments from coordinated efforts to strengthen health systems and by 
introducing “re-verticalisation” of planning, management and monitoring and 
evaluation systems (Oliveira-Cruz 2008:2; Biesma et al. 2009). More generally, 
the work of these initiatives points to a tension between emphasis on local 
ownership, integrated service provision and system development (as has been 
attempted through funding mechanisms such as sector-wide approaches and 
direct budget support), and the pursuit of measurable outcomes, specific 
objectives and short-term efficiency (McPake 2008).
To counter criticism that disease-specific activities may be damaging 
national health systems and producing unsustainable health gains, today’s global 
health initiatives claim that they undertake a range of efforts to specifically 
strengthen health systems. GAVI and the Global Fund, as an example, have 
elaborated specific mechanisms for funding health systems using “cross-cutting” 
solutions (Banati and Moatti 2008). The WHO’s Maximising Positive Synergies 
Collaborative Group — which includes representatives of the major global health 
initiatives -  recommends that health system strengthening should be a higher 
priority for global health initiatives, and, in a statement issued in June 2009, 
promises to implement changes to this effect (Lancet 2009b).
Yet, the notion of “health system strengthening’ remains vague, with 
different global health initiatives operating with divergent underlying 
assumptions about what it actually is, and how it might improve health (Marchal 
et al. 2009). On the basis of a detailed review of the health system strengthening 
strategies published by various global health initiatives, Marchal and his co­
authors (2009) judge that most such strategies are in fact selective, disease- 
specific interventions. They therefore warn that the stated commitment to health
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system strengthening within the existing institutional structures of global health 
initiatives may undermine, rather than accelerate, progress towards the long-term 
goal of producing an effective, high-quality, and equitable health system (ibid)
The debate about the effects of global health initiatives is thus clearly 
polarised, in many ways mirroring the debate about selective and comprehensive 
approaches that permeates the Safe Motherhood Initiative’s history. Further 
research into their effect is needed to inform the future development of global 
health initiatives and to encourage critical reflection on the question of whether 
continued strengthening of such initiatives is indeed a desirable trend. Such 
research needs to adopt a longer-term perspective than has been taken in existing 
studies in order to take on board well-founded concerns not only about the 
immediate effectiveness, but also about the sustainability of disease-specific global 
health initiatives that rely heavily on private finance, especially in times of 
economic turmoil (e.g. Le Loup et al. 2009). Will gains such as improved access 
to antiretrovirals, improved case detection of tuberculosis and coverage of 
insecticide-treated bed-nets be sustained over time?
It is too soon t o  answer these questions, but the experience o f  the Child 
Survival Revolution, as a precursor to contemporary global health initiatives, 
suggests grounds for caution. In the early 1990s, many credited GOBI 
(UNICEF’s intervention package consisting of growth monitoring, oral 
rehydration therapy, breastfeeding, and immunisation) with drastically decreasing 
child mortality in low-income countries. According to UNICEF, the under-5 
mortality ratio fell from 118 per 1000 live births in 1980 to 94 in 1990, and 
immunisation coverage expanded rapidly (UNICEF 2001). Although the 
immediate success of GOBI was remarkable, the gains in immunisation coverage 
were not, in fact, sustained over time. Indeed, in an editorial published in 2007, 
McCoy, Sanders and Kvale (2007*) argued that the subsequent collapse of health 
systems has contributed to many countries suffering reversals or significant 
slowing of child survival gains, noting that in sub-Saharan Africa immunisation 
coverage has stagnated at around 55% since 1990 (see WHO/UNICEF/ World 
Bank 2002). With the ‘new* child survival revolution oriented around the MDGs, 
McCoy and colleagues (2007a) have therefore warned against repeating the 
mistakes of the past of pursuing high immunisation coverage and mortality 
reduction through vertical programmes, without simultaneously building up the
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health systems necessary to sustain high vaccination coverage and health 
improvement. This is a warning that the new global initiatives targeted at MDG 5 
should also take heed of.
9.3. The way ahead?
Given the issues discussed above, the safe motherhood community should be 
cautious about continuing its current emphasis on issue-specific, global-level 
advocacy to establish itself as a more viable competitor for global health 
resources. On the one hand, such strategies seem to be enhancing political 
priority for the issue of safe motherhood, and enabling the reproduction of the 
safe motherhood community as a specialist expert community. On the other 
hand, we may question whether such issue-specific advocacy is the best strategy 
for achieving long-term, sustained progress towards the Initiative’s core goal of 
health system strengthening to ensure women’s access to life-saving care.
The risk of safe motherhood-specific programmes damaging overall 
health systems may be less pronounced than that associated with some of the 
stronger global health initiatives, primarily because safe motherhood 
programmes are unlikely to attract the volume of resources needed to set up 
parallel health systems of the kind associated with donor-driven 11IV/AIDS 
programmes, for instance (Goodbum and Campbell 2001). Safe motherhood 
programmes will therefore by their very definition have to rely to a considerable 
extent on government-run health services, rather than parallel, vertical services 
(ibid). Yet, and perhaps precisely because of this, the safe motherhood field 
might nonetheless question whether its search to establish itself as a competitor 
to other disease-based initiatives ultimately serves to sustain a global health 
architecture that may, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, further 
fragment and weaken existing health systems. Any such further fragmentation 
will likely have repercussions for precisely the kind of integrated, inter-linked 
healthcare that maternal health specialists insist is necessary for maternal 
mortality reduction.
Pursuing an alternative course of action is not straightforward. For one, 
as this thesis has shown there clearly continues to be pressure on the safe 
motherhood community to define alternative health policy responses to the 
unpopular message on health system strengthening. In a recent article, for
242
example, Prata and colleagues (2009:131) urge the safe motherhood community 
to face “the reality” of weak health systems and to identify interventions that 
“require minimal treatment/infrastructure and are not dependent on skilled 
providers.” In a similar vein, donors constantly call for ‘innovative’ approaches 
to solve the problem of maternal mortality, which for the most part implies 
simple solutions that do not depend on a functioning health system. But, as my 
informants frequently insisted, innovation is not what is most urgendy needed to 
improve maternal health. Rather, what is needed is better knowledge and 
experience of overcoming context-specific ‘bottlenecks’ to the scale-up of 
complex health system strategies. The widespread consensus that exists on this 
point within the maternal health community points to the importance of pushing 
this message, while resisting the demand for over-simplified messages that, when 
‘over-marketed’ and ‘oversold’ (Ogden et al. 2003), risk undermining the sort of 
health system strengthening the field is trying to achieve. But how might 
maternal health specialists go about doing this?
A first option is for safe motherhood practitioners to redirect some of 
the energy they are currendy investing in creating ever more campaigns, 
initiatives and funds dedicated to safe motherhood (of the kind are described in 
Chapter 6), towards constructive debates about how to reconfigure current 
institutions and initiatives, so that they are more conducive to overarching health 
system development goals. Practical steps towards this end might include 
renewed efforts to clarify the remit of existing institutions, such as the 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, so that it does not 
undermine, but rather enhances, the credibility of UN institutions and enables 
them to become more representative of low-income country needs. It would 
perhaps be better for the safe motherhood community confront and attempt to 
resolve the competitive tensions inherent in this ‘partnership,’ rather than 
concede to the failure of integration and pursue the creation of new institutions 
that may only contribute to further fragmentation of the global health field.
Furthermore, rather than calling for the dedicated funding mechanisms 
to scale up maternal health-specific interventions alone, safe motherhood 
advocates would do well to push further, along with other global health 
advocates, for a public reassessment of the heavy reliance on disease-specific 
public-private partnerships to disburse international financial assistance to the
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health sector in low-income countries. Maternal health specialists could also 
contribute to the call for further alignment of development assistance, for 
instance by putting their weight behind advocacy for reforming the Global Fund 
so that it addresses not only disease-specific goals, but health improvement and 
system strengthening in a fuller sense (Costello and Osrin 2005; Cometto et al. 
2009).
Through research and advocacy, the field can also help to document the 
way in which activities aimed at health improvement in specific areas may, at the 
national or even sub-national level, impact on cross-cutting issues such as human 
resources for health and infrastructure. Safe motherhood practitioners can 
further help to uncover the way that success as measured in improvement in one 
outcome, such as access to HIV/AIDS services, may mask unintended impacts 
in other areas, such as in access to maternal health services. A case for 
monitoring maternal health outcomes and indicators as part of broader 
assessments of global health efforts can be made once we accept that maternal 
health indicators serve as a “litmus test” for the functioning of the health system 
as a whole (Graham et al. 2004). In addition to documenting negative effects, 
researchers and advocacy specialists can also play a more instrumental role in 
communicating the positive lessons derived from case studies of successes in 
health system strengthening at national or sub-national levels, and thereby help 
to challenge the sense of despondency that prevails because of the seemingly 
intractable difficulty of improving maternal health outcomes. Meanwhile, they 
can also draw attention to context-specific aspects of health improvement (see 
Koblinsky and Kureshy 2009; McPake and Koblinsky 2009).
By communicating constructive lessons from in-depth case studies that 
incorporate epidemiological analyses, maternal health specialists may also help to 
challenge the uncritical acceptance of the present research culture and normative 
ideas about evidence that, as Chapter 7 demonstrated, skew the international 
research agenda away from research to address the challenges of implementing 
and scaling up effective interventions. There is a need for more openness in the 
global health community as a whole about the inadequacies of experimental 
methods for addressing policy-relevant research questions pertaining to complex 
and context-specific health policy change. This includes a need to promote 
greater inclusion of social science and more operational forms of research tied to
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real-life programmatic practice within evaluation frameworks (Napolitano and 
Jones 2006; Bennett et al. 2008; Koblinsky and Kureshy 2009; Manandhar et al.
2009). One way of promoting such change is to investigate, expose and challenge 
donor priorities in research and programming, as McCoy and colleagues (2009) 
have done for the Gates Foundation. By conducting similar analyses, maternal 
health practitioners can help to create more open debate around the limitations 
of a narrowly defined evidence base, which on many levels is reinforcing, if  not 
legitimating, donors’ apparent preference for disease-specific, discrete and 
biomedical interventions whose health impact can easily be documented. At the 
same time, it is important to acknowledge that many academics presently avoid 
taking forward such debates because it is in the interest of their careers not to do 
so. Indeed, researchers will not in reality be in a position to challenge unrealistic 
expectations for scientific certainty and rigour unless they gain more 
independence, including from private donor agencies who are increasingly 
influential in setting the research agenda. Academic institutions as a whole clearly 
need to play an important role in securing such academic independence.
While I have focused here on the way in which the safe motherhood 
community can contribute to addressing some of these factors, it is important to 
acknowledge that bringing about change will require not only collaboration with, 
but also parallel contributions by, other existing coalitions within the global 
health field. Child and neonatal health experts, for instance, also have a 
responsibility to consider the unintended repercussions that may result from the 
disease-specific activities that they in many cases continue to promote, and to 
consider more carefully that the success of global health efforts cannot be 
assessed through improvements in one health outcome alone. I Iealth system 
experts, while often struggling to gain funding and recognition for their own 
work, may be in a good position to help bridge the gap between different issue- 
specific coalitions, given their greater independence from disease-specific 
initiatives. Perhaps more importantly, the actions of issue-specific advocacy 
coalitions will not come to much unless donors, including private donors, and 
international institutions also start to alter their behaviour and deliberately revise 
their fixation on what Freedman and colleagues (2005:998) have termed “short­
term and short-lived successes.”
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Of course, the findings of this thesis confirm that there are important 
social, political and institutional impediments to advancing a health systems 
agenda within research, advocacy and policy development. Underlying 
international, donor-driven political and academic cultural pressures have to date 
largely persuaded maternal health specialists to adhere to current normative 
models of evidence production and programming oriented towards disease- 
specific targets (Béhague and Storeng 2008). Weak health systems, current 
priority-setting mechanisms based on uncritical support for disease ranking and 
cost-effectiveness measures, and uncoordinated and conflicting donor agendas 
all impede the development of coherent policy agendas to align disease-specific 
goals and health system development (Mayhew et al. 2005; Walt 2005).
There is some cause for hope, however. There is presently a certain 
momentum for change and signs that a sort of mid-course correction is under 
way. First, there is growing dissatisfaction with neoliberalism as the ideological 
basis for global health and development. Such dissatisfaction underpins the 
revival of social justice and human rights-based approaches to public health 
(Gruskin et al. 2008; People's Health Movement et al. 2008), as well as the 
reversal of some of the most heavily criticised neoliberal health policies, such as 
user fees for healthcare (Ridde and Diarra 2009). Dissatisfaction with 
neoliberalism has also been accompanied by renewed attention to the social 
determinants of health, as seen with the WHO’s Commission on the Social 
Determinants of Health (2008), and to the role of health in development and 
poverty reduction. Second, health systems are again on the international health 
policy agenda, despite contested interpretations of what is meant by health 
system strengthening (Bloom and Standing 2008; Legge et al. 2009). Positive 
signs of a change in emphasis also include that the World Health Report for 
2005 called for “coherent, integrated and effective health systems” to improve 
maternal and child health (WHO 2005), while the 2008 World Health Report 
strongly encouraged a revival of the comprehensive primary healthcare principles 
elaborated at Alma-Ata 30 years earlier (WHO 2008).
The global health community must seize this momentum to ensure a 
greater place for health system strengthening and attention to social determinants 
of health on the global health policy agenda. Safe motherhood advocates may be 
in a particularly opportune position to take forward this agenda, given the high
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level of consensus within the movement that such factors are essential to achieve 
improved maternal health and survival. As I have shown in this thesis, the 
maternal health field appears to have a relatively high level of critical awareness 
of its own history. While this is in part due to the fact that they are using this 
awareness to help refashion themselves continually in response to external 
pressures, such self-awareness could also be used as a resource to reflect critically 
on how they can resist these pressures and help to revive support for its own, 
original aims.
In order to generate further broad-based support for such a revival of its 
own original vision, however, safe motherhood advocates face not only the 
challenge of creating commitment in donor countries to address a health issue 
that overwhelmingly affects distant strangers. They also face the challenge of 
generating support for policy change whose benefits may be as distant in time 
(because building health systems is not a quick-fix solution) as in geography. 
They also need to persuade the global health community, governments and the 
public that, as one of my informants memorably put it, “the least a health system 
should be able to deliver is a baby.” Messages on the need for health system 
strengthening are clearly difficult to ‘sell’ to donors and governments who are 
impatient for quick-fix and immediate solutions to save lives. Yet, doing so is 
essential because concentrated efforts to improve maternal health in selective 
geographical areas (of the kind that some donor-funded initiatives are currently 
pursuing) or through ‘innovative’ strategies that bypass the health system, are not 
on their own likely to bring about sustained health improvement.
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London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Keppel Street
London WC1E7HT
Tel: +44 (0)20 7927 2209
Fax: +44 (0)20 7927 4314
Email: katerini.storeng@lshtm.ac.uk
What is the overall objective o f  the study?
The objective of this ethnographic research is to examine the history of the safe 
motherhood movement at the global level, including:
Examining historical representations of global safe motherhood research 
and policy developments
Delineating the main actors in the global safe motherhood field and 
charting their diversification over time and changes in the distribution of 
power within their networks
Identifying changes in the relationships between the safe motherhood 
field and other public-health sub-fields, including child health and 
reproductive health
Uncovering the strategies and practices deployed by these actors in 
constructing safe motherhood discourse
Is participation voluntary and can I  withdraw at any time?
Participation is voluntary. You are free to refuse to join this study and may 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. If you choose to participate, you 
may choose not to answer certain questions.
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What will happen to participants?
You will be interviewed about your knowledge and experience of the safe 
motherhood field, including research and policy. You will also be asked give your 
permission for the interview to be recorded
What inconvenience o f  discomfort will this involve?
Participation in the study will require that you take the time to participate in 
interviews and/or focus groups, although this will be limited to no more than 
two or three hours of your time. If you do not feel comfortable answering 
specific questions that arise you can refrain from doing so without having to 
provide any explanation to the interviewer. You are free to terminate your 
participation in the study at any time.
What risks are involved?
There are no specific risks involved in participating in the study.
What will happen i f  something goes wrong?
If, during interviews, you find the questions being posed intrusive we will stop 
the interview. If you are not happy with the interview process or would like to 
make a complaint, please contact the investigator.
Who will be responsiblefor the confidentiality o f  the material and its use and disposal at the 
end o f  the study?
The investigator will have sole and ultimate responsibility for protecting your 
confidentiality in the material and its use. All your contact details will be 
destroyed at the end of the study.
How will data be collected, handled and stored?
Interviews focus groups and informal discussions and will be recorded on audio 
cassettes (if you grant permission) and/or written field notes and interview 
transcripts. All the information obtained during interviews, focus groups or in 
related informal discussions will be treated in confidence, and care will be taken 
so you cannot be identified from details in reports of the study. Your address will
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be kept in strict confidence and your name will not be revealed or associated 
with any written materials. You will be given a unique identification number that 
will be used instead of your name in all records. Your address will not be stored 
with any other information associated with you. Information will be stored 
carefully to prevent anyone not associated with the study from gaining access to 
it.
Should you wish to not be quoted directly or have any personal data 
regarding your background or identity appears in any public reports or analyses 
ensuing from this research, you are free to request that this be the case. In the 
event that direct quotes are used, should the investigator be in doubt as to 
whether your identity can be discerned in any written documentation, you will be 
provided you with the passages in question to check whether you prefer these 
portions to be deleted.
What an  the financial arrangements ofparticipation?
No payment will be made to you if  you choose to participate.
Which ethical committee has approved the study?
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, U.K.
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Consent form
Study title
“The Safe Motherhood Movement: An Historical Ethnography”
Investigator 
Katerini T. Storeng
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Keppel Street
London WC1E 7HT
Tel: +44 (0)20 7927 2209
Fax: +44 (0)20 7927 4314
Email: katerini.storeng@lshtm.ac.uk
Statement o f  consent
I have read the information sheet concerning this study [or have understood the 
verbal explanation] and I understand what will be required of me and what will 
happen to me if I take part in it.
My questions concerning this study have been answered by the investigator.
I understand that at any time I may withdraw from this study without giving a 
reason without any consequence.
Choose one o f  two options (delete as appropriate):
I agree to take part in this study under the conditions of anonymity and 
confidentiality outlined in the attached Information Sheet.
I agree to take part in this study, under the conditions of anonymity and 
confidentiality outlined in the attached Information Sheet, but with the 
additional condition that I not be quoted direcdy and that no personal data about 
me be presented in any analyses.
Signed.....................................................
Date.......................................................
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